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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the extent to which the physical terrain features across Egypt, Libya and 
Tunisia affected British operations throughout the campaign in North Africa during the Second 
World War. The study analyses the terrain from the operational and tactical perspectives and 
argues that the landscape features heavily influenced British planning and operations. These 
should now be considered alongside other standard military factors when studying military 
operations. This thesis differs from previous studies as it considers these additional factors from 
June 1940 until the Axis surrender in May 1943.   
Until now it has been widely assumed that much of the North African coastal sector was a broadly 
flat, open region in which mobile armoured operations were paramount. However this work 
concentrates on the British operations to show they were driven by the need to capture and hold 
key features across each battlefield. At the operational level planning was led by the need to hold 
key ground in Libya and across the province of Cyrenaica during the crucial middle period of the 
campaign. A secondary theme of the thesis argues that British forces began to improvise some 
tactical doctrines, with the initial practice of combined arms altering into Infantry and armour 
fighting separated battles. Other new developments included the practice of unit dispersal to hold 
key ground and to engage the enemy using temporary units known as Jock columns. The two 
themes are inter-linked and contribute fresh insights to the debate on British methods of warfare.  
The methodology has been to consult key primary documents, reports, war diaries and published 
memoirs, from major archives across the UK and compare these with the campaign historiography 
to develop the main arguments. These include the National Archives, the Churchill Archives 
Centre, the Liddell-Hart Centre for Military History, the National Army Museum, John Rylands 
Centre, Imperial War Museum at London and Duxford and London and the Tank Museum Archives 
at Bovington. The sources include unit war diaries, after action reports, along with many of the key 
3 
 
published and some unpublished memoirs. The analysis of these two themes will show that key 
terrain features were a significant influence upon all levels of military planning and operations 
throughout the campaign. 
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Glossary 
1. Local names and terms 
Deirs - Crater-like depressions with raised edges; the edges offered a defensive position and often 
overlooked the surrounding lower ground. Some were over a mile wide and therefore offered 
useful forming up places for vehicles. 
Escarpments - Low limestone ridges, either sharply defined to one side, or broader in width. They 
were stony covered or with a thin layer of gravel/sand which proved difficult to dig into. They 
offered important artillery observation places and from which the surrounding ground could be 
dominated and were therefore the key features over which many of the battles were fought. 
Trighs – Desert tracks, often up to 100 yards wide, which rapidly turned to fine dust or winter mud 
due to the volume of vehicles using them. 
Wadis – ditch or wide river bed, mostly dry but often flooded by winter rains. 
2. Military glossary 
AGRA – Army Group Royal Artillery; a group of Regiments of Artillery, designed to give large 
concentrations of fire where needed. 
Anti-tank gun – weapon designed to engage armour. 
B-echelon – these were the British supply units for each Regiment. They moved constantly 
between the frontline units and the Field Supply Depots. 
Barrage – Massed Artillery fire which targets an enemy position or unit. 
Battalion – Army Infantry unit, usually of four companies and an HQ, averaging 400-700 men. 
Battery – Artillery unit of 4-8 guns, often three to an Artillery Regiment, 250 men each. 
Brigade – Army unit, usually of two to four Battalions or Regiments of Armour. 
CinC – Commander-in-Chief Middle East. Successively held by Generals Wavell, Auchinleck and 
Alexander through the campaign. 
CO – Commanding Officer, usually of a Regiment, Infantry Battalion or Brigade. 
Corps – Army formation, usually off two or more Divisions and attached Brigades. 
COS – Chiefs of Staff. The three Commanders-in-Chief for the Army, RAF and Royal Navy in 
London. They advised on plans and operations with the CinC Middle East. 
Division – tactical Army unit, usually consisting of two or three Brigades, and supporting units of 
Artillery, Engineers, Signals and Supply units. 
Flash-spotting – method of observation of enemy gunfire by Artillery spotters 
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Forward Supply Depots (FSDs) – British supply depots sited in the desert. 
GHQ – General Headquarters, Cairo, for the Middle East Theatre. This developed into numerous 
departments with hundreds of personnel. 
Heavy machine guns – Infantry weapon designed for firepower in defensive positions. 
Jock Columns – formed by Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Campbell in 1940, to utilize his artillery 
batteries more offensively against Axis positions, when holding a front-line position. They usually 
consisted of one battery of Artillery, protected by a company of Infantry, 3 anti-tank-guns and 3 
Bofors AA guns, plus detachments of signals, engineers. A full discussion of their influence on the 
campaign is in Chapter 9. 
LRDG – Long Range Desert Group; formation originally set up by Major Ralph Bagnold for 
reconnaissance and raiding duties behind the lines. It used the deeper Oaises and desert routes to 
traverse to its operations. 
Matilda – British Infantry or ‘I’ tank, slow moving with a 2pdr gun and thick 78mm frontal armour. 
2nd NZ – New Zealand; The 2nd New Zealand Division, or elements of - which became one of the 
leading Dominion formations of Eighth Army, along with the 9th Australian Division. 
Patrolling – doctrine of sending out small units to watch or engage enemy positions 
Recce’d- short or slang for reconnoitred or made a reconnaissance of ground or an enemy 
position. 
Reconnaissance in force – a powerful raid into enemy territory often designed to destroy supply 
dumps or individual positions and gain intelligence intentions. 
Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) – British Artillery Regiment, with three batteries of eight guns. 
RTR - Royal Tank Regiment. British Armoured Regiment consisting of numerous units. Each one – 
1st/ 2nd etc was classed as a ‘battalion’ of the regiment. Each had a three squadron structure, like 
the Cavalry Regiments which had been converted to armour.  
Squadrons – Armoured Unit of 13-17 tanks, or Armoured Cars. RAF unit of 12 aircraft. 
WDAF – ‘Western Desert’ Air Force; The frontline RAF unit in Egypt and Libya, although ‘Western’ 
was hardly used, it was referred to as the Desert Air Force. Other  RAF formations contributed to 
the air support provided throughout the campaign. 
Western Desert Force – WDF, the original British frontline Corps which invaded Libya in 1941. 
British Corps formation which held the frontline in 1940 and became 13th Corps from January 
1941.  
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3. Axis formations and terms 
Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) - the first German units sent to North Africa. The force became a 
Panzergruppe in 1941 and part of Panzerarmee Afrika from January 1942. 
5th Light Division – An early form of Panzer Division with one battalion of tanks and supporting 
arms. This converted to the 21st Panzer Division in 1941. 
90th Light Division  - This unit originated from a mixed group of regiments and became the Zur 
Besonden Verfügung (Special Services) Division during Crusader, before being named 90th Light 
Division from 15 December 1941, see Chapter 6. 
Luftwaffe – German Air Force 
Panzer Division – the three deployed were the 15th, 21st and later the 10th Panzer Divisions. They 
consisted of two battalions of Panzers, each of 60-72 tanks, and supporting Infantry, anti-tank and 
artillery units. 
Panzergruppe – Axis forces designated and Armoured Corps in 1941. 
Panzerarmee – Axis forces designated an Army in January 1942. 
Raggruppamento – Italian Armoured Group in 1940. 
Italian Divisions: Ariete was the Armoured Division, Trieste a Motorised Division and the 
remainder were standard Infantry Divisions. In late 1942 reinforcements included the Folgore 
Parachute and Littorio Armoured Divisions.  
  
 
  
Chapter 1 Introduction and Literature Review 
This study sets out to consider the impact of terrain on British land operations throughout the 
whole campaign in North Africa. Previous studies have described the campaign narrative in terms 
of military factors including command, supply and equipment issues of the British forces. They 
have also considered the importance of the air and sea war in terms of closing the Axis supply 
routes. In most of these studies, the effect of terrain on operations by both sides has always been 
treated as a relatively minor factor. This thesis will consider the effect of terrain at both the 
operational level and the tactical level throughout the British campaign between June 1940 and 
May 1943. It will show that the outcome all of the key battles depended upon the possession of 
essential areas of land. Also, the nature of dispersal of forces throughout the landscape heavily 
influenced improvisation of British tactical doctrine. British methods of fighting evolved through a 
series of stages which will be discussed in relation to the natural landscape. 
At a recent symposium in Birmingham, a formal discussion by leading military historians noted 
that terrain had yet to be fully analysed as a separate topic in relation to army operations during 
the Second World War.1 The relevant primary documents, reports and war diaries clearly show 
that terrain heavily influenced planning, command decisions and tactics during the key battles. 
Units made operational moves to capture and hold high ground or other features in order to gain 
an advantage over the enemy. Commanders made their tactical decisions based on the success or 
failure of gaining these features in battle, as well as the destruction of enemy units. They planned 
subsequent moves based on their ability to hold key ground, alongside the standard military 
factors of remaining unit strength, morale, cohesion and supply of their formations.  
                                                          
1
 Conference: ‘Revisiting Churchill’s Army: New Directions in the Study of the British Army in the Second 
World War’, University of Birmingham, Friday 14 September 2012. Roundtable Discussion: New Directions 
Dr Jonathan Fennell (KCL); Dr Stephen Hart (RMA Sandhurst); Dr John Peaty (DSTL); Prof. Gary Sheffield 
(University of Birmingham). 
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The main battle chapters seek to answer a range of questions which assess how well the Army 
approached each major action and what problems they faced. A key section within each chapter 
considers how far the terrain features impacted on doctrine and what the outcomes were and 
whether the formations involved learnt from the combat experience.   
In North Africa, the British Army faced a range of desert environments; In Egypt the ground across 
the Western Desert was a mixture of soft sand depressions and stony ridges, whilst in Libya the 
main plateau was mostly hard stony ground with occasional ridges from which to create a 
defensive position. Finally when British forces pushed into Tunisia, the relief features became 
much more substantial and required a series of alternative assault doctrines in order to be 
captured. Throughout much of the campaign, British forces had limited manpower and equipment 
until the autumn of 1942 and this affected the offensives being limited in terms of Formations 
committed and the tactics used during operations. The numerous terrain features which Axis 
forces developed into defensive positions meant that the fewer British units were spread even 
more thinly trying to capture them. The final offensives were constantly limited by a lack of 
available Infantry particularly after the heavy losses at Second Alamein.  
In 1940 British units won a series of key battles using a successful doctrine of combined arms in 
both attack and defence, where it inflicted a major defeat of the Italian 10th Army. During the next 
phase of the campaign British doctrine changed sharply with units fighting separated actions 
without support and with new formations such as Jock Columns. These were an improvised tactic 
to hold large areas of ground and to engage the enemy and their use continued through the 
middle phases of the campaign during 1941 and into the late summer of 1942. British doctrine was 
transformed again following the arrival of General Montgomery in the autumn 1942, and this 
contributed heavily to success at Second Alamein. The final phases of the British advances through 
Libya and Tunisia saw doctrine evolve in both attack and defence. The steady improvement 
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enabled British forces to combine both ground and air units again to become a formidable fighting 
force.  
This study aims to contribute to knowledge the effect on British operations by considering the 
impact of terrain as a topic equally alongside other military factors. Therefore it should 
complement other existing studies which have concentrated on specific issues of the Army and its 
performance in North Africa. These leading works have focussed on the British Army at specific 
moments of the campaign and include David Rolf, Niall Barr and Jonathan Fennell.2 This work is 
noticeably different to previous efforts in that it considers the impact of terrain on British 
operations throughout the whole campaign. 
Overview of the campaign 
From 1882 Britain had retained an administrative hold over Egypt, and later used it as a military 
base for numerous campaigns before and during the First World War. After this, Egypt became the 
‘veiled protectorate’ for the next twenty four years, with the Army protecting the vital Suez Canal 
route to India and the Far East.3 The Italian capture of neighbouring Libya from 1932 increased the 
Fascist threat to British-held Egypt and the Middle East which raised the importance of the 
Mediterranean theatre in British defence planning as war approached. Throughout the late 1930s 
Mussolini had dominated recent Mediterranean politics, successfully dividing the British and 
French as they tried to appease him. He viewed the Royal Naval bases at Malta and Gibraltar as 
‘bars’ blocking the Italian fleet from pushing into the Atlantic and the Red Sea. Mussolini 
impatiently awaited the chance to take control of the North African coastline to create his new 
                                                          
2
David Rolf, The Bloody Road To Tunis (London: Greenhill Books, 2001), Niall Barr, Pendulum of War. The 
Three Battles of Alamein (Woodstock: The Overlook Press, 2004), and Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale 
in the North African Campaign. The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
3
 Artemis Cooper, Cairo In The War 1939-1945 (London: Penguin, 1995), pp.11-13. 
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‘Roman Empire.’4 He began his ‘parallel war’ in June 1940, following the French defeat and 
surrender in Europe. It was his chance to defeat Britain and takeover the North African territories 
he had always coveted.5 Unfortunately his armies were defeated in Libya and Egypt which forced 
Hitler to send German forces to hold Libya. Suddenly Britain was faced with a renewed Axis effort 
to regain Libya and Egypt. The pendulum of war would push British forces to expand the campaign 
and bring in Allied troops to finally defeat the Axis Forces by the 13 May 1943.  
For Britain, the North African campaign had initially been one of defending Egypt, with the aim of 
protecting the Suez Canal and the land route to the Middle Eastern oil centres. As Prime Minister, 
Churchill also saw it as a means of defeating Italy first and later diverting Axis forces from other 
fronts. The campaign also provided the British Army with the opportunity to defeat the more 
professional German forces. Therefore victory in North Africa became the focus of British strategy 
which drew in her new ally, the United States, who initially just supplied equipment to British 
forces there but later committed ground and Air forces directly to the campaign.  The new allies 
believed this would weaken the Axis alliance and provide lines of attack on Germany itself through 
southern Europe. 
Research focus and methodology 
This thesis raises a number of questions on how far terrain impacted on British operations and 
seeks to answer these through consulting primary military documents, unit diaries and anecdotal 
evidence from private and published memoirs. Each of the major engagements is considered 
chronologically using terrain as the main focus. The second chapter starts with an overview of the 
landscape of North Africa, focussing on the coastal sector across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Chapters 
3 to 10 provide a detailed analysis of the battles in chronological order with a focus on the impact 
                                                          
4
Reynolds M. Salerno, Vital Crossroads. Mediterranean Origins of the Second World War, 1935-1940 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp.11-13. 
5
Douglas Porch, Hitler’s Mediterranean Gamble. The North African and the Mediterranean Campaigns in 
World War II (London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson, 2004), p.40.  
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of the tactical terrain. The battles have been summarised to avoid revisiting the detailed narratives 
of previous works. A discussion centred on the effects of terrain and doctrine is included to argue 
that the landscape was as important to British success as other standard military factors. For the 
most part the campaign chronology is maintained, with the exception of the retreats from 
Cyrenaica which are considered together as they were so similar and are discussed in terms of the 
defence of the province. The final chapter briefly considers the other military factors which 
influenced the campaign. 
The methodology consulted primary documents from the major archives around the UK and 
compared these with published memoirs and the general historiography to make a fresh analysis 
of the major battles and turning points in the campaign. The primary and secondary materials are 
discussed more fully below, but each archive provided some key documents which contributed to 
the thesis; the National Archives at Kew provided the bulk of the series WO 201 and 169 
documents which covered the campaign. Other Individual papers of personnel or units which 
served in the campaign were found at Churchill College Cambridge, the National Army Museum, 
the Imperial War Museum (IWM) in London and the John Rylands Library in Manchester. The IWM 
Archive at Duxford included some useful translations of operational documents from the Afrika 
Korps, while the Bovington Archives provided key regimental war diaries and battle reports of the 
various British Armoured Regiments involved.  
The primary sources 
The main series of documents consulted were the WO 201 series held at the National Archives. 
Although these cover the North African campaign from a variety of topics, the main focus was to 
extract information specifically relating to commentary on the impact of terrain features either at 
the operational and the tactical level. The most telling folder was WO 201/578 on the Topography 
of Tunisia and showed how far the Eighth Army HQ had developed in calling for a full appraisal of 
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the upcoming terrain by the final stages of the campaign. Earlier reports on either Libya or Egypt 
tended to be much less detailed and part of Intelligence summaries within command files or post 
action reports (e.g. WO 201/2691 Lessons of Cyrenaica).  
Many of the higher level reports on the need to capture supply bases or key airfields were found 
amongst the command and planning folders, (WO 201/156, and WO 201/421), whereas reports 
relating to the impact of terrain at the tactical level came mainly from ‘after-action’ reports 
submitted by Regimental Officers who wanted to pass on their knowledge. These post battle 
summaries were found either in the files referring to individual battle reports, (WO 201/539A) on 
the 150th Brigade Box at Gazala in 1942, or from within Regimental files such as the 1st Worcester’s 
Regiment, (WO 169/5074) from the WO 169 series.  
Most of the unit War Diaries are in the WO 169/series, which give a range of data from weekly 
unit strengths to movement and position information and occasional reports on actions. One 
minor difficulty with this series was to pinpoint when a Regiment was actually involved in the 
campaign because each year has a different file for each Regiment or Brigade. Equally useful are 
the Battle reports, (e.g. WO 201/2692 Gazala report) and the larger unit folders, (e.g. WO 
201/530B Guards Brigade at Agedabia). These provided a lot of tactical detail relating to the key 
features, although there was not one for every action or unit involved. Some reports were just 
listed as Eighth Army Tunisia (WO 201/598) and offered a basic overview of events. 
Other important WO 201 documents include the higher level telegrams between the current CinC 
and London, (WO 201/401) which gave useful detail on their thoughts and plans based on the 
information they held at the time. The third group of this series were those dealing with the arms 
of service topics such as Signals (WO 201/369), which are highly detailed and offer lots of analysis 
on their operations and show how they were influenced by terrain. A final group of folders which 
provided useful supporting evidence were the AIR and Admiralty series, (e.g. ADM 199/414) which 
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note support for Army operations by the fleet. Other RAF support folders are found within the WO 
201 series, (e.g. WO 201/363, RAF during Crusader).  
Other Archives around the UK provided important evidence about the impact of terrain on the 
campaign. The Royal Tank Regiment documents at the Bovington Tank Museum Archives 
contributed numerous after action reports and letters by soldiers who wished to explain what had 
occurred in the actions by their Regiments. The unit War Diaries added in details of movements 
and timings to these reports. Key Regiments here included 3rd RTR, 6th RTR and 44th RTR. It was 
interesting to note that certain months were missing especially those of May-June 1942 when so 
many Regiments were shattered at Gazala. Similar reports were found amongst the papers of 
various commanders and other Officers and men, deposited at the remaining Archives. For 
example, the papers of Tom Corbett at Churchill College Cambridge provided many details on the 
training and planning by 4th Indian Division, which were not found at Kew. Both the Liddle Hart 
Centre and the Imperial War Museum in London had many battle details amongst the papers of 
participants and commanders including Brigadier Ray Briggs from the 1st Armoured Division, while 
the National Army Museum gave Eric Dorman-Smith’s report and maps from June 1942. The 
Duxford Archive (IWM) includes a valuable collection of German documents and some translations 
made by the New Zealand Intelligence HQ of individual Divisions such as the 90th Light Division. 
The John Rylands Archive contains Auchinleck’s papers which were important to his part of the 
campaign, but the process of gaining the data was limited by their internal methods of only 
releasing a few pages at a time. The primary documents therefore provided the bulk of the 
evidence to supports the arguments in this thesis that key landscape features across the North 
African coastal sector impacted upon British operations throughout the campaign. This evidence is 
supported by details from within a range of memoirs, studies and narrative histories which are 
discussed in the Literature review.  
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Literary review 
The importance of terrain in the writing of military history was clearly noted by writers as early as 
Sun Tzu. Although he was referring to early Chinese warfare, he argued that terrain was one of the 
five structural ‘estimations’ for any commander.6 Most of the more recent military studies tend to 
place the importance of the impact of terrain on military operations in a description of the ground, 
or as part of the narrative rather than affecting the outcome.  They continue to emphasize other 
military factors such as the quality of command, training, doctrine and weaponry of the campaign. 
Perhaps one recent exception is that of Christopher Duffy’s work on the campaigns of Frederick 
the Great, which contributes a chapter on the key terrain features and how they affected Prussian 
operations both in Prussian manoeuvres and at the tactical level.7 Most works on modern conflicts 
consider the impact of more usual military factors such as command, intelligence, weapons and 
equipment, leaving the terrain as a background description linked to environment issues.  
Published sources most useful for details about terrain and doctrine 
The published memoirs provide details about the campaign, along with some useful references 
about the impact of tactical ground on combat operations. Other texts give more detail about the 
narrative of battle, tactics, movement, equipment, training and life in general in the desert. Works 
published during the war, such as those by reporters Alan Moorehead and Alexander Clifford, have 
nearness to events untainted by later histories and present an outsiders’ view of the campaign.8 
There are some useful memoirs by soldiers from British Armoured Regiments; two of the most 
important are Cyril Joly’s account of his part in the campaign, whilst equally detailed is Robert 
                                                          
6
 Ralph D. Sawyer, Sun Tzu. Art of War (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994), p.167, describing ground as being, 
‘difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable,’ 
7
 Christopher Duffy, Frederick the Great, A Military Life (London: 
8
 Alan Moorehead, African Trilogy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1946), and Alexander Clifford, Crusader 
(London: George Harrap, 1942). 
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Crisp’s account of 3rd RTR during Operation Crusader. Both are important for noting the use of 
terrain and for details on tactics and operations.9  
Some wartime accounts offer useful examples of tactical doctrine including works such as With 
Pennants Flying, which contains first-hand accounts of Beda Fomm and Tobruk,10 and John 
Verney’s poignant account of a Yeomanry Regiment at Gazala and Alamein.11 They have been 
rarely consulted since publication and can be compared with Keith Douglas’s often quoted 
memoir, which also notes the starched officer characters within Yeomanry Regiments, but also 
covers the tactical battle during Second Alamein and the pursuit to Tunisia.12 Roy Farran served 
with the 3rd Hussars during the pre-war and early campaign and his is an important memoir full of 
tactical detail.13 Rea Leakey discusses his pre-war desert training and some of the early operations 
up to the siege of Tobruk.14 Jake Wardrop’s diary covers 5th Royal Tank’s campaign from the 
soldiers’ perspective.15  
Other arms of service provide some useful details of the tactical battle, desert life within a Jock 
Column in 1941 are covered by both R.L. Crimp and H.J. Griffin along with an unpublished account 
by Gerald Jackson which gives useful detail on tactics and Jock Column operations.16 Dan Billany’s 
The Trap is an excellent wartime account of the 150th Infantry Brigade at Gazala.17 Many Divisional 
histories were written in the immediate post-war era, and used first-hand accounts which 
                                                          
9
 Cyril Joly, Take These Men (London: Constable, 1955), and Robert Crisp, R, Brazen Chariots. An Account of 
tank warfare in the Western Desert, November-December 1941 (London: Frederick Muller, 1959). 
10
 David Masters, With Pennants Flying. The Immortal Deeds of the Royal Armoured Corps (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1943). 
11
 John Verney, Going to the Wars (London: The Reprint Society, 1955). 
12
 Keith Douglas, Alamein To Zem Zem (London: Bantam Books, 1985). 
13
 Roy Farran, Winged Dagger. Adventures on Special Service (London: Cassell, 1999). 
14
 Rea Leakey, Leakey’s Luck, A Tank Commander with Nine Lives (Stroud: Sutton, 1999). 
15
 George Forty (ed.), Tanks Across the Desert. The War Diary of Jake Wardrop (London: William Kimber, 
1981). 
16
 R.L. Crimp, The Diary of a Desert Rat (London: Pan, 1974), and H.J. Griffin, An Eighth Army Odyssey 
(Pentland Press,1997), and Gerald Jackson, A Long Parting (undated, unpublished). 
17
 Dan Billany, The Trap (London: Panther, 1964). 
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provided important details on landscape features and doctrine. The Fiftieth Division history 
provides excellent detail from the battle of Gazala to the end of the campaign.18  
The Tunisian campaign includes wartime memoirs by John D’Arcy Dawson, who argued that the 
First Army units ‘materially’ contributed to the final victory,19 and A.D. Divine.20 John Frost’s 
account of the First Parachute battalion,21 and one of his Engineer officers, Peter Stainforth, both 
relate the tenacious battles for the important high ground.22 The Infantryman’s battle for key 
terrain at Longstop hill is well recorded by John Kenneally.23 Memoirs from HQ personnel include 
Freddie de Guingand, who served under Auchinleck and Montgomery, and contrasted their 
different style of command.24 David Hunt, an Intelligence officer at 13th Corps HQ, is useful for both 
command and Intelligence matters,25 while Bernard Fergusson served as Wavell’s ADC so gives 
useful detail on GHQ in 1941.26 Denis Falvey served with the 64th Medium Artillery Regiment and 
covers the later campaign.27 
Memoirs by Commonwealth soldiers complement those of British soldiers; Howard Kippenburger 
gives an important and detailed account of the campaign fought by the 2nd New Zealand Division 
from Crusader to Tunis, as a battalion commander and later Brigadier.28 The biography of Captain 
Charles Upham VC adds detail on the tactical battles as he served in Kippenburger’s 20th Battalion 
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at First Alamein.29 Brigadier Clifton also provides details of First Alamein and Alam Halfa in which 
he was captured.30 Geoffrey Cox produced an important memoir of his time as Intelligence Officer, 
perhaps the only published account which notes the importance of the terrain features near 
Tobruk before Crusader.31 An Australian Infantryman’s view is provided by Herb Ashby who 
offered a compelling account of his battles at Tobruk and Second Alamein with the Australian 
2/48th battalion.32 The letters of Lieutenant-General George Brink are an important defence of his 
record as commander of the ill-fated 5th South African Brigade during Crusader.33 Kaushik Roy 
offers some key insights into Indian Army commanders brought over by Auchinleck.34 The wartime 
published account entitled The Tiger Kills, offers some useful detail on the impact of terrain and 
complements the official histories of both 4th and 5th Indian Divisions which are full of tactical 
details.35 Many veterans have also written useful histories about specific battles. Michael Carver 
served throughout the campaign as a staff Officer, and has provided detailed histories of three key 
battles. His work on Second Alamein made some discussion of terrain impact but emphasized 
issues about British equipment and command failures.36 The Dilemmas of the Desert War 
defended Ritchie’s leadership at Gazala in May-June 1942.37  
Narrative histories provide structure and often make use of less well known first-hand accounts; 
Barrie Pitt, an Infantry veteran, wrote three detailed volumes highlighting the Infantry role in a 
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campaign supposedly dominated by armoured warfare.38 John Strawson served there as a young 
officer and produced an early one volume history.39 The siege of Tobruk has become a popular 
subject for analysis recently with studies by William Buckingham and Robert Lyman, who both 
argue it was the decisive battle which saved the British desert campaign.40 Frank Harrison showed 
the contribution of the British 70th Division in breaking the siege during Crusader.41 The fight for Bir 
Hacheim was covered by Richard Holmes and is a useful analysis of Free French forces showing the 
diversity of the Eighth Army.42 Peter Bates, a New Zealand veteran captured at First Alamein, 
argues its importance over the more famous victory later that October.43  
The Second battle of Alamein is the most studied battle of the whole campaign. It made 
Montgomery’s reputation and began a new phase in the development of British doctrine for 
future operations. Jon Latimer and Niall Barr have written two of the more detailed recent 
assessments, with Barr defining changes in Eighth Army doctrines in this period.44  Other 
narratives, such as those by John Strawson and Fred Majdalany are useful for some analysis of the 
terrain and for details by veterans who served there.45 Michael Carver’s history includes an 
analysis of alternative plans.46 Richard Doherty’s study adds some valuable analysis of the battle’s 
place in military history, 47 while Richard Holmes argued that the victory was important for the 
army48 while Paddy Griffiths considered the important ‘Snipe Action’ which defined Second 
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Alamein as an example of the changing nature of doctrine and how improved weaponry created 
an ‘empty battlefield’.49  
The immediate aftermath to Second Alamein is less well studied with Exit Rommel detailing the 
tactical battles of the Axis retreat and Tunisian battles.50 The works by Gregory Blaxland, David 
Rolf and Rick Atkinson have confirmed the importance of the Tunisian campaign as a separate 
stage of the campaign and not just a footnote to the Eighth Army’s march towards Tunis. Gregory 
Blaxland defends the First Army’s experiences despite the difficulties faced but David Rolf’s work is 
a more recent reassessment and a detailed operational study and draws similar conclusions.51 
American authors have taken more interest in their own formations and the impact of the Torch 
landings on the campaign, Orr Kelly’s work gives an overview of Torch and the US battles in 
Tunisia.52 Dominic Graham combined his own experiences with a history of the campaign.53  
Historians such as Robin Neillands used numerous interviews with veterans and letters for his 
works on the Eighth Army and 7th Armoured Division.54 Richard Doherty’s works on the Eighth 
Army and the 51st Highland Division are patriotic, but offer useful primary sources.55 His later work 
on the Royal Artillery is based much more on primary sources and compliments the official 
Artillery history.56 The Regimental history of the South Notts Hussars used many first-hand 
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accounts for Tobruk and Gazala.57 The final battles of the Eighth Army have been less well covered. 
Barry Barnes used many veteran accounts on the battle for the Wadi Akirit (6 April 1943), but his 
account is rather disjointed. Ken Ford has recently written a series of brief battle histories which 
include Crusader, Gazala, Second Alamein and Mareth (March 1943).58 David Fraser wrote a 
Divisional level history of the British Army which offered a general officer’s view on British 
Divisional effectiveness during the campaign.59  
Journal articles about the impact of the terrain appeared either during the war or in the post-war 
period. They include an early analysis of Libya which was published by the Royal Geographical 
Society in 1940 and should have been of great interest to British forces in North Africa.60 There 
were some later discussions by members of the LRDG on their role in the desert in 1945, which 
related more to the deeper Sand Seas than the coastal sector.61 Articles relating to doctrine 
include a brief study about Wavell’s first Offensive in Libya from 1956 while John Buckley’s more 
recent study noted that British Armoured doctrine tried to adapt to changes to combat better Axis 
equipment and doctrine62 while other factors included the Air Battle for Malta and the importance 
of US aid to Britain in 1940.63 Brad W. Gladman’s recent study on how far Intelligence aided the 
improvement of RAF doctrine in the Western Desert is useful and a precursor to his later book.64 
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These few articles represent the majority of past journal studies on the campaign, however there 
is a great deal of forthcoming new research on the British and Indian Army which should redress 
the balance.65  
Studies on other factors 
There are works which cover the various other military factors which also contributed to the 
performance of British forces in the campaign. These are discussed here to coincide with the final 
chapter which offers some key examples where these factors directly influenced the campaign. 
The reasons for the British presence in Egypt and her Mediterranean strategy are assessed by 
Steven Morewood.66 Studies on the British Army provide useful insights into doctrine and training 
and include David French’s work which notes the development of command and control.67 Harris 
and Toase make a useful assessment of problems in the development of armoured doctrine.68 
whilst Azar Gat’s revisionist work argues that military thinkers like Liddell Hart was actually a 
strong influence on German thinking and contributed to the development of Axis doctrine while 
British doctrine was struggling for clarity.69 David Fletcher argued that poor pre-war British tank 
manufacture contributed to the poor performance of British Armoured Divisions in combat and 
led to poor quality of armoured vehicles being sent to the desert.70 
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Bidwell & Graham offer an Artillery perspective on operations and offer some controversial 
arguments about the effectiveness of certain British Commanders.71 The fictionalized accounts 
written by veterans often doctrinal details and talk of other factors include George Greenfield’s 
Desert Episode which recounted a typical Infantry attack at Second Alamein, based on his own 
experiences. His later memoir is a useful comparison of this earlier novel,72 and Men of Alamein 
described the signallers work in the same battle.73 Joan Beaumont details the operations of the 
Australian Divisions which were used at the beginning of the campaign and later at Alamein.74 The 
Prime Minister directly influenced the campaign at key times and his wartime career has been 
closely scrutinized by numerous studies, the latest of which is by Carlo d’Este.75 The strategic move 
to support Greece vitally altered the North African campaign in 1941 and Churchill’s role in this 
decision has been analysed in Sheila Lawlor’s work.76 His influence on successive commanders is 
best covered by their individual biographies, including John Connell’s hagiography of Auchinleck 
and Victoria Schofield’s more balanced account of Wavell.77 
The most detailed study on the impact of airpower during the campaign is by B.W. Gladman, 
although he overstates his argument that the Allied Air-forces were the, ‘single greatest factor’ for 
victory, an argument which this study will refute.78 Tedder’s own biography gives his biased view 
on Army operations while a typical air battle account is given by Humphrey Wynn who used the 
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diaries of two pilots to recount the air battles at First Alamein.79 A.J. Levine has made an important 
study of the development and effectiveness of the Allied Air Forces which deployed in Tunisia and 
enabled air superiority to complete the final defeat of Axis forces.80 Perhaps the most important 
primary study of the Axis forces during the campaign is that by Martin Kitchen which shows the 
other side of each battle.81 Other useful works include James Lucas’s study of Afrika Korps 
veterans along with the memoirs by F.W. von Mellenthin and Heinz W. Schmidt, which give 
valuable details of Axis planning and doctrine.82 The impact of Malta and the Royal Navy on the 
campaign has been extensively covered in major studies and narrative histories. These include 
both naval and air aspects such as Tony Spooner’s Supreme Gallantry about the impact of Malta 
on the Mediterranean campaign and James Holland’s detailed study about the defence of the 
island.83 
Conclusion 
This thesis will argue that during the North African campaign from 1940-1943, British operations 
were influenced by the impact of the key terrain features both at the operational and at the 
tactical level. Secondly, it contends that these impacts should be considered alongside other 
standard military factors, as they had such a major influence of the outcome of each battle, 
especially in relation to the Army’s use of improvised doctrine, which developed slowly 
throughout the campaign. The research uses a range of primary documents including command 
papers, intelligence summaries, battle reports and unit War Diaries, along with numerous personal 
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accounts to prove how far the key landscape features was important. The thesis has also 
consulted a large range of the published historiography. These works provide details of individual 
units and their battles which contributed to the debate on tactics or on other factors, but which 
rarely mentioned the impact of terrain beyond a descriptive passage. They remain firmly focussed 
on the impact of other military factors contributing more to the outcome of the campaign. 
  
Chapter 2 Terrain 
The campaign was mainly fought along the North African coastline, from El Alamein in Egypt, 
through Libya and ending at the Tunis-Bizerte bay. This chapter is an assessment of both the 
geography of the coastal sector from a strategic perspective and an analysis of each of the major 
areas of ground from a tactical level. British operations along the coastal sector were influenced 
by the strategic impact which affected vital supply issues and included possession of several 
airfields in Cyrenaica. These will be discussed, along with an evaluation of how far the areas of 
tactical terrain influenced each of the key battles.  
The geography of the various coastal ports played a significant role in the development of British 
strategy. The need to supply the Army across North Africa was affected by the position and 
distances of the key ports and was a priority for GHQ. It believed that the coastal terrain was 
considered to be, ‘well suited to mechanized movement and…strategically there was great scope 
for offensive manoeuvre.’1 There was also an additional requirement to protect the sea convoy 
routes to Malta. These issues focussed British planners’ attention on the importance of capturing 
the few ports along the coast.  They also realised the need to capture and hold the coastal airfields 
which were positioned near the main ports and stretched north around the Cyrenaican peninsula.  
This study is the first to make a full assessment of the ground conditions throughout the entire 
campaign. In comparison, other studies only offer a brief description of the terrain. They define its 
parameters and combine it with the well documented problems faced by troops living in desert 
conditions; climate, disease and survival in such a difficult arena. The desert environment 
demanded coastal supply bases which made the few available ports into important operational 
and strategic targets. Certain histories describe battlefields such as El Alamein, but the narrative 
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always returns to the impact of other military factors. The theory of the pendulum effect of war on 
armies is discussed more fully by Niall Barr. Briefly this argues that the effectiveness of an Army 
declines the further it moves away from its main supply base and into enemy territory. However it 
could be argued that for British operations each objective area they hoped to advance into created 
a ‘mini-pendulum’ effect for the Army. In 1940, British forces were only expected to get beyond 
the Libyan frontier or at least only to Tobruk. In 1941 for Crusader, the main objectives included 
Tobruk and the western airfields, whilst in 1942 the planned advance from the Gazala line was 
only planned to reach to Benghazi. Finally in 1943, the advance into Tunisia was only made when 
Libya was secure.  
Egypt: strategic perspective 
Egypt was an obvious communications hub from which to mobilize Divisions from the Empire. In 
the rear British supply routes were directed towards Port Said at the northern end of the Suez 
Canal, whilst Port Suez on the Red Sea was the safest supply base. The outbreak of war with Italy 
forced most British convoys to use the safer but longer route travelling 12,000 miles around the 
Cape of Good Hope to Port Suez. Alexandria was the main British naval base and became a target 
for Axis air attacks. From Alexandria there were numerous road and rail networks linked to 
military bases near Cairo and to the oil terminal at Haifa in Palestine. The coastal sector of Egypt 
was divided into a more fertile river delta in the east, surrounding the Suez Canal and River Nile, 
and the Western Desert stretching to the Libyan border. There were numerous British military and 
supply bases, along with rail and road links between Cairo and Alexandria and east to Palestine. In 
the west, the Egyptian Western Desert stretched for up to fifty miles inland to the Great Sand 
Seas, although only reconnaissance units operated in the deeper desert areas.  
31 
 
 
Figure 2:1 Egypt and the Libyan frontier.
2
 
One of the main transport issues facing British forces was the single metalled road which ran for 
400 miles from Alexandria to Sollum on the Libyan frontier. Military doctrine recommended that a 
major supply base was needed at least every 200 miles so the forward British base was sited at 
Mersa-Matruh, where the road and single railway ended in 1940. The distance from the Nile Delta 
limited the size and number of units which could be maintained along the frontier, which was 140 
miles beyond Mersa Matruh. British forces ideally needed another forward base nearer the 
border. This, of course, would be vulnerable to enemy action as the Italian base at Bardia was just 
across the Libyan border.  The single coast road and rail-track carried all supplies and units forward 
to Mersa Matruh.  
The railway had been hurriedly completed and even by late 1940 it was rapidly becoming an 
overworked supply route leading to an over-crowded railhead which was hemmed in too near the 
coast by the closeness of the escarpment. This natural feature meant there was no land available 
to increase the supplies capacity. A new railhead had to be built at Quesaba, fifteen miles in the 
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rear, which increased overall journey time to the front.3 Further railheads were developed in 1941 
and the railway was extended forward to Mischiefa near the frontier for Operation Crusader.4 
British operations were hampered throughout 1941 because of the strategic distances from its 
main bases in the delta to the frontlines. The railway was extended to Belhamed near Tobruk in 
early 1942 and became a joint supply base for Eighth Army. It was captured and used with limited 
success by the Axis, running supplies back into Egypt, though the track and trains were vulnerable 
to constant RAF attacks. 
Libya: strategic perspective 
The border with Libya was an important sector for both sides and became a tactical battlefield 
during the campaign. Strategically, the eastern province of Cyrenaica was the central arena of the 
campaign during much of 1941 and 1942 and consequently became the focus of British planners. 
The problems with defending the province are discussed in Chapter 4 and the impact of the scale 
of the province remained the biggest issue for British operations. The major port in Libya was 
Tripoli, which was the main Axis supply base until 1943. Benghazi and Tobruk were major port 
bases in Cyrenaica, and both repeatedly changed hands throughout the campaign. Bardia was a 
small port, a few miles inside the Libyan border, which was used as an intermediary base to 
prevent overstretching supply lines to Tobruk 80 miles in the rear. 
Tobruk was a deep water port delivering an average of 20,000 tons of supplies per month.5 It 
became an operational target for both sides because of its position and the location of airfields 
nearby. The Italians had built major air bases outside the perimeter defences at El Adem, Gambut 
and Sidi-Rezegh. This group of airfield facilities became important to cover the airspace over Egypt 
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and the sea routes to Malta. West of Tobruk the Djebel Akhdar hills formed the strategic high 
ground of the Cyrenaican Peninsula. Amongst the hills was the small port of Derna. The town had 
a deep wadi on its eastern side which offered, ‘a naturally strong position if…not encircled via 
MECHILI,’ and was one of the best sites for defence in the hills.6 These hills provided numerous 
strong defensive positions which could block the coast road but the entire Djebel region was 
outflanked by difficult but still passable desert routes to the south. The north-western coast of 
Cyrenaica was strategically important due to the air bases sited there. These included Martuba 
near Derna and Benini at Benghazi, from which aircraft could target the sea routes to Malta and 
Tripoli.  
 
Figure 2:2 Egypt and Cyrenaica.
7
 
Benghazi was over 400 miles from Tripoli and 170 beyond Tobruk. It became a forward Axis port, 
delivering an average of 30,000 tons of supplies per month. British forces captured it twice, first 
after Beda Fomm in January 1941 and later after Operation Crusader in December 1941.8 
However, they only held it for two short periods, (February-March 1941 and December-January 
1942), and on both occasions the supply base was limited because Axis air attacks from Tripoli and 
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Sicily denied its full use. Later, when under Axis control, the RAF made it a priority target and 
effectively reduced its supply capacity for the German forces. 
Despite having the two main ports in the centre of the campaign arena, Cyrenaica remained 
logistically weak for British supplies because the ports and coast road were vulnerable to air 
attack. A more direct inland route to Tobruk ran south of the Djebel hills, then east-west across 
desert Trighs (trackways), via the colonial forts of Mechili and Msus. The Trighs re-joined the coast 
road west to Benghazi or south-west to Mersa-Brega. Here the coastline turns north-west at the 
Gulf of Sirte and continues another 435 miles to Tripoli. This sector of coastal area had few 
defensive sites for the Axis and those that were useful could be outflanked by British units moving 
inland. The Axis retreat did not halt for a variety of reasons, until it reached the Mareth line in 
southern Tunisia. This was the first major defensive site and was based on an old French defensive 
line built to keep Italian forces from invading Tunisia, it was developed by Axis engineers to hold 
Eighth Army in early 1943. 
 
Figure 2:3 Tripolitania.
9
 
The western province of Tripolitania was important to British forces in the later stages of the 
campaign, as they advanced towards Tunisia. It contained Tripoli which was the major port in this 
sector and any advance into Tunisia, needed the port to be captured. The Eighth Army 
Commander General Montgomery remained cautious as he pursued the Panzerarmee, because he 
was short of troops and the Axis forces could always riposte as they had done in previous years.  
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Tunisia: strategic perspective 
Tunisia became the battleground for the final six months of the campaign in 1943. Eighth Army HQ 
was now fully aware of the need to obtain the best analysis of the local terrain through which it 
would have to advance to reach Tunis. One major intelligence report focussed on an in-depth 
analysis of the approachable routes north and of all features of the ground which would affect 
operations. It was complete with tables of good and poor ‘going’ for vehicles, route reports, 
distances and key hill features.10 This developed from regular updates issued in weekly Intelligence 
summaries, and was recognition by Army HQ of the need for accurate information about the 
landscape on which to make operational plans.  
The final advance by the Eighth Army required the capture of ports along the eastern Tunisian 
coastline for supply, including Sousse and Sfax. In the west the Torch landings in Algeria and 
Morocco brought fresh Allied ground forces heading for Tunis. Their routes led through northern 
Tunisia and they were held up for six months by the failure to capture two prominent hill features.  
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Figure 2:4 Tunisia.
11
 
The eastern edges of the Atlas Mountains cut across the country from south west to north east, 
which meant the roads from Algiers passed through many gorges and tunnels which were easily 
blocked.12 Further south, the Medjez valley provided a more direct route for the First Army down 
onto the plains near Tunis.  However these hills were also dominated by some key heights on 
either side of the valley and Axis forces delayed the Allies here too for six months.13 South of the 
Medjerda valley is the high Dorsale region, a mixture of steep hills and narrow passes. This rugged 
terrain influenced the winter battles and prevented both sides from gaining a major advantage in 
their February offensives. This blocking of the First Army’s advance meant that the operational 
initiative was back with the Eighth Army which was coming up from southern Tunisia.   
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Egypt: tactical features at the El Alamein position. 
The following tactical level analysis of each battlefield is described following a geographical order 
rather than chronological one from El Alamein to Tunis. To the west of the Nile delta, the Western 
Desert stretched for forty miles inland from the coast before reaching the Qattara Depression 
which is an area of impassable salt marsh. South of this is the Great Sand Sea, another impassable 
region with huge sand dunes reaching all the way into Libya. Consequently, mechanized 
operations were confined to the coastal sector due to the nature of the ground surface.  
The first defensive position to have a major impact on the key battles was sited sixty miles west of 
Alexandria near the railway halt at El Alamein. This sector of the tactical ground has been 
described in numerous accounts of Second Alamein, with analysis ranging from a brief 
commentary to the more analytical comments by Niall Barr. The features which influenced the 
three battles of Alamein were a series of low limestone ridges and deirs (depressions). Each was a 
few miles long and became more prominent in height further south near the Qattara Depression. 
The ridges ran broadly in parallel with the coastline, from south-east to north-east, and the low 
valleys on either side of them became traversable passing routes for motorised units. Directly on 
the coast was the Tel el Eissa feature traversed by the coast road which overlooked the Alamein 
railway halt. Its capture became a vital pre-requisite of the successful armoured break-out during 
both Alamein battles because it dominated the surrounding ground.14 Immediately south of here 
the ground gradually climbed to the higher Miteiriya ridge which had a long south-westerly slope. 
The capture of this ridge became the main objective during Operation Lightfoot in October 1942 as 
it dominated the ground to the west and overlooked Axis positions.  
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Other areas of tactical importance at El Alamein include the low, hummocky ground near Kidney 
Ridge which was covered by scrub bushes and soft sand and lay to the west of the Miteiriya ridge. 
Paddy Griffiths noted that this low ground provided good cover for low profile well dug-in anti-
tank weapons, and was therefore as defensively important as the higher ridges.15 South of 
Miteiriya ridge was a further area of low ground flanked by two deirs. These had high-rimmed 
perimeters which gave useful observation points similar to a ridgeline. Infantry Lieutenant George 
Greenfield noted that observation from these was, ‘everything’ in the desert’.16 The Deir-el-Shein 
depression protected Ruweisat ridge from the north-west and the larger El-Mrier depression 
extended west and across its southern edge. Both of these areas needed to be captured in order 
to advance onto the central Ruweisat ridge.   
The central sector of the battlefield was dominated by the narrow Ruweisat ridge which ran east-
west for 15 miles. It became a forward position for both sides at times, and as with any prominent 
position, defending troops were exposed to enemy fire from three sides. The limestone rock made 
digging-in nearly impossible and required pneumatic drilling equipment or explosives to make an 
effective defensive site. This was a re-occurring problem for the units which captured the ridge. A 
feature named Stuka Wadi overlooked the low ground south of Ruweisat before rising to the 
smaller Alam Nayil ridge. East of Alam Nayil was Bare ridge which ran north-easterly and 
developed into the much higher Alam Halfa ridge. This line of southerly ridges dominated the 
traversable desert and provided the Axis a route of advance to their objective at Alam Halfa in 
August 1942. Overall the forty mile stretch of inter-connected low ridges and deirs was the best 
available defensive position from which British forces protected their delta bases, and dominated 
the fighting from July to October 1942.  
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Egypt: tactical features in the Western Desert 
Beyond Alamein the traversable desert for vehicles widened as the Qattara Depression dropped 
away to the south, leaving an inland high plateau. This was divided by an escarpment which 
averaged 500 feet in height and had only a small number of routes traversing down to the next 
level. The passable ground below it ran along an east-west axis and alternated between slower 
going soft sand and faster hard gravel areas. The central plateau below the escarpment reached to 
within ten miles of the coast where another escarpment dropped the land level to the coastal 
plain. In 1940, the Italian 10th Army used numerous higher features in the coastal area to create a 
series of defensive camps from which they attempted to delay a British advance. Their weakness 
however, was that the areas of good going enabled motorised units to by-pass the camps 
altogether.  
The forward base at Mersa Matruh was situated 182 miles from Alexandria and was the advance 
post for British forces. It was only protected by weak minefields but British commanders 
considered it to be a fortress similar to Tobruk. The main weakness of the base as a defensive 
position was that it was easily by-passed along the higher plateau, as shown by Axis forces in late 
June 1942.17 However, it was a useful supply base and was used as the headquarters by the 
Western Desert Force. Eighty miles beyond Matruh along the coast was Sidi Barrani.  Here the old 
colonial fort and adjacent inland escarpments provided tactical features which needed to be 
captured before forces could move further west.  
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The Libyan border: tactical features 
This sector was dominated by a landscape which could be used defensively by the Axis and easily 
halt British mobile operations. The main feature was the high coastal escarpment, a shelf of land 
which curved inland and divided the desert into two sectors. At the border near Sollum Bay, this 
ridge became a cliff with unrivalled views toward the east and over the coastal strip of land below. 
East of Sollum the coast road climbed sharply up the cliff face at the Halfaya Pass with a series of 
hair-pin bends. Axis troops showed that this route could be effectively defended if attacked from 
below. The top of the Halfaya pass was an equally good defensive site due to the lack of cover for 
approaching forces from across the plateau.  
 
Figure 2:5 The Egyptian frontier sector.
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The desert plateau above the cliff was dominated by a series of low hills and small ridges which 
extended inland for twenty miles. These were noted as important features by British planners in 
1940, and were developed by the Axis into a series of interlocking defensive positions in May 
1941.19 The Italian base at Fort Capuzzo was positioned on one of these high features and 
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dominated the border and coast road. Other key heights included Pt 206 and 208, and further 
inland was the Hafid ridge feature which consisted of three separate ridges. This group of Axis held 
positions became the British objectives for both Operations Brevity and Battleaxe in the summer 
of 1941. In the autumn of 1941 the Eighth Army avoided them by a 50 mile detour inland into 
Libya for Operation Crusader. The border south from Capuzzo was marked by a thick barbed wire 
fence erected by the Italians to prevent the local Senussi tribes moving into Egypt. It was a deep 
array of up to five layers of wire, which stretched passed the Omar position to Fort Maddalena 
fifty miles inland. This was the southern-most point where large mechanized forces crossed the 
border. The Omars were developed into one of the strongest defensive Axis positions along the 
frontier in 1941.  
Cyrenaica: tactical features 
The importance of tactical terrain in Cyrenaica increased as the campaign progressed. In 1942 the 
Eighth Army HQ began requesting more details from Intelligence reports for data on relief and the 
vehicle going across different types of ground.20 The small port of Bardia was the first key 
objective for British forces advancing into Cyrenaica. The base perimeter defences were situated 
on the plateau above the cliffs, but they were overlooked by ridges outside the perimeter and 
divided by a ridge of high ground inside the base. Beyond the frontier, much of the traversable 
landscape consisted of a hard gravel plateau, with three escarpments running west to the Djebel 
Akhdar hills. 
The next main port along the coast was Tobruk which was situated eighty miles west of Bardia. 
The perimeter defences here included two lines of concrete pill-boxes, barbed wire and trenches 
each protected by minefields and a deep anti-tank ditch. The higher ridges inside the perimeter 
created additional defence lines for observation and artillery batteries, making it a formidable 
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fortress.21 The weakest point of the perimeter was in the low ground to the south-east, which was 
overlooked by a high ridge.22 The three escarpments south of the port combined to make a 
complex series of defensive positions which overlooked the Axis by-pass road and Sidi Rezegh 
Airfield. It was this area which became the focus of British operations during Operation Crusader. 
The quadrangle of high ground to its north and west dominated the whole area in that sector.  
The western coast of Cyrenaica contained stretches of very poor going with soft sand, which 
slowed travel and hindered navigation. The inland area south-east of the Djebel hills was a mixture 
of hard gravelled plateau, deep wadis and larger rocks which slowed movement. The plateau 
offered a broader stretch of passable going and was crossed by numerous tracks running east-
west or north, which provided routes for vehicles and aided navigation. However these were soon 
ruined by the passage of hundreds of vehicles which ground the surface to a fine dust which 
clogged air filters and engines. Vehicles parts rapidly wore out which made movement here 
difficult, but both sides used this shorter route to gain an operational advantage over each other.23 
The Via Balbia continued down from the Djebel hills to Cyrenaica’s second major port of Benghazi. 
This was surrounded by a low plain to south, and was bordered in the east by a ridge which was 
thought to be a good defensive line. However, it proved inadequate after the first Axis advance in 
March-April 1941, with GHQ noting that it was, ‘indefensible from a military point of view.’24  
Beda Fomm to Tripoli 
The coastal plain south of Benghazi provided navigation points and landing grounds to hold this 
large expanse of desert and included the small settlement of Mersa Brega, with its important coast 
road and track junction. The coast road crossed over low hills and was often bordered by soft sand 
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dunes which were impassable, especially in wet weather. These features restricted the Italian 
retreat in February 1941 and contributed to their defeat at Beda Fomm. South of Mersa Brega, the 
good vehicle going was narrowed to a few miles by the deep wadi Feragh and some appallingly 
bad hummocky ground. British forces twice attempted to make into a viable defensive position in 
this area and failed because of a combination of the bad terrain and poor doctrine. Further west 
the El Agheila colonial fort was a much more effective position. The passable terrain was blocked 
inland by wide salt marshes and was overlooked by high features to the west. This marked the 
high point of British advances until the pursuit of December 1942, when the defeated 
Panzerarmee only used it as a delaying place en-route to Tunisia. 
The province of Tripolitania had a more broken physical terrain along the coast road sector. It was 
good defensive ground with numerous deep wadis, and high land mixed in with barrier dunes, 
ridges and marshy lagoons. It provided some of the strongest defensive positions during the Axis 
retreat of January 1943. Near Tripoli, a line of hills gave the Axis a chance for a more lengthy 
defence but they retreated again by the 23 January, although they had succeeded in dramatically 
slowing the Eighth Army’s advance to the Tunisian border which added to its supply problems. Axis 
commanders decided to make a proper defensive site using the old French Mareth Line in 
Southern Tunisia, rather than trying to hold the British in Libya.  
Tunisia: tactical impact 
The need to overcome the terrain became part of the planning process to defeat the Axis 
bridgehead which now surrounded the ports of Tunis-Bizerte and defended approaches to these 
from the hills inland. Their air forces operated from all-weather airfields on the plains south of 
Tunis countering Allied air superiority for a while. Eighth Army’s approach crossed the undulating 
desert which was divided by the Djebel Dahar hills running parallel to the coast. To the west was 
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the Great Erg region which had difficult going near to the hills and deep sand dunes further west.25 
Therefore it was forced to remain on the eastern side of the Djebel to manoeuvre and maintain 
supplies more easily.  
South of the Dorsale were large salt lakes called the Chotts which narrowed movement 
northwards to a fifteen mile wide gap from the marshes to the sea. Here the Wadi Akirit and the 
high ground behind it provided one of the strongest defensive positions on the coast for the Axis 
to defend.26Eighth Army quickly appreciated the problems here, ‘the easiest way to take the 
MARETH line is in the rear and that if ROMMEL’S forces are to [retreat]…the GABES gap must be 
closed.’27 This was one of the few positions which could not be outflanked, except by strategic 
movement of forces into the Dorsale uplands, such as an advance by the U.S. 2ndCorps. Southeast 
of the Chotts undulating dunes were interspersed by extensive wadis which became heavily 
waterlogged in winter/spring dominated.  
At Mareth French engineers had built a defensive line of concrete positions from the hills and 
behind two coastal wadis. By 1943, Axis engineers had created new battalion sized defences and 
numerous heavy anti-tank positions specifically to delay Eighth Army’s advance. Its only weakness 
was a gap in the hills at the Djebel Tebaga, which led behind the Mareth line. It was 
reconnaissance by the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) who discovered a route which led to the 
New Zealand Corps level move which outflanked the Axis. The Mareth line artificially strengthened 
a wide coastal wadi and its defence was aided by the wet spring weather which waterlogged the 
low area.  
North of this the Gabes gap was divided by the Wadi Akirit and this was overlooked by a series of 
high hill features which combined to make the sector one of the strongest defensive positions in 
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the region but Axis did not have time to make it impregnable. Enfidaville provided an even higher 
range of hills which effectively blocked further direct advance by Eighth Army. The upland nature 
of Tunisia led to a change in the style of operations, giving the Allies a taste of what they might 
face in southern Europe; and it required strategic co-ordination by First and Eighth Armies to 
overcome this difficult ground. 
The geography of North Africa influenced British operations for much of the campaign. The four 
hundred miles from the Delta bases to the frontier affected operations in 1940 and 1941, while 
the scale of Cyrenaica became the overriding problem for British forces over two years. This was 
partly driven by the need to secure the western airfields needed for the protection of Naval 
convoys to Malta, but also to deny Benghazi and Tobruk from the Axis. The final advance into 
Tunisia was affected by the location of the more dramatic relief features which delayed or blocked 
the final advance to Tunis-Bizerte. The vital ports of Benghazi and Tobruk remained vulnerable to 
Axis air attack from Sicily, Tripolitania and Crete, which undermined their operational capacity.  
At the tactical level features of high ground dominated the landscape and often made the best 
defensive positions. Operations show the need to take and hold this high ground for observation. 
Other features such as the higher edges of deirs or low hummocky ground provided effective 
deployment positions for anti-tank and Infantry formations and took on an increased tactical 
importance as they dominated surrounding areas. Tripolitania had more undulating features along 
the coast which were useful delaying positions but the open desert flank undermined these. 
Tunisia provided more European relief features which presented British forces with fresh problems 
of assault doctrine.  
  
Chapter 3 Operation Compass to Beda Fomm, December 1940-
February 1941. 
This chapter details the first British campaign against the Italian 10th Army and the subsequent 
capture of Cyrenaica, and highlights the way in which tactical terrain contributed to British 
successes in each of the main battles. It shows that British assault doctrines at this time were 
successful and describes how two final defensive actions were aided by the terrain. Other factors 
which also contributed to British success have been noted by historians including Jon Latimer, 
George Forty and Barrie Pitt and include military factors such as good planning, better equipment, 
training, and higher morale.1 However, most commentators only offer vague references to the 
importance of the terrain and ignore the tactical impact shown here. The more obvious 
operational level impact of the shorter desert route via Msus cutting the coast road south of 
Benghazi is noted, but again the weight of discussion mostly relates to supply issues.  Whilst this 
contributed to the rapid British advance across Cyrenaica, it was clearly the decisive impact of the 
tactical terrain which contributed to British successes in each of the main battles which should be 
considered alongside these other military issues. 
The Campaign: Opening phases  
Following the outbreak of war in June, British forces defended the Egyptian frontier by carrying 
out small scale patrols and harassing actions. The commander of Western Desert Force, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor, initially used the 7th Armoured Division to hold the front 
by maintaining offensive patrols and with attacks on isolated enemy positions. By mid-September, 
Mussolini pressured Marshal Graziani to order an advance by the 10th Army, which duly entered 
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Egypt and reached Sidi Barrani, sixty miles beyond the frontier. Here it halted and built a series of 
defensive camps awaiting improvements to the coast road and fresh supplies. British forces began 
operations with improvised tactics including aggressive patrolling and made best use of the terrain 
to delaying the Italian advance.2  
By late October Italy had invaded Greece, and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) wanted Wavell to send air 
and ground reinforcements to support the Greek campaign.3 Wavell ordered O’Connor to plan a 
short counter-offensive against the Italians with further exploitation to capture the Libyan frontier 
sector and attacking the forward Italian base at Tobruk. Units were also needed for other active 
Middle East campaigns.4 Supply was an issue because maintaining two divisions in the desert 
would quickly use up all the available reserves.5 British Intelligence estimated there were elements 
of six Italian Divisions occupying camps around Sidi Barrani with patrols by, ‘columns of infantry 
and guns…reinforced by tanks,’ in between.6 It was this ground which became vital to British 
success in the operation which followed. 
Compass: Terrain 
The land between the two armies was an eighty mile stretch of open desert with areas of good-
going for vehicles mixed with poor-going sections of soft sand. The coastal plain was divided by a 
ridge-escarpment running parallel to the coast with few accessible tracks down it. The Italian 
camps were situated mostly east and south of Sidi Barrani, some were sited to defend the few 
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escarpment tracks, and each was held by elements of a Division. They were mostly sited on a 
convenient rise adjacent to the tracks, to defend the obvious routes of advance.7  
 
Figure 3:1 Operation Compass; the assault on the Italian camps.
8
 
Each camp was protected by an anti-tank ditch outside a low bank of earth or stones, and was 
strengthened by mines and wire on the eastern faces.9 Near the coast were the Tummars group 
and Pt 90 which covered the track to Maktila, the farthest point advance for the Italians. The first 
British objective was Nibeiwa camp situated five miles from the Tummars and sited to defend the 
escarpment track at Bir-Enba. The vital gap in the Italian line of camps was twenty-five miles 
across and lay between Nibeiwa and Rabia, before the next group at Rabia and Sofafi, which were 
sited on top of the escarpment to prevent any British moves along the higher plateau. This group 
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was considered too strong for a frontal attack by the limited British units available, so they were 
screened off by the 7th Support Group Jock Columns.10  
The ground between Nibeiwa and Rabia was described as, ‘flat and featureless, with no vital or 
commanding ground.’ 11  British aggressive patrolling tactics prevented the Italians from 
establishing another camp on this low ground which provided an opportunity for O’Connor.12 The 
localized doctrine of using Jock columns had successfully kept the gap open, and now the two 
attacking divisions could make their approach march. The going immediately south of Mersa-
Matruh was particularly broken terrain, which could have delayed the British advance, so units 
moved along the upper plateau and then dropped down to the Enba Gap which was still a 
significant night march of 85 miles. Lieutenant Rea Leakey of 1st RTR noted, ‘The upper 
plateau…was good going for vehicles…The land dropped fifty feet, but there were few tracks down 
it…the plain was soft sand, wadis and generally bad going.’13 The British advance to contact was 
successful because it utilized the better going of the upper plateau, before returning to the softer 
ground of the plain. 
The tactical terrain affected the outcome of Compass and subsequent battles, which led to the 
defeat and capture of most of the 10th Army deployed in Cyrenaica. Strategically, the capture of 
Cyrenaica for the first time eased British naval convoys to supply Malta and protected the Suez 
Canal sector from aerial bombing. The landscape had an operational impact on planning, because 
it determined the preparatory moves by British forces and the first tactical assaults. O’Connor was 
able to take advantage of the gap between the Italian camps on the escarpment and at Nibeiwa. 
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Then, the fast pursuit phase across the desert route via Msus-Mechili helped to trap the retreating 
Italian columns at Beda Fomm and Sidi Saleh.  
Compass was a success for current British tactical doctrine at that time, with the combined arms 
assaults by 4th Indian Division Infantry and the Matildas from 7th Royal Tank Regiment (RTR). The 
heavy armour had led the break-in through the Italian perimeters and the Infantry followed, 
clearing successive positions. Later on, the 6th Australian Division proved equally successful using 
an ‘Infantry-first’ variation of the assaults made during Compass. Equally aggressive British 
patrolling and the use of Jock columns around the camps had kept Italian units hemmed in and 
reluctant to engage British units beyond the camp perimeters. 
Compass: Preparations 
Operation Compass was the first offensive by British forces (Western Desert Force) and was to be 
a five day raid. Fast convoys had provided new vehicles which needed time in the workshops to be 
prepared for the desert environment while their crews undertook training.14 The 7th Armoured 
Division was strengthened with both Brigades brought up to three regiments, totalling 276 tanks. 
The 4th Indian Division had two Indian and one British Brigade (nine battalions) with three artillery 
regiments and divisional support units, the attack force totalled some 25,000 troops. The 
spearhead of each assault would be led by the Matilda tanks of 7th RTR, supported by four 
Regiments of Artillery.15 The Australian 6th Division which arrived in January provided the Infantry 
force for the later campaign. The Italians, in contrast, had 75,000 troops in six Divisions, from an 
estimated 250,000 troops deployed across Libya. The armoured force was General Maletti’s 
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Raggruppamento and was considered the most well trained unit, equipped with 120 poor quality 
tanks and 2,500 Libyan Infantry.16 
Wavell issued an order to O’Connor on 2 November which showed the importance of terrain in 
British planning, ‘we are more highly trained…we know the ground and are better accustomed to 
desert conditions.’17 Each Division needed a supply dump to cover the sixty mile distance so two 
Forward Supply Depots (FSDs) were created thirty miles forward of Matruh. The assaults were 
practised on a full scale replica of Nibeiwa camp built for an exercise in late November. After this 
some of the tactical plans were altered and this increased the confidence of the participating 
troops. The RAF committed three fighter squadrons for air cover and ground attacks while six 
squadrons of bombers targeted aerodromes and communications with the camps being bombed 
to mask the overnight approaching march.18  
Compass: battle summary 
The advance was made during the night of 8/9 December, as RAF sorties masked the noise of 
hundreds of vehicles passing close to Nibeiwa. The first assault began with a brief bombardment, 
and then two squadrons of Matildas attacked the rear entrance and overran the tank battalion 
leaguered there. The Matildas were quickly followed by two battalions of Infantry who fanned out 
to eliminate strong points, whilst a diversionary attack was made against the eastern perimeter. It 
was noted how the Italian Infantry quickly gave up once they had lost their leaders whereas the 
Italian gunners ‘fought like hell,’ for over two hours despite being surprised, but by 10.40am the 
camp was secured.19 They continued to fight against the imposing Matildas even at close range but 
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could only cause heavy damage to them, which contributed to the collapse of Italian morale and 
most troops surrendered.20  
The subsequent assault on Tummar-West was made after a brief replenishment. The lack of 
surprise and a growing sandstorm made this a much tougher objective to overcome, so only nine 
Matildas were to lead the later assault on Tummar-East.21 Both Italian camps were fully aware of 
the British attacks by now and proved to be more difficult to overcome for British Infantry. The 
broad pattern of each battle remained the same with aggressive British infantry charging Italian 
positions, supported by Matildas. The ‘Italian gunners fought to the last,’ and once they were 
overrun the remaining Infantry quickly surrendered. 22  
Continuing the advance, the larger base at Sidi-Barrani was assaulted the next day by the 16th 
Brigade. Again using a sandstorm as cover, the eleven remaining Matildas and other armour led a 
successful break-in. It was another tough battle and produced the highest casualties for British 
troops as the Brigade suffered 250 of the 600 casualties received. The coastal group of camps 
were captured or abandoned, 1st Libyan Division withdrew from Maktila and was attacked in the 
open by Selby Force and surrendered the following day. Operationally, the capture of the coastal 
group of camps had broken the Italian defensive line and made it untenable. The Rabia and Sofafi 
group were quickly abandoned and the garrisons retreated towards Bardia. Near the coast at Buq-
Buq a mass of Italians were caught with their guns and they fought back for a while.  
Despite this resistance, the action ended when 1st RTR outflanked and knocked the battery out 
and took 6,000 prisoners. While the Italian Gunners showed some resolve, the Italian Air Force 
offered only weakened resistance, with high level bombing or occasional low level attacks to delay 
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the British advance.23 The 10th Army had fought back, yet an aggressive doctrine and good use of 
the terrain had enabled the smaller British forces to overcome their defensive line of camps. 
Minor armoured actions were also affected by terrain as British forces advanced into Libya, with 
the 1st RTR making good tactical use of a ridge to deploy unseen before advancing onto the flank 
of a column of twenty Italian M13s.24 Such aggressive tactics by armour and Infantry strengthened 
British morale. The Western Desert Force made a successful pursuit into Libya, but was operating 
at the extremity of its supply lines and suffering constant shortages of fuel, water and 
ammunition. The supply situation remained ad-hoc with only essentials being delivered by sea to 
various small ports along the coast.25  
After the camps were lost, Marshal Graziani wanted to pull back and concentrate his remaining 
forces near Tobruk to await fresh reinforcements, but Mussolini insisted Bardia was also 
defended. After Compass, Wavell countered this logical defence plan by blockading each port and 
then captured them by direct assault, which left Benghazi and the more distance western airfields 
as distant objectives after Tobruk.  
Bardia: Terrain 
The next target to be assaulted was Bardia which was situated on a cliff top headland overlooking 
an enclosed port and divided from the plateau by the Wadi Gefani. The base had a 17 mile 
perimeter, with the outer line including minefields, wire defences and an anti-tank ditch with 
concreted emplacements every 800 yards for anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns.26 The 
interior defences included a secondary line of emplacements, called the ‘switch-line’. They were 
widely spaced, however, which undermined their ability to interlock their fire.27 The coastal 
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escarpment divided the base on an east-west axis, leaving the northern sector under observation 
from higher ground and vulnerable to isolation. This main geographical feature had a direct impact 
on the defence of the base.  
Bardia: preparations and battle 
Bardia needed to be captured by 13th Corps because its garrison could threaten British supply 
routes if by-passed.28 There was a three week delay while the 6th Australian Division was brought 
in: although they lacked battle experience they were motivated to assault and capture a major 
Italian base. The delay in bringing forward the bulk of 6th Australian Division enabled its HQ to 
make a more detailed analysis of the defences and identify the key weakness of the ‘fortress’ and 
how it might be attacked.29 They were facing a garrison which included elements of four Divisions, 
totalling some 30,000 troops, along with one hundred tanks and over 400 guns.  
The key terrain was identified and became a primary objective from which further advances could 
be made. Sixth Division directed its 16th Brigade towards the high ground, where units were to, 
‘exploit to an average distance of 1500 yards to the top of the escarpment, thus forming a 
bridgehead.’30 The initial break-in would be made by Engineers and Infantry through a narrow 
front of just four outposts, supported by artillery fire from five regiments to cover the Infantry 
crossing the open plateau. Only then would 7th RTR’s remaining half Regiment of Matildas follow 
up and help roll up the emplacements either side of the gap. They would also help secure the 
escarpment to expose the flank and rear of the numerous Italian batteries deployed in the north-
east sector.  
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The assault began early on 3 January with a 25 minute bombardment, following which Engineers 
cleared wire and mine defences whilst 16th Brigade stormed the frontline positions followed by the 
‘I’ tanks and truck mounted anti-tank guns. The Brigade Diary noted that from the beginning, 
‘hordes of Italians threw down their arms and surrendered…[so] by early afternoon the count had 
reached 10,000…However other BTYS [batteries] refused to quieten and all day long pounded back 
at us.’31 The intensity of the Italian barrage from 400 guns provided the strongest response to the 
vigorous Australian attacks.  
The initial attack successfully divided the Italian defences, which continued to fight on separately 
at first. The 16th Brigade Infantry secured its objectives and planned for the next day’s assault, the 
battalions used the ridgeline as an enfilade position on the exposed the Italian artillery and gave 
some protection for the next advance. Heavy naval gunfire support from three battleships helped 
to break the morale of the remaining defenders and the Italians fought on until the assaulting 
troops reached them and then most of them surrendered.32  
The Australian 17th Brigade Infantry assaulted the south-east sector the next day with the last units 
surrendering in the afternoon of the 5 January.  British commanders were surprised by the large 
numbers of garrison captured and their low morale which the prisoners blamed on a lack of 
support from Tobruk and their Air Force, who had failed to stop heavy RAF and naval 
bombardments.33 This was a second major defeat for the 10th Army, with over 400 artillery pieces, 
127 tanks and 700 trucks being captured along with 38,300 troops. British forces had lost suffered 
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500 casualties, with some of the few remaining Matildas receiving further heavy damage from the 
close range fighting.34 
The fall of Bardia was a major strategic turning point in the campaign and caused Hitler to 
intervene with German forces deployed to the theatre to prop up the Italian war effort. The first 
units of the Afrika Korps (DAK) were dispatched to Tripoli as a blocking force and a Luftwaffe Air 
Corps of 200 aircraft was sent to Sicily. This unit was to act offensively against the Royal Navy in 
the central Mediterranean and to attack ports and bases in western Cyrenaica.35 The first air 
attacks on the Navy heavily damaged the carrier Illustrious on 10 January, which considerably 
weakened the Royal Navy’s capacity to provide air cover in future operations, while Army units in 
Cyrenaica were constantly attacked. 
In Cyrenaica these air attacks were noted by the 11th Hussars diary on the 23 January, just after 
Tobruk had been captured from the Italians.36 The Western Desert Force had to face three more 
months of determined air attacks before any contact with the Afrika Korps. These also influenced 
the dispersal of British formations and vehicle movement by supply columns, the 6th Australian 
Division HQ insisted that dispersal discipline was re-established after Bardia, as they feared a loss 
of trucks would affect their already limited ability to bring forward supplies.37 At the tactical level, 
both Bardia and Tobruk capitulated once Commonwealth units had occupied the dominating 
ridges within their defences. The terrain on the frontier offered a line of defensive positions which 
forced O’Connor to drive his pursuing units rapidly forward to prevent any Italian consolidation 
along the frontier. 
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Tobruk: terrain and battle summary 
The main Italian base at Tobruk had a well-constructed defensive perimeter, but despite this the 
garrison Commanders had little answer to the British advance and simply awaited encirclement. 
The perimeter defences at Tobruk ran in a thirty mile arc which stretched eight miles inland from 
the port. The outer anti-tank ditch was twenty feet wide and had been linked with natural wadis 
where possible. It was overlooked by more than seventy concrete emplacements which were 
protected by wire and mines with a second line of emplacements sited 500 yards behind. 
However, the Australian reconnaissance concluded there was weakness caused by a series of 
ridges inside the perimeter and also noted incomplete perimeter sections in the south-eastern 
sector.38 These escarpments overlooked the perimeter, coast road and harbour and were the main 
objectives to controlling the base. The Pt 209, Ras-el-Madauer height overlooked the perimeter to 
the south-west, whilst the Hagiag Chargia ridge overlooked the airfield and included the Italian HQ 
at Fort Pilastrino. The 6th Division took 12 days to plan and train for the assault on the 21 January, 
which included making full scale replicas of the defences for the Infantry to practice assault 
techniques.  
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Figure 3:2 The Italian Defences at Tobruk, January 1941.
39
 
The British assault began on the 21 January with the 19th Brigade breaking through at the weakest 
south-eastern sector and advancing towards the Hagiag ridge which was behind the frontline and 
divided the defences. Two HQ sites were captured along with the garrison commander by the end 
of the first day and the Australian commanders ordered a general advance the following day when 
the remaining Italian opposition collapsed. The Italians had suffered a third major defeat which 
forced the remnants of the 10th Army to retreat across western Cyrenaica. 
Tobruk: outcome and effect on British operations 
British forces pursued the retreating Italians in two groups while the Australians followed along 
the coast road and soon captured Benghazi and the nearby vital western airfields. However, these 
were affected by bad weather which made them unusable during the winter. Inland, O’Connor 
ordered a mixed arms force to move rapidly across the shorter desert route to Mechili to cut the 
road south of Benghazi, and block the 10th Army’s retreat. Trooper Palmer from 2nd RTR 
remembered the approach march of around 150 miles as a combined force of exhausted men and 
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tanks.40 It was this force which deployed in their respective defensive sites with just a few hours to 
spare and engaged the retreating Italian columns along the coast road. 
Sidi-Saleh: the terrain and battle 
At Sidi Saleh the tactical terrain influenced the battle in favour of the British units; the soft ground 
rendered Italian attacks on British positions ineffectual, limiting them to narrow frontal assaults 
along the road. Between the road and the sea there were more soft-going dunes which were 
impassable for vehicles. The supporting British artillery deployed four miles to the east to give 
covering fire to the whole area.41 The Brigade faced an approaching column of 20,000 Italians with 
just 2,000 troops, a few armoured cars and eleven anti-tank guns. British defensive doctrine was 
effective due to the deployment of the Infantry in low ground and the ferocity of the defensive fire 
which stopped the Italian column. The battle continued in darkness with the 7th Hussars breaking 
up an attempted flank move on the seaward side. The following day three more attacks were 
repulsed; the last of which penetrated the Rifle Brigade positions, but was stopped at close range 
by anti-tank and supporting artillery fire.  
The British had used the terrain to help their defence of the area. The hummocky ground suited 
the low profile of the 2pdr anti-tank guns and Infantry positions which them difficult to locate. 
There was close coordination between Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell from 4th Royal Horse Artillery 
(RHA) and Lieutenant-Colonel Renton from 2nd Rifle Brigade which contributed to the determined 
British defence. One officer observed that another determined push by the Italians would have 
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broken through, as they did not realize how incredibly weak the Rifle Brigade position was, with no 
reserves and almost no supplies left.42  
 
Figure 3:3 Sidi Saleh and Beda Fomm, February 1941.
43
 
Beda Fomm: terrain and battle 
The tactical terrain contributed to the final action near Beda Fomm. East of the coast road there 
was mainly low, undulating ground, where Colonel Combe selected a position to allow the 4th 
Armoured Brigade to manoeuvre against the retreating Italian columns from cover. The tactical 
deployment was made by 2nd RTR’s CO, who selected two features of high ground from which to 
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fight. The first feature was known as the ‘pimple’, over which the road passed and to the south-
east of this was a further low ridge topped by a mosque, which was used as cover for reserves and 
supply trucks. The terrain and bad weather both contributed to the determined British defence in 
both actions.  
The ‘pimple’ hill dominated the road west of Beda Fomm while the 2nd RTR used the white mosque 
hill as cover and hull down positions to repulse numerous frontal armoured attacks.44 The soft, 
hummocky ground either side of the road stopped the slower Italian M13s from making any wide 
outflanking moves. Visibility was hindered by heavy rain squalls and smoke, allowing British Light 
armour to attack the Italian columns from the flank. The Italians had overestimated the strength of 
British armour and began to retreat, whilst 2nd RTR made an immediate assault on the main 
column. After quickly re-arming the fourteen remaining tanks, they moved to attack. The regiment 
made good use of hidden ground, using cover and rapid movement to gain maximum surprise.  
The initial action lasted about two hours on the first day and developed into two separate 
defensive actions over the next two days, one by armoured regiments at Beda Fomm and the 
other by Infantry/artillery at Sidi-Saleh. Beda Fomm continued as ‘battering rams’ of Italian tanks 
made repeated but uncoordinated attacks against both the pimple and mosque hills.45 The British 
countered the few attempts to outflank them, which were also blocked by the low dunes which 
were had been made worse by heavy rain. The supporting artillery also knocked out more than 
twenty M13s and numerous guns, which enabled the pimple to be retaken and held from late 
afternoon on the second day.  
The actions at Beda Fomm and Sidi-Saleh were tenacious defence actions which gave O’Connor a 
close run final victory. The British forces available were minimal but well led by experienced 
                                                          
44
 WO 201/2691. Operational Reports: First Cyrenaican Campaign, Sept1940-Feb 1941.Appendices, maps. 
45
 WO 169/1390.11
th
 Hussars Diary. Jan-Dec 1941. Appendix L. Report on the battle of Sidi-Saleh, 5-7 
February 1941, by Col. Combes. 
62 
 
regimental commanders, who made the best use of the available terrain and firepower to defeat 
the uninspired Italian assaults. Following this defeat the Italians surrendered, giving up a lot of 
equipment and a further 8,000 troops went into captivity.46 The Western Desert Force under 
O’Connor had defeated a larger, better equipped Italian army. The 10th Army had suffered losses 
of nearly 130,000 troops, many as POWs, 400 tanks and over 800 guns along with ammunition and 
supplies. British forces had suffered only 2,000 casualties in comparison. 
The battles of this first campaign presented the weaker British forces with a series of operational 
and tactical problems; all of which had been directly influenced by the operational and tactical 
terrain. During Operation Compass O’Connor used the gap between Nibeiwa and Rabia camps to 
position his assault force behind the Italians and then carry out a series of well-executed assaults. 
Similar tactics were used in combined arms attacks on the remaining camps which unlocked the 
Italian defence line and outflanked the remaining Rabia-Sofafi camps in the advance to Bardia.  
The British advance into Libya forced the Italians to abandon the frontier positions at Sollum-
Capuzzo and allowed British forces to isolate the ports. The attacks on Bardia and Tobruk were 
well executed by trained forces and contributed to the surrender of each port. The attacks were 
successful in breaking through well defended Axis positions and showed that the doctrine was 
flexible and could be adapted to changing circumstances. The final battles at Beda Fomm and Sidi-
Saleh were well led improvised defensive engagements and units made a tenacious defence 
against difficult odds.  
In the next phase of the campaign, the problem of retaining Cyrenaica revolved around the issues 
of distance and the lack of any suitable defensive terrain across the plain surrounding Benghazi 
and in southern Cyrenaica. British Commanders compounded these problems by under-estimating 
                                                          
46
 WO 169/1390.11
th
 Hussars Diary. Jan-Dec 1941. 2
nd
 RB, Report on Operations 5
th
-7
th
 February 1941. 
63 
 
the effectiveness of German tactical doctrine, especially when commanded by an aggressive and 
dynamic commander like Lieutenant-General Erwin Rommel. 
  
Chapter 4 The defence of Cyrenaica and the two British Retreats, 
April 1941 and January-February 1942 
This chapter considers the defence of Cyrenaica and the two successive British retreats from the 
Libyan province in April 1941 and January-February 1942. These actions highlight the problems of 
defending such a huge province from an operational level and also show the impact of a lack of 
suitable, tactical defensive positions. These issues were compounded by an improvised tactical 
doctrine and changing British command decisions and resulted in defeat and a forced retreat.  
British forces also suffered from a lack of troops, equipment and tanks, and an overlong supply 
line during two successive inhospitable winters.  
In February 1941 London took the strategic decision to fight in Greece, which dramatically reduced 
the British strength in Libya leaving few formations to successfully defend Cyrenaica. Churchill 
mistakenly regarded Benghazi as the, ‘strong flank for the…Nile valley and the invaluable 
aerodromes situated in Cyrenaica.’1 At GHQ, Wavell viewed the port as having some propaganda 
value but of to him it was of little military importance because the Luftwaffe had made the port 
almost unusable.2 
Unfortunately for British forces, there were simply too few places in western Cyrenaica where a 
secure defence could be made. In the south, Wavell recognized that Benghazi had less importance 
for supply because of heavy Axis air attacks, yet he ordered British units much further forward to 
El Agheila which over-stretched the supply capacity. East of Agheila, the passable terrain narrowed 
at Mersa Brega which created a single defensible site. The coast road continued up across the 
Benghazi plain which opened out to a passable escarpment leading onto the Libyan plateau. The 
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road north from Benghazi was a fast route through the Djebel hills but was vulnerable to Axis air 
attacks. The numerous routes eastwards across the desert were almost impossible to block easily. 
The landscape south and east of Benghazi was too wide open for defence while the Djebel Akhdar 
hills north of the port contained some good defensive sites along the coast road to Derna, but this 
upland area was flanked by the passable desert route via Msus and Mechili.  
This inland route was used by both sides to make a faster crossing of the centre of Cyrenaica. It 
had a series of tracks running northwards through the Djebel hills which outflanked any position 
the British might take along the coast road. Axis forces used these tracks northwards in both 
retreats to outflank British units out of successive positions. The eastern edge of the Djebel hills 
created a sector of defensible ground from which the 4th Indian Division’s commander, Major-
General Francis Tuker believed could have given British forces a base from which to hold and to 
counter-attack.3 Instead, the Eighth Army withdrew further east to the Gazala line, which 
developed inland from the coast at Ain-el Gazala.  
At the operational level, the need to defend wide areas of Cyrenaica led to Infantry and Armoured 
Brigades being spread over a wide area. In both 1941 and 1942 the front lines were too long and 
held by too few units. Transport and supply issues left other Brigades in the rear and occupying 
different positions along the coast road with their own supporting arms. This dispersal of Brigades 
moved the focus away from a Divisional battle so that they engaged more powerful Axis forces 
without support and had little choice but to retreat. In both years the effect was an unseemly 
rapid retreat by numerous units in a state of disorder. 
The British defence in both 1941 and 1942 consisted of a frontline held by Jock columns supported 
by a single Armoured Brigade. The need to hold such a wide frontline led to the dispersal of 
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formations to dominate the neutral ground.4 The harsh nature of the gravel surface of the plateau 
led to constant wear and tear on the vehicles and contributed to high wastage in tank numbers. By 
May 1942, after the Second Retreat, Cyrenaica was still a difficult area to hold. The forty-five mile 
long defence line at Gazala spread the British Infantry Brigades across a wide front covering the 
coast road and more passable sectors of desert to the south. Dispersion was still needed to cover 
the likely routes of approach from the Djebel hills and tracks south of them.  
The importance of Tobruk 
The siege of Tobruk was vital to the British defence of Egypt in 1941. It aimed to deny the Axis use 
of the port which would stretch their supply lines back to Benghazi and Tripoli and deny their full 
supply needs.5 Axis forces besieged the base from April, and soon the defence turned from a 
military need into a political issue. The recent withdrawal from Greece meant that British forces 
could not be seen to be making further retreats as this might adversely affect morale at home and 
influence the views of future allies such as the USA. They had to be seen to be fighting, though 
Wavell doubted the military importance of the base.6 If the port was abandoned or lost the Axis 
would regain a forward base from which to threaten into Egypt.  
The siege has attracted a number of studies which have highlighted its importance to the 
campaign.7 Harrison notes the importance of the British 70th Division in the defence and 
subsequent break-out from Tobruk in December as a turning point for Crusader,8  whilst Lyman 
considers it, ‘the battle which saved North Africa from the Nazis.’9  
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The ad-hoc garrison, made up of British and Empire units, repulsed a series of hasty assaults. They 
were opposed by determined counter-attacks by the 9th Australian Division which were closely 
coordinated by General Leslie Morshead and led to the first decisive victory against the DAK. In 
these early attacks, the Axis troops committed too few tanks and infantry and failed to coordinate 
other diversionary assaults and air attacks. The siege became a major strategic diversion for the 
Axis over the next eight months while they planned a full scale assault on the port, with the 
autumn shipping crisis delaying these plans long enough for Operation Crusader to begin. The 
British defence of Tobruk certainly prevented any further advance beyond the frontier by Axis 
forces and remained a potential threat to the Axis supply routes.  
 The First Retreat, April 1941 
Operationally, Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, CinC of Cyrenaica Command, had spread his 
available brigades to cover all the possible approaches available to the Axis. Unfortunately this 
meant they were too widely dispersed to offer any mutual support. The supply dumps were sited 
at Msus and Mechili along the desert route and were too far in the rear for the few supply units to 
be effective. At the tactical level the British did not deployed enough Jock Columns to hold a 
lengthy frontline at El Agheila. Also, the frontline consisted of terrain which was nearly impassable 
for the truck based units.  
Commentators have noted the problems of British dispositions across Cyrenaica.10 Fraser believed 
it was a combination of better quality armour and Rommel’s aggressive leadership which levered 
the British out of position and kept up the momentum of the Axis advance but he fails to mention 
the impact of either Cyrenaica or the tactical ground.11 Gladman argued that Axis HQs were more 
efficient while British HQs struggled to control events.12 The British forces suffered from a number 
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of issues which influenced the outcome of the retreat, including too few and poor quality tanks 
and the loss of commanders. In addition they were forced to deploy too widely across the region 
and frontline units were seriously hampered by the difficult ground.   
 
 
Figure 4:1 The First Retreat, April 1941.
13
 
First Retreat: terrain 
British forces were trying to protect Benghazi from the south which left them deployed in an over-
extended position. Tactically, the frontline was moved further forward so that British 
reconnaissance squadrons could move forward to hold the landing ground at El Agheila. Wavell 
identified a line of salt marshes after his visit in March which he considered to be a strong 
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defensive position. This feature was located twenty miles west of El Agheila and ran south into the 
desert but was not used tactically as it was too far from the supply lines. Further east was a vital 
road junction at Mersa Brega, where the passable terrain was reduced by a sector of hummocky 
dunes and the wadi Feragh on its eastern desert flank. Another important road junction north of 
Brega, was Agedabia.14  
North of Agedabia the terrain opened out into an undulating plain with the higher Libyan plateau 
rising east of an escarpment. There were defiles running up onto the plateau which were 
defendable places, but the whole escarpment was actually fairly passable by vehicles which could 
easily outflank the defiles. Above the plateau, the desert route to the Msus/Mechili depots had 
long stretches of difficult going, but later German Engineers began clearing the track through the 
rocky ground. This route was seen as, ‘empty, neutral desert, offering no help or haven…[the 
choice] was only death by thirst or starvation, or capture by the enemy.’15 The coast road had few 
decent defensive positions south of Benghazi once the Mersa Brega gap had been breached, which 
left the whole of Cyrenaica open. Both routes had to be covered but the coast road remained the 
quickest and the most vulnerable from air attack.  
Preparations 
Cyrenaica Command was set up in early February 1941 as a holding force to defend the province. 
Wavell calculated that German forces were being held back by logistical delays and would not be 
ready to advance into the province until mid-May or the end of the summer to avoid the intense 
heat. Churchill had ordered him to make Greece his priority following the victory at Beda Fomm. 
This had diverted many of his best units from Cyrenaica over the previous few weeks, leaving only 
light forces along the frontline.16 In Cyrenaica the commander, Lieutenant-General Philip Neame, 
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was criticized for his poor command and deployment of units. Neame also had an in-experienced 
Corps HQ staff equipped with few vehicles or decent radios. The Command had three levels of 
Corps, Divisional and Brigade HQs in charge of just two frontline Brigades. 
The 3rd Armoured Brigade was 40 miles behind near Mersa Brega, and contained two units of 
desert veterans. However, the equipment of the Brigade is worth noting as it was under strength 
and of inferior quality. The 3rd Hussars had just 33 Light tanks; the newly arrived 5th RTR had 23 
worn out Cruisers while the 6th RTR had twenty six old Italian M13s, all of which were inferior to 
the German MkIII Panzers. Wavell later admitted he had not appreciated the poor state of the 
armour until his belated visit to the front. Both Neame and the Brigade commander had already 
informed GHQ about the problems but the information did not arrive until after the Axis advance 
had begun.17 British plans were for the 3rd Armoured Brigade to strike the flank of the Axis columns 
whilst the infantry and artillery delayed them frontally. 
The frontline Infantry was also weak, and was provided by the 2nd Support Brigade which only had 
one motor battalion, one Regiment of Artillery and six anti-tank guns. The reconnaissance was 
taken over by the King’s Dragoon Guards in mid-February and faced better armed German 
reconnaissance vehicles in a new environment. They were in constant daily contact with Axis units 
from late February, until they withdrew and became part of Tobruk garrison.18 Behind the front, 
other Infantry Brigades were dispersed around Cyrenaica at key points. Neame was to maintain a 
frontline of highly mobile ‘covering forces’ (Jock columns) to avoid losses, and be prepared to give 
up ground including Benghazi which Wavell viewed as having propaganda value but was of little 
military importance by this stage.19 The 9th Australian Division had one Brigade east of Benghazi 
and the other at Tocra in the Djebel Akhdar hills, but had few trucks to aid their movement. These 
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units were 150 miles, or two to three days in the rear of the front. The 3rd Indian Motor Brigade 
arrived in late March without any artillery or support weapons and was deployed in the rear near 
Martuba to cover routes through the Djebel. The deployment to Greece had seriously reduced RAF 
support leaving four squadrons in direct support. 
German units had recently arrived near Agheila and had been designated the Deutsches Afrika 
Korps (or DAK). The force was based on the experienced 5th Light Division and was led by the 
aggressive General Erwin Rommel. The Division’s main assault unit was the 5th Panzer Regiment, 
which initially had just 78 tanks supported by Artillery, Panzer-Jager (anti-tank), machinegun and 
Reconnaissance units. The force was deployed into battlegroups of all arms, which were supported 
by the Luftwaffe formation, Fliegerführer Afrika, under Major-General Stephan Frölich. This had 
two groups of Stukas, a fighter squadron and reconnaissance squadron. Rommel had the freedom 
to operate an independent command, something which few other commanders have. 
First Retreat: battle summary 
The flow of this battle was influenced by Rommel’s aggressive leadership. His reconnaissance and 
Intelligence showed the weakness of the British deployment, so the leading elements of the 5th 
Light Division were rushed forward to clash with British patrols and soon captured the important 
water wells at Agheila on the 24 March. Rommel then ordered the Division to capture Mersa 
Brega. A further week was spent probing British positions while the Luftwaffe made heavy 
bombing attacks on British units. This air superiority enabled them to counter any British moves.  
The British 2nd Support Group was deployed along an eight mile front from the coast to Mersa 
Brega with the 3rd Armoured Brigade on the flank to the south east.  Under orders the Armour 
retired five miles to the north–east; however the Axis battlegroups were able to break through the 
gap. From the 2 April the retreat north and east of Agedabia was a slow fight with the 3rd 
Armoured Brigade contesting, ‘each ridge and hillock against the superior weight of enemy 
72 
 
armour; at other times in a wild flurry of speed and disorder as…we were again being 
outflanked.’20 The remnants of the 3rd Armoured Brigade were forced to make a slow fighting 
withdrawal to Msus and Mechili over a distance of 160 miles which caused the unit to be 
annihilated by attrition. The Australian Brigades escaped into the Tobruk perimeter to form the 
garrison with other British units. Other troops retreated beyond the frontier and allowed Axis 
forces to capture the frontier positions. 
First Retreat: Influence of terrain and doctrine 
The initial actions were influenced by British deployment in the difficult landscape and by poor 
doctrine. On the 31 March Axis forces advanced in three powerful battlegroups which assaulted 
and by-passed the isolated British Motor battalion which was forced to retreat as their position 
was under constant observation. Further back the 3rd Armoured Brigade was deployed in depth, 
with the armoured cars in front and behind them the 3rd Hussar Light tanks with the remaining two 
Regiments south-east of Mersa Brega. The 6th RTR Troop leader Cyril Joly noted the ‘draining’ 
effect on his Regiment which fought daily battles and suffered a steady attrition in tanks and 
crews, all of which affected their morale and ability to fight on. The Axis Infantry battlegroup made 
similar flanking moves through the coastal dunes near Mersa Brega and past the British armour 
near Agedabia. This narrow deployment enabled the larger Axis columns to outflank the Brigade 
and force it to retreat. 
The British key commanders were captured by fast moving Axis columns, with Generals Neame, 
O’Connor and Brigadier Combe all being taken prisoner on 6 April. The capture of Gambier-Parry 
and his 2nd Division HQ at Mechili a day later completed the dislocation of the British command. 
The armoured battle highlighted the successful Axis doctrine which defeated the improvised 
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doctrine of the British. Other problems for the British included the early destruction of the supply 
depot at Msus, which contributed to the demise of the 3rd Armoured Brigade.21  
First Retreat: conclusion 
The retreat lasted for just over two and a half weeks with actions fought across much of the 
province. The constant outflanking moves by the Axis undermined successive British attempts to 
hold and caused confusion amongst its numerous commanders. Buckingham believes Neame has 
been unfairly maligned and that Wavell should have accepted more responsibility for the 
command decisions surrounding the initial British deployment. Rommel had surprised Cyrenaica 
Command and his own superiors by exceeding his instructions and reached the frontier effectively 
cutting off Tobruk. The loss of Benghazi left a single Australian Brigade defending the coastal route 
through the Djebel Akhdar hills and a rapidly failing Armoured Brigade were destroyed along the 
desert route. British Intelligence Officers, from the 2nd Armoured Division HQ, made poor analysis 
about the Axis advance which destroyed the Msus supply base too soon and completed the 
destruction of the Armoured Brigade.   
The Second Retreat 21 Jan – 8 Feb 1942 
This study argues that the Second Retreat was a further attempt by the Eighth Army to defend a 
large province and prevent an Axis breakthrough towards Egypt. The scale of the distances 
involved heavily influenced British operational deployment of Brigade groups by causing them to 
be dispersed across the region. At the tactical level the Eighth Army struggled to successfully 
defend sectors which contained too few defensible positions. These problems compounded issues 
of doctrine which had remained largely unchanged in terms of deployment and defensive tactics. 
Most commentators attribute the failures to poor command, logistics and weaponry but little 
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mention is made about the impact of terrain or tactics used. Jonathan Fennell argues that the 
increasing confusion caused by the retreat contributed to a growing morale crisis.22  
At the tactical level the frontline Jock Columns struggled to carry out their operations in the 
difficult ground south of Mersa Brega. They had specific orders to harass any Axis advance and 
then to withdraw.23 The participants commented on the scenes of confusion to which the 
appalling terrain had contributed. The distances from Benghazi contributed to an acute shortage 
in supplies, Benghazi was slowly returning to use as a port from the 7 January, after months of RAF 
attacks. The frontline terrain slowed down rate at which the B echelon supply units reached the 
Jock Columns.  
The Second Retreat: terrain 
In Western Cyrenaica near Agedabia-Antelat the Eighth Army deployed a forward line of Jock 
Columns. However, this was difficult ground and the vehicles could not operate effectively across 
this landscape. In comparison the Axis Battlegroups contained more tracked vehicles which could 
overcome the hummocky ground and took swift advantage of British difficulties and the lack of 
armour nearby. Major-General Messervy thought it was the only large area of ground where 
tracked vehicles were better suited than wheeled vehicles.24 The frontline was situated between 
Antelat and a narrow strip of passable desert south of Agedabia, where a number of tracks joined 
the coast road. The frontline was 30 miles long and included rough going to the deeper Wadi 
Feragh, a natural wadi which blocked movement inland. The area north of Antelat was relatively 
good going over which vehicles travelled between 50-65 miles per day. South of this, the terrain 
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worsened to particularly bad dunes and hummocks over which travelling distances were reduced 
to just 25 miles per day.  
 
Figure 4:2 The Second Retreat, January 1942.
25
 
Further north the Benghazi plain was more undulating and offered few defensive positions. The 
plain was bordered by the Sclediema escarpment to the east which curved from Antelat north to 
Benghazi and was crossed by a few tracks which climbed through sharp defiles. Further north the 
coast road divided through the Djebel Akhdar hills and offered some defensive sectors. The area 
was outflanked by the desert route to the south. The inland desert route offered British supply a 
safer, more direct route to Tobruk from the frontline and was a mixture of difficult and easier 
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going. Along it were two supply dumps at Msus and Mechili. Tobruk had become the Eighth 
Army’s main supply port with a rail-head depot nearby providing 1,500 tons of supplies per day. 
Supply columns took seven days to make a return journey to the front via Msus, in comparison the 
coast road was quicker but had severe bottlenecks which were under constant Axis air attack.26 
Second Retreat: preparations 
Ritchie intended to resume the advance into Tripolitania, once the Eighth Army had enough 
supplies and fresh drafts of armour. In comparison to 1941, the front sector was more strongly 
held by two Support Brigades deployed in Jock Columns and one Brigade from the 1st Armoured 
Division. The frontline was held by two British Brigades operating in Jock columns, 200th Guards 
Brigade had two battalions and five batteries covering the coast road and the 1st Support Group 
was inland with another two battalions and four batteries. They had orders to withdraw and not to 
become entangled with enemy columns.  
The armour was to remain free to engage the enemy near Antelat, while the Jock columns were 
designed to harass and delay any advance. However the 1st Support Group had only taken over on 
the 19 January just two days before the Axis advance began.27  Godwen-Austen planned for a 
controlled retreat in case the situation changed rapidly.28 He also believed that the most 
defensible position was at Gazala, east of the Djebel hills and not forward at Antelat-Agedabia, but 
this did not allow for holding western Cyrenaica and its vital airfields. In the rear, near Antelat, was 
the newly arrived 2nd Armoured Brigade of three regiments, one motor battalion and five 
batteries. The RAF support only had 280 aircraft and suffered from numerous equipment 
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shortages. Across Cyrenaica the 4th Indian Division had one Brigade at Benghazi with transport, and 
two others without at Barce in the Djebel hills and Tobruk.  
For a short period, the Panzerarmee was stronger, and could disrupt Eighth Army preparations to 
advance by capturing Agedabia and inflicting casualties. Rommel confused British intelligence by 
disobeying his orders from OKW and he took the opportunity to advance again whilst the Eighth 
Army was overstretched along the frontline.29 The British thought that the Axis formations were 
too reduced to renew operations quickly, the three German divisions totalled just 12,500 men and 
the seven Italian Divisions just 25,000 men. The 13th Corps HQ intelligence thought that numbers 
must have increased to between 50-70 tanks in the forward areas whilst Ariete Division had 
another eighty tanks.30 The Panzer battlegroups now had more powerful MkIII ‘specials’ supported 
by a battalion of 30 anti-tank guns. Major-General Messervy at the 1st Armoured HQ noted the 
build-up of Axis armour but believed they were for reconnaissance only. Axis Air Forces had 
recovered their strength to nearly 300 serviceable aircraft so had a good advantage over the RAF 
along the front.  
Second Retreat: battle summary 
The battle was hampered by bad weather which covered the Axis approach march and caused 
poor atmospherics which blocked British communications at crucial moments. The severe dust 
storms along the frontline prevented observation and the issue was compounded by the 
withdrawal of British Reconnaissance units which left the task to the newly arrived Jock columns. 
The Axis advanced on the 21 January to Antelat with two columns thrusting eastwards after a 
short bombardment of the front line. The supporting 2nd Armoured Brigade was ordered north to 
engage the enemy Armour on the 23 January. It was divided to cover two small villages and was 
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attacked and defeated by more powerful battlegroups. For four days to 30 January, Axis 
formations remained around Msus whilst the Ariete Division advanced towards Benghazi. German 
columns were seen on the escarpment at Scelediema advancing north and west to support the 
Italians on the 30 January.31 
Ritchie attempted to protect the desert flank of 4th Indian Division to halt the Axis advance, but his 
plans were flawed as there were only 33 tanks to cover a front of 35 miles. He wanted both 4th 
Indian and 2nd Armoured to counterattack against Msus and Major-General Tuker complied as best 
he could to make it work. The 7th Indian Brigade moved west and attacked the enemy flank. 
However, Msus was captured after a further action which split the 1st Armoured Division and gave 
the Axis options for further advances. On the 28 January Axis columns feinted along the desert 
route towards Mechili, but the real thrust headed towards Benghazi which trapped the 7th Indian 
Brigade south of the port. British formations began to retreat through the Djebel Akhdar hills and 
shepherded large numbers of supply trucks and units which had disengaged from Benghazi. The 
Army had been forced back from Antelat and was only able to halt near Gazala after the Axis 
advance ground to a halt.  
Second Retreat: the impact of terrain and doctrine 
The ground near Agedabia included a narrow strip of fairly good going north of the Wadi Feragh. 
This developed into terrain which was poor to impossible for wheeled vehicle and impeded Jock 
column movement so much that the few passable tracks became vital. The bad going in this 
eastern sector of the front was unexpected and forced the columns to leave vehicles and guns 
behind. One report indicated that it weakened the unit’s ability to defend in that area.32 There was 
                                                          
31
 WO 169/4005. XIII Corps G Branch, Jan-Jun 1942. 13 Corps Intelligence Summary No.85. 30 Jan 42.pp.1-2. 
32
 WO 169/4005. XIII Corps G Branch, Jan-Jun 1942. 13 Corps Intelligence Summary No.83. 23 Jan 42.p.8. 
79 
 
more soft sand between Agedabia and Antelat which caused vehicles to become bogged down 
again. Jock Columns were proving to be not as effective as they had been during Crusader.33  
The poor going affected the ability of Jock columns to hold the line and they were forced to 
retreat. They were trying to hold a long frontline on difficult ground, against bad weather and fast 
moving Axis columns. By late morning on the first day the Axis had infiltrated the frontline. The 
difficult ground impeded the Gun tractors which become easily bogged down in the soft sand and 
created traffic jams along the few passable tracks as British units tried to pull out. By mid-
afternoon the Jock columns started to lose radio contact with one another causing further retreat. 
The following day they were dive-bombed by the Luftwaffe but did not see enemy ground troops. 
The retreat remained orderly as 1st Support Group columns manoeuvred in pairs to cover each 
other. However they could not stop the Axis from making a rapid advance of nearly 70 miles, 
leaving some columns behind the front and exposing the supply route to Msus. The 200th Guards 
Brigade had four Jock columns deployed some 50 miles south of Agedabia, in very difficult 
terrain.34 Later reports agreed that these columns had little choice but to retreat once by-passed.   
British doctrine was still committing the armour to fight its own battles, when the 2nd Armoured 
Brigade was dispersed to cover both Antelat and Saunnu 20 miles away.35 The two Regiments at 
Antelat attempted to disengage the enemy and re-join its fellow Regiment but were attacked by 
elements of both Panzer Divisions and suffered heavily. Their supporting artillery fought 
tenaciously but the Brigade and eight artillery batteries were defeated by stronger and more 
effective Axis tactics. The Axis consolidated and engaged 2nd Armoured Division again with eighty-
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five tanks. Hans Schmidt noted how well his anti-tank company worked with Panzers to out-flank 
British armour from defended locations in this action.36  
Ritchie clashed with his subordinate commanders, which caused a succession of command issues 
during the retreat. At 13th Corps HQ, Godwen-Austen wanted to evacuate Benghazi, but was over-
ruled by Auchinleck who was visiting Ritchie at his Army HQ at Tmimi, so the 7th Indian Brigade was 
ordered to ‘strike vigorously southwards.’37 Tuker opposed his only forward Brigade being 
dispersed into more Jock columns, so Ritchie took personal control of the 4th Indian Division to 
ensure the Brigade advanced towards Antelat.38 British units suffered two days of command 
indecision and this was picked up by Axis signals and enabled Rommel to strike for Benghazi rather 
than continue to Mechili.39 The Axis had better intelligence, which noted confusion amongst 
British commanders and enabled Rommel to out manoeuvre the separated Brigades. The Eighth 
Army had been decisively defeated; the Armoured Brigade and Jock Columns suffering heavy 
losses in guns and vehicles, including 70-100 tanks, 40 guns and 1,400 casualties. The Panzerarmee 
benefitted from the mass of stores captured in depots and at Benghazi.  
Second Retreat: conclusion 
The main problem for British forces remained the size of Cyrenaica and the poor tactical terrain 
along the British frontline. This was too far south from the nearest supply bases and was too wide 
for eight Jock Columns to cover. The appalling terrain slowed down the British Columns which 
were by-passed by faster moving enemy units. Other British formations were too far in the rear to 
be an effective support as they were sited to cover the numerous routes across the province. 
These ran through the Djebel Akhdar hills and across the desert route to the south. Once Axis 
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forces had reached the plateau, the supply bases here were vulnerable and further divided British 
forces trying to cover the coast and the inland supply lines. British units were dispersed in their 
deployment but also in their defensive doctrine, when the 2nd Armoured Brigade had to fight a 
separated battle. 
Other factors also contributed to the two Retreats with failures in British Intelligence and 
Command which were affected by the terrible weather conditions, while in 1942 Ritchie spent 
much days disagreeing with his subordinate commanders over how to slow down the Axis 
advance. The Eighth Army also withdrew three reconnaissance regiments from the front and the 
RAF were prevented from providing air reconnaissance and disguised the initial Axis advance, 
while British Intelligence was also misled that the Panzerarmee was too weak to do more than 
make a ‘reconnaissance in force,’ to destroy forward British supply dumps. These were all 
important issues which hampered British operations but it was the size of Cyrenaica which made 
any operational defence difficult and this was compounded by the lack of defensible sites.
  
Chapter 5 Brevity and Battleaxe May-June 1941. 
This chapter compares the two British offensives of May and June 1941, codenamed Brevity and 
Battleaxe, and will highlight how aspects of terrain impacted on British operations to influence the 
outcome of each action. These operations were designed to recapture the frontier sector, defeat 
German armoured formations and advance towards Tobruk. Operation Brevity was a chance to 
take advantage of stationary Axis forces at Tobruk whilst Operation Battleaxe was a more 
optimistic plan designed to relieve Tobruk, retake the Cyrenaican airfields and also destroy Axis 
armour.  
These offensives have both been well documented in various histories, but there has been no 
assessment of the impact of the tactical terrain, beyond noting the coastal escarpment and the 
Hafid ridge, which so undermined British attacks during Battleaxe. Robin Neillands provides details 
of the armoured assault on the Hafid ridge, but is less clear on the 11th Indian Brigade assault on 
Halfaya, whilst Barrie Pitt offers more detail on the latter, though neither discusses the impact of 
terrain.1 Paddy Griffiths argues that the operation was a failure of, ‘reconnaissance, navigation and 
terrain analysis’ by British forces.2 Memoirs tended to be critical about both operations, Tedder 
commented in the midst of Battleaxe, ‘Afraid I’ve got no more faith in the army than they have in 
themselves.’3 But G.L. Verney, a later commander of 7th Armoured Division believed the offensives 
were vindicated because Axis forces made no further advance for the next five months.4 Their 
discussion focusses on the problems of command, the lack of units and good equipment for British 
Forces who faced well informed and much stronger Axis forces. Colonel Rainer Kreibel gives a 
detailed study of the Axis defences and doctrine and shows how their main positions were centred 
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on the key heights, but again misses the point that it was the number and complexity of defences 
which undermined the British attacks.5 The Axis defence was more dynamic in their mobility and 
vigorous counter-attacks which out-flanked the already weakened British forces, forcing them to 
retreat. Lewin places this success on better Axis tactics, better intelligence derived from poor 
British radio security and the markedly better anti-tank weapons.6 Whilst noting British problems 
of too many tank variants he does not appear to appreciate the tactical terrain. At the operational 
level, especially during Battleaxe, the lengthy approach march from the railhead impacted on 
British tank numbers which reached the front, and kept the British HQ 100 miles in the rear.  
Operation Brevity, 15-17 May 1941.  
Wavell was under enormous pressure during May 1941, sustaining a difficult workload to control 
five campaigns simultaneously across the Mediterranean and Middle East.7 Iraq was still in revolt, 
German intervention into Syria was imminent, the East African campaign had reached a successful 
conclusion but diverted resources, whilst Ultra intelligence clearly indicated an airborne assault on 
Crete was expected in late May and all of these required his valuable time, and limited troops and 
resources. Churchill badgered Wavell for a quick offensive because Ultra decrypts also showed the 
mechanized German 5th Light Division had been defeated at Tobruk and Rommel had been 
ordered to hold along the frontier, so it was an opportunity to strike before the arrival of the new 
15th Panzer Division.8 Wavell, under severe pressure from London to achieve a victory, ordered an 
offensive on the 1 May to recapture the Libyan frontier positions, ‘to secure a good jumping off 
place for an attack on a larger scale.’9  
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Brevity: Terrain 
What has not been emphasized in the existing literature is that the British objectives were too 
numerous in total and even if achieved they could be outflanked by an approach from the desert 
because the terrain was good going for armoured vehicles. The main feature of the terrain along 
the frontier sector was the high escarpment which ran near to the coast at Sollum, and forced any 
major advance by British forces to be divided, (see Fig.1). The coast road ascended the cliff at 
Sollum and at Halfaya Pass five miles to the east, to the plateau above, before continuing onto 
Fort Capuzzo. At Halfaya the upper and lower sections of the track were developed into major 
defensive positions by the Axis, covering the surrounding open ground with heavy anti-tank guns, 
protected by Infantry, wire and minefields. Any forces attacking the pass needed to capture both 
positions which meant a more complicated, simultaneous assault.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:1. Operation Brevity, 15 May 1941 
Beyond Sollum, there was a further ‘line’ of defensive positions which protected the coast road for 
eight miles, through Musaid, Bir Wair and Capuzzo. When added to the two at Halfaya and those 
at Sidi-Aziez, these presented a much more formidable area defence of interlocking fire to British 
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forces. These were just widely enough dispersed to prevent British forces from advancing to 
Tobruk.  Much of the surrounding desert was largely flat with little cover, offering ‘good going’ 
which allowed motorized units to bypass positions inland. Despite this, the modest British force 
available to Brevity was simply unable to cope with the impact of these dispersed objectives. 
Brevity: preparations 
One issue facing Lieutenant-General Beresford-Pierce was limited numbers of troops and too 
many objectives. He designated 22nd Guards Brigade to divide its three battalions into four Jock 
columns.10 They were to be supported by 4th Royal Tanks with just 16 Matilda tanks to lead the 
Infantry assault on Halfaya before moving towards Bir Wair and Capuzzo. The lower Halfaya and 
Sollum positions were to be assaulted by a Coastal Group of one battalion (2nd Rifle Brigade) 
supported by artillery. The ‘Desert Group’ of 2 Cruiser squadrons and three more Jock columns 
from 7th Support Group was to cover the Halfaya attacks and strike towards Capuzzo and beyond.11  
Air Marshal Collishaw believed the most effective way to neutralize enemy armour was to deny it 
petrol and ordered for RAF support to concentrate on ground-strafing sorties against Axis supply 
columns behind the front.12  Therefore British forces were too weak and their doctrine of using 
separated assaults along with Jock Columns had only proven useful in harassing, rather than in 
major operational assaults. In comparison, Axis forces had a line of static units holding the front-
line positions, under the command of Colonel von Herff who had between 30-50 tanks in the 
forward area in direct support. Their vulnerable supply artery was actually the shorter desert route 
to Tobruk along the Trigh Capuzzo and not the more exposed coast road targeted by the RAF. 
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Brevity: battle summary 
Early on the 15 May, the two positions at Halfaya Pass were assaulted and captured by British 
Infantry. The momentum continued so that Bir Wair, Musaid and Fort Capuzzo were also overrun. 
However, 2nd Rifle Brigade struggled to capture lower Halfaya, despite RAF bomber support. The 
Desert Group advanced beyond Capuzzo onto Sidi-Azeiz, but could not halt the subsequent 
counter-attack by the 5th Panzer Regiment which retook both, and then inflicted heavy losses on 
the isolated Jock columns. Brigadier Gott realized that a strong counter-attack was likely and 
ordered a withdrawal back to Halfaya and the weakened Desert Group wisely delayed a 
subsequent counter-attack and also retired.  
The Axis counter-attack was made on the following day and used what became a well-tried 
doctrine of attacking with the low sun behind their vehicles, but avoided closing completely on 
British positions which enabled the latter to withdraw.13 Fort Capuzzo was later recaptured 
because the Jock Columns were overwhelmed by fresh armour and heavier firepower, with one 
report noting, ‘there were 40 Mk IVs in a fold in the ground near Capuzzo…[they] fired a solid shot 
which penetrated our tanks…there were also numerous A/T guns of the same type.’14 By 26 May 
15th Panzer Division had its full complement of tanks on the frontier and its supporting 1/104th 
Rifle Regiment who quickly recaptured both the upper and lower Halfaya positions. The Western 
Desert Force had been pushed back to its original position and needed fresh armour and troops to 
make any further progress against the series of strengthening Axis positions.  
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Brevity: conclusion 
This operation failed because of the impact of terrain which highlighted the weaknesses in British 
assault doctrine.  There were too many Axis defensive positions and these were too widely 
separated for weaker British forces to hold once captured. The numerous positions also forced 
Wavell to use much stronger forces in the subsequent Battleaxe operation to make an effective 
advance beyond them. The multiple and widespread nature of the positions compounded British 
weaknesses in numbers, poor equipment and doctrine. Only four armoured squadrons had been 
used and this was clearly not enough, especially once casualties had been sustained. In doctrinal 
terms, Cruiser and Infantry units still operated separately and were too dispersed, meaning British 
forces had not learnt from the errors of the First Retreat in April. The Infantry Matilda tanks had 
been impervious to Italian guns but now proved vulnerable to the highly effective German anti-
tank guns, with 4th RTR noting that better quality shells penetrated their 78mm frontal armour.15  
Future British combined arms assaults would remain compromised because they revolved around 
the ability of this tank to survive these more effective German guns and carry the Infantry onto 
Axis positions.  The Western Desert Force was still using faulty Infantry doctrine by employing Jock 
columns which dispersed artillery and Infantry in penny-packets. The Guards Brigade held Halfaya 
using Jock columns to harass Axis positions, but made a phased withdrawal when a battlegroup 
attacked and recaptured the same position two weeks later.16 These units were unable to cope 
with subsequent Axis counter-attacks made by more powerful battlegroups. British casualties 
were not excessive but the battle still left two infantry battalions weakened and numerous tanks 
were lost.17  
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More importantly, Brevity signalled likely British intentions for future advances on the frontier to 
reach Tobruk.  Axis forces gained another month to strengthen their positions and increase their 
firepower, which would make future assaults on them even more difficult. The arrival of the 15th 
Panzer Division concentrated German armour at the front and put British forces further on the 
defensive which contributed to delays in the preparations for Battleaxe.18 
Battleaxe: 15-17 June 1941  
By early June Wavell was under even greater pressure from Churchill who demanded, ‘Everything 
must now be centred upon destroying the German forces in the Western Desert, only by this deed 
will you gain the security on your western flank…’19 This second offensive to capture the frontier 
positions and Tobruk was simply a larger scale version of the Brevity plan with similar objectives 
but which still ended in failure. At Churchill’s insistence, a total of 238 new tanks had been rushed 
directly through the Mediterranean for the operation.20 Various studies including Griffiths have 
concentrated on detailed narratives of the fighting, but none emphasize the impact of the terrain 
on the key battles despite discussing the Halfaya pass and Hafid ridge battles.21 This study argues 
that the importance of the terrain has been underestimated while British forces were attempting 
to capture too many widely-dispersed objectives, using poor assault doctrines.  
Battleaxe: Terrain 
The British wanted an ‘armoured battle’ in the open desert, to defeat the Axis armour and move 
quickly towards Tobruk.22 However, their objectives had increased to include capturing both upper 
and lower Halfaya, followed by Sollum, Capuzzo and its flanking defences at Musaid and Bir Wair. 
They were expected to complete a follow up advance to Tobruk. However, this was a demanding 
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series of objectives for two weak Divisions when considering the distances to be covered between 
the Axis positions. 
 
Figure 5:2 Operation Battleaxe 15-17 June 1941.
23
 
The approach to lower Halfaya meant crossing two miles of open ground, which was heavily 
mined. The approach to upper Halfaya, along the top of the escarpment, was broken by numerous 
ravines which were the only cover along the crest-line. Inland on the plateau, Axis forces under 
Rommel’s direction had developed key areas of high ground and turned them into heavily 
defended positions. These positions included Pt 206 which dominated the ground on both sides 
and along with Pt 207 behind it, slowed any approach towards Capuzzo, (see Fig. 2). Further 
inland, the Hafid Ridge was a prominent feature about five miles west of Capuzzo, behind which 
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more Axis armour was concentrated.24 The ridge had three successive crest-lines each with anti-
tank guns, armour and artillery in reserve.25 Near the coast, Fort Capuzzo blocked the road to 
Bardia but was only lightly held as Axis units held the more valuable higher ground in the rear and 
to the south-west, which overlooked the whole area.26  
Battleaxe preparations  
British forces were rebuilt quickly for the operation although weaknesses remained in armour, 
equipment, training and doctrine especially when compared with Axis preparations and 
deployment across numerous defensive sites.  The Western Desert Force had managed to 
strengthen two Divisions; the 7th Armoured Division was built up to two armoured brigades using 
both new and reconditioned tanks, whilst the 4th Indian Division also rebuilt two Infantry Brigades 
each of three battalions with supporting artillery. This was clearly still not enough to capture and 
occupy the numerous enemy positions.  
Churchill had expected great success from the newly arrived ‘Tiger cubs,’ which despite being re-
equipped by mid-June were still experiencing technical problems. Wavell reported that of the new 
tanks, only sixty-seven were in good order with the rest needing hours of maintenance in 
workshops.27 The Regiments only received their new tanks by the 9 June and the 7th Armoured 
Division’s commander urgently requested five more days for crew training which delayed the start 
of the operation to the 15 June.28 The RAF provided air support including 36 Hurricanes, two 
Blenheim squadrons, one Tomahawk squadron and one reconnaissance squadron, and despite the 
inexperience of the crews, they provided effective support on the first day.29 
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There were three planned phases to the operation, starting with the defeat of Axis forces at the 
front and an advance to Bardia-Capuzzo area. This would be followed by an advance to Tobruk-El 
Adem and the defeat of further enemy forces there, and finally a possible exploitation towards 
Derna-Mechili and beyond. It was a huge task and Wavell did warn the Prime Minister that despite 
British strength in tanks and supporting aircraft there still might not be sufficient troops to gain a 
decisive victory.30 On the right the 11th Indian Brigade would divide to assault upper and lower 
Halfaya, with the Cameron Highlanders attacking along the top of the escarpment supported by 20 
Matildas. In the centre column, 22nd Guards Brigade was to assault multiple objectives including Pt 
206, Pt 207 and Capuzzo.31 Further inland again, 7th Armoured Brigade was to capture the Hafid 
ridge and expected to engage an Axis counter-attack for a decisive armoured battle, but Gerald 
Jackson with 6th RTR, believed it was, ‘an ill-fated operation with quite inadequate forces.’32 
Axis units had been distributed into self-sufficient battlegroups across the strongpoints, from the 
coast to fifteen miles inland at Sidi Omar. The forward zone was occupied by German and Italian 
units; the positions at Fort Capuzzo, Musaid and Sollum were strongly held by elements of the 
Italian Trento Division, along with three batteries of artillery.33 Rommel had deployed numerous 
heavy anti-tank guns throughout the front line. All of these positions were supported by lighter 
weapons and protected by Infantry, wire and minefields. The 15th Panzer Division was deployed as 
a mobile reserve, whilst the more experienced 5th Light Division remained in reserve near Tobruk. 
German defensive doctrine emphasised firepower around a key point or Steutzpunkt, to wear 
down their attackers before local reserves of armour delivered a powerful counter-attack.34  
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British intelligence was providing less accurate information than the tactical intelligence provided 
by forward Axis units. On 13 June, it was estimated that the Axis only had 102 tanks and 72 anti-
tank guns along the frontier positions whilst the weakened 5th Panzer Regiment was thought to be 
further back near Tobruk re-fitting and largely unready for combat.35 Ultra reported Axis shortages 
of petrol and trucks which mislead analysts into thinking this would limit their ability to advance or 
counter-attack easily. However, RAF attacks on supply shipping in Benghazi during May had 
limited success as 90% of supplies were still being unloaded.36 In comparison, Axis intelligence 
collated by 621 Signals Company accurately showed British preparations and definite signals 
activity which indicated an offensive to relieve Tobruk. Consequently, Rommel increased numbers 
of anti-tank guns across the positions which Brevity had previously targeted.37  
The British were experiencing command problems when Churchill questioned the appointment of 
Lieutenant-General Beresford-Pierce to command the Western Desert Force. Beresford-Pierce also 
struggled to site his HQ near the front and was forced to place it sixty miles to the rear at Sidi-
Barrani. Any further forward and he would have lost radio contact with the RAF Group HQ at 
Mataan Baggush 100 miles further to the rear.38 This left the control of the tactical battle to the 
Divisional commanders Messervy and O’Moore-Creagh. Messervy noted he was issued plans, 
photos and maps only twelve days before, and realised he had, ‘no knowledge of the country, 
except from…the maps and from one short visit to the area.’39 The long journey to the front 
caused British armoured strength to be reduced before the operation began, leaving 4th RTR with 
only 45 Matildas and 6th RTR with just 35 Crusaders.40 It took two days to move the vehicles up by 
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rail, and a further two days to move the armour 100 miles across the desert while carrying out 
constant repairs.41  
Battleaxe: battle summary 15-17 June 
The first assaults along the top of the escarpment highlighted how the open ground enabled the 
Axis guns to knock out the supporting Matildas at 2,000 yards.42  The supporting Infantry (11th 
Indian Brigade) continued on before being pushed back by an Axis counter-attack.43 The assault at 
Lower Halfaya was similarly halted by Axis fire. The supporting infantry were unable to cross the 
open ground and this effectively ended the assaults on the coastal positions.44 British assault 
doctrine was failing to take account of ground conditions in daylight assaults, which resulted in the 
loss of valuable armour. 
The centre column was more successful and it made combined armoured/ infantry assaults which 
captured Pt 206, Sollum and Fort Capuzzo, with the Matildas of 7th RTR advancing to occupy the 
nearby airfield on the following day.45 However, heavy and accurate Axis gunfire knocked out 
many tanks here and forced the regiment to retire with only 14 vehicles on the 17 May. The 
regiment subsequently engaged an ‘overwhelming Axis column’ which enabled the remnants of 
22nd Armoured Brigade to withdraw.46 The 7th RTR became overextended trying to capture too 
many enemy objectives and fought a separated battle from the infantry support. 
On the left flank, the British Armoured Brigade advanced towards the Hafid Ridge.  However, 
visibility was very poor because of the heat and dust which made observation beyond 1,000 yards 
impossible, and the Brigade was soon under heavy enemy fire. Second RTR made a frontal assault 
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on the second crest-line, with B squadron driving in from the flank and became heavily engaged 
amongst the Axis guns.47 As Joly observed, the armoured assault faltered when support from other 
squadrons failed to materialize.48  The remaining British tanks were quickly lost due to the 
attritional fighting and communication errors which resulted in some tanks driving away in error. 
This was another example of the armour fighting alone without infantry and artillery support. 
The attack on Hafid ridge failed with heavy losses and after a stationery fire-fight 2nd RTR began a 
long slow retreat pushed back by Axis tanks. The armour lost communication with its artillery fire 
support which left 6th RTR isolated and weak.  Troop commander Cyril Joly noted, ‘the gun OPs 
were miles behind and hadn’t a chance of getting up to us. We’ve got to get that better 
organized…have ‘em riding in tanks…the present set-up’s bloody well useless.’49 The British attack 
had been surprised and undermined by the two further crest-lines of the ridge which had enabled 
the Axis anti-tank guns and armour to deploy in-depth. Major Pip Roberts also believed this was 
the reason for the failure of the attack.50 
Another feature of this mobile warfare was that regiments became scattered across different 
objectives very quickly. Despite this, a weakened 7th Armoured Brigade worked alongside the 
artillery to halt an attack by 5th Light Division, and was forced to withdraw 15 miles.51 The British 
artillery was still an effective force, as noted by Gerald Jackson who watched an Axis column 
coming under heavy shell fire which compelled them to withdraw.’52 Even though British units 
were being dispersed according to the battle plan, they were still able to engage the enemy 
effectively. The doctrine was weak, however, as they were each fighting an independent battle 
instead of as a combined force.  
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The key terrain heights remained the focus of the fighting, the remnants of 7th RTR retreated and,  
The sqn arrived at Pt 205 which dominates the entire country. Maj Holden therefore 
decided to hold it…the enemy had overwhelming superiority and attacked from all 
directions... By 1900hrs the remaining five tanks had run out of ammunition and were 
short of fuel so Maj[or] Holden decided to withdraw them.53 
The concluding phase of the battle, on the 17 May showed how better Axis signals intelligence 
helped Rommel win the final phase of the battle. It confirmed that British commanders had lost 
faith in the battle and the remaining concentration of British tanks were forward near Sollum, so 
he ordered his fresh battlegroups to swing towards the coast behind them and thrust north-east 
towards Halfaya. The remnants of 7thArmoured Brigade made a fighting retreat from this thrust 
and Messervy and Beresford-Pierce decided to cancel their planned moves and order a general 
retreat to save the remaining armour. Wavell had come forward to Beresford-Pierce’s HQ on the 
previous afternoon to gain a better picture of events, but the British Commander had already gone 
forward to meet his two Divisional commanders, who had controlled the tactical battle with little 
input from him so far.54 British commanders were now on the spot, like their Axis counter-parts, 
yet they no longer had the armoured strength or the will to alter the course of the operation. 
The battle was influenced by other factors which included poor command and communication 
issues. The 4th Indian Division blamed poor radio links between air and ground units for the failure 
of the operation.55 However, the two Divisional Generals had actually kept good radio security by 
conversing in Hindustani, but other messages back to 13th Corps HQ were more insecure.56 The 
supposedly vital radio message from Creagh back to Beresford-Pierce at 0930hrs on the 17 June, 
was picked up by the German 621 Signals Company and confirmed that British commanders were 
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in doubt about their next move. This intercepted message enabled Rommel to change the 
direction of his counter-attack to outflank 7th Armoured Division. 57  Yet Rommel failed to 
acknowledge this in his own account, and stated that ordered his own advance quickly towards 
Halfaya.58 
The tactical battle was influenced by terrain due to the quantity and distribution of the Axis 
defensive positions. These locations gave Axis armour the time to concentrate for an effective 
counter-attack from a flank position, which in turn undermined the British advance. As in Brevity, 
the objectives were too widespread for the limited forces and some positions such as the Halfaya 
Pass needed more tactical finesse to capture. The three crest lines of the Hafid ridge had 
undermined the British armoured assault as the ill-planned attack was made by armour alone 
against the deep Axis defence position. 
British doctrine had become weakened by the improvised over-use of Jock Columns. The 
armoured assault on the Hafid Ridge had no infantry support because 7th Support Group operated 
in Jock columns in a protective screen on the left flank. There had been a lack of combined arms 
training with Cruiser tanks, and most commanders traditionally used Infantry with ‘I’ tanks. The 
Jock columns kept the artillery too widely dispersed and Royal Artillery commanders were critical 
of the lack of concentration of guns. There was a growing perception the tanks needed mobility 
more than artillery support fire, and that the, ‘over-use of scattered guns in jock columns,’ led to 
armour becoming more self-reliant.59 The British might have used more concentrated supporting 
artillery fire which would have been more effective in covering the assault troops onto the 
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positions. Air support from the RAF had concentrated on units behind the frontline and was 
attritional but did not decisively change the battle.60 
Battleaxe had been hastily planned and carried out with insufficient forces, when more detailed 
planning and better intelligence might have led to some tactical gains. British forces had again 
failed to hold onto any of the numerous objectives and suffered losses which included 1,000 
casualties, 91 tanks and 40 aircraft for no gain. British estimates initially thought Axis losses had 
also been heavy with large numbers of trucks and 700 casualties along with losses of nearly 100 
tanks, but after recovery the Axis had lost just 13 tanks with another 50 damaged and recovered.   
The command and communication structure was also weakened by the scale of the distances 
involved, as seen in the site chosen by Beresford-Pierce for his HQ. This was a poor compromise to 
cope with the fast changing situation in the battle, and was made worse by insecure radio 
procedures. In comparison, Rommel led from the front and placed his tactical HQ alongside his 
leading armoured units, meaning he was able to respond more quickly to British attacks.  
British forces needed fresh reinforcements before any further advance could be considered and 
Churchill finally sacked Wavell who was exchanged with Auchinleck, as CinC India.61 The new CinC 
also insisted on a proper reorganisation of British forces before any further offensive would take 
place. This created the Eighth Army with new equipment and a training period of five months 
before the next offensive, Operation Crusader took place. British planners also had to contend 
with how to overcome the operational terrain problem; of moving a large, well equipped force 
across eighty miles of desert to defeat the enemy. 
                                                          
60
 TNA AIR 27/1588. 274 Squadron Operations: summary of events 1 June-31 July 1941. 
61
 Connell, Wavell, p.484. 
  
Chapter 6 Operation ‘Crusader’ Oct-Dec 1941. 
 
This chapter considers the major British offensive of late 1941 which was designated Operation 
Crusader. It looks at the impact of terrain upon the operational level planning and command 
decisions, as well as how the tactical terrain affected various key battles during the operation. The 
effect on the operational level planning was influenced by the scale of the distances traversed by 
the Eighth Army before Tobruk could be relieved, as well as fighting across two different sectors of 
Libya. The impact of the tactical terrain will be examined as the key battles unfolded in three 
different sectors. This became the focus of the fighting and influenced the outcome as much as 
the issues of command, training, and equipment, which have been the focus of much of the 
previous historiography about the battle. British doctrine will also be considered to show how it 
evolved from previous operations. 
Other studies about Crusader have concentrated on the narrative of this complex twenty day 
battle and argue that the outcome was influenced by other, standard military factors which 
affected British performance, before briefly considering the lessons learnt. De Guingand’s 
memoirs note that it received little attention and was one of the hardest fought battles for the 
Eighth Army which defeated a more experienced Axis force. Geoffrey Cox considered the relief of 
Tobruk was important but the battle had become eclipsed by Second Alamein.1 Tim Moreman 
notes the need to improve British doctrine, and the dispersion of formations,2 while Michael 
Carver discusses the failures of poor equipment and doctrine which again misses the importance 
of the impact of terrain on the tactical battle.3 John Strawson argues that the British command 
was weaker, and the Axis had better gun-armour equipment which affected doctrine but again 
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terrain is not mentioned as a factor.4 Barrie Pitt offers a detailed narrative highlighting the 
separated armoured and infantry actions but again made little of the terrain impact.5 Adrian 
Stewart and Richard Humble both provide detailed narratives and focus on command problems 
but neither comment on the impact of terrain.6  Therefore this study argues that terrain played an 
important part in how British units fought, where they fought and the outcome of key battles. This 
operation was an important step for British forces gaining more combat experience in learning 
how to defeat Axis forces, but there were crucial lessons still not being learnt which were to 
influence future doctrine.  
Crusader terrain: the Frontier sector 
At the operational level, the scale of Cyrenaica and its terrain influenced British planning, due to 
the distances between the Axis frontier defences and the primary objective, Tobruk. The defences 
forced the Eighth Army to divert around them, increasing the distance of the approach march 
towards the Tobruk sector. This created two areas of British operations and drew away large 
numbers of British units just to contain the frontier sector. The frontier defences also diverted 
Rommel’s attention away from the more vital Sidi Rezegh battle, which gave Eighth Army forces 
there a chance to regroup for the final phase of operations to relieve Tobruk. 
Tactically the Axis frontier positions had been strengthened over the previous four months, from 
Sollum to the Omars and were sited on the dominating heights for twenty miles along the frontier 
wire. New Zealand Intelligence Officer Geoffrey Cox thought that they provided, ‘the Germans 
there with a very defensible line.’7 The problem for British forces was that each position had to be 
                                                          
4
 John Strawson, The Battle for North Africa (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969) pp.103-107 
5
 Pitt, Crucible of War, Vol II, pp.43-153. 
6
 Adrian Stewart, The Early Battles of the Eighth Army. ‘Crusader’ to the Alamein Line 1941-1942 (Barnsley: 
Leo Cooper, 2002) p.39 and Richard Humble, Crusader Eighth Army’s forgotten victory. November 1941-
January 1942 (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1987) p.200. A Pyrrhic victory was a battle won, but at great cost to the 
winning side. 
7
 Cox, A Tale of Two Battles, p.163. 
100 
 
contained, assaulted and captured, during which time the Axis garrisons were extending local 
minefields throughout the blockade.8 At the southern end of the line, the Omars were considered 
the most formidable positions as they consisted of three strong points which were all sited to 
cover each other. These targets were blockaded for several weeks and were assaulted at the end 
of Operation Crusader. 
Crusader terrain: the Sidi Rezegh sector  
The ridges south-east of Tobruk became the main focus of the fighting during Crusader and largely 
defined the outcome of the main battle. The terrain here was dominated by three parallel 
escarpments and the high ground along each provided good artillery observation over lower 
ground on either side, which enabled units to target concentrations of vehicles and men. The 
control of this area and of the Sidi Rezegh airfield played a major role in defining success and 
failure for both sides. The airfield became a focus for British commanders because it was an 
important Axis supply route and its capture would force the Luftwaffe further away from the 
frontier.9   
The three escarpments ran broadly east-west and were the most prominent terrain features in this 
sector. The first or northerly one was the Ed-Duda ridge, which overlooked the Axis bypass road 
and Panzergruppe HQ and was the objective for the break-out by 70th Division from Tobruk. The 
second or middle escarpment was situated south of the Trigh Capuzzo, and was the highest 
feature reaching 192 metres in places. Other key heights along this ridge were Pt 163, overlooking 
the airfield on its southern side and five miles east at Pt 175, another prominent circular hill was 
made naturally defensive by defiles on either side.10  
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Figure 6:1 Crusader, Sidi Rezegh, November-December 1941.
11
 
The ridge was passable for vehicles onto the southern slopes but was too steep on the northern 
slopes to descend except in a few places.12 The third escarpment was three miles south of Sidi-
Rezegh airfield and became more prominent further westwards to overlook the El-Adem airfield. 
The south side of this ridge provided a staging area for both sides as they made approaches north 
towards the airfield. The final area of ground which saw major fighting was south-east from the 
Tobruk perimeter where numerous Axis defensive positions were sited across low ground and lead 
towards the northern escarpment at the Ed Duda ridge. These operational sectors of eastern 
Cyrenaica influenced Eighth Army commanders’ decisions during planning and contributed to the 
outcome of the fighting at the tactical level as much as other military factors. 
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Crusader: preparations  
Auchinleck delayed another summer offensive, despite pressure from Churchill, because he 
argued that the Eighth Army needed time to reorganize, train and re-equip, ‘as an essential part of 
the preparations for driving the enemy out of Libya.’13 Even though fresh reinforcements, 
including American Stuart tanks and British Cruisers arrived in August and September, he realized 
the armoured regiments would not be trained or prepared enough until mid-November.14 The 
subsequent preparations for Crusader took place on a vast scale and ensured that the Eighth Army 
was well equipped, though training levels varied between units. Reinforcements came in from 
Britain and the Empire, including 27,300 in new formations and 17,000 for existing units along 
with 2,100 new tanks, which gave Auchinleck the three to two ratio of armour he wanted to begin 
the offensive. Other new equipment arrived up to October including over 34,000 trucks, 600 field 
guns and 200 anti-tank guns along with thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition.15  
The Eighth Army used the four months build up to reorganize and improve training. The Infantry 
were grouped mainly in 13th Corps, under Lieutenant-General Godwen-Austen, with 2nd New 
Zealand Division and 4th Indian Division both increased to three Brigades each, supported by the 
1st Army Tank Brigade. The main armoured formation was 30th Corps, under Lieutenant-General 
Norrie, the 7th Armoured Division had three full Armoured Brigades plus its Support Group, while 
the 1st South African Division had two Infantry Brigades and the experienced 22nd Guards Brigade 
attached. Some units still needed further training so the mid-November start date was delayed 
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further.16 Despite the lengthy build-up, not all units had the time for doctrinal training and 
consequently there was little real change in battle tactics. 
The RAF made thorough preparations to achieve air superiority and support for the Army and had 
built up 500 aircraft in nine bomber and nineteen fighter squadrons. Liaison with the Army 
improved as Air Vice-Marshal Coningham sited his HQ alongside Eighth Army HQ for closer 
cooperation.17 The bombers began a month long, phased campaign which targeted the major Axis 
airbases at Derna, Tmimi and Gazala, increasing the intensity of raids in the final week before the 
ground offensive.18 The RAF provided a combination of regular fighter sweeps over the battlefield 
and medium-bombing raids on enemy concentrations of MET,19 along with deeper raids on enemy 
airfields and supply routes.20 A new fighter-bomber squadron was created to specifically target 
Axis supply trucks and air cover improved as the fighter squadrons were made ready to take over 
landing grounds just behind the front.21 Problems still remained over operational control and 
there were delays in signalling targets back to squadrons for them to react in time but overall the 
RAF provided solid support for the Army, which was an improvement on previous operations.  
Auchinleck was criticized about his choice of commander for the Eighth Army prior to this vital 
offensive. He appointed General Sir Alan Cunningham, who had defeated the Italians in East 
Africa, but who had not yet faced German forces and had no experience in armoured warfare. The 
CinC defended his decision to London despite their wishes for the more experienced Maitland-
Wilson to have been appointed. British forces were to suffer from command problems during the 
operation when Cunningham suffered a breakdown at a critical moment and Auchinleck had to 
take direct command for a period. Cunningham’s style of command was seen by contemporaries 
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as weak. Brigadier John Harding, then BGS at 13th Corps HQ noted that, ‘Orders formed a basis for 
discussion rather than something that had to be done.’22 There were also errors in the selection of 
plans made by GHQ and approved by Auchinleck, which were forced on Cunningham. The final 
choice was a compromise of options designed to protect the vulnerable Infantry formations 
against armoured assault and bring the Panzer Divisions to battle.  
The main task of 30th Armoured Corps was to advance south of Tobruk and await the Axis 
response to bring about an armoured battle, whilst the Infantry of 13th Corps would screen the 
frontier defences and then advance west once the Axis armour had been defeated.23  The plan was 
altered and weakened after objections from the New Zealand General Freyberg and Godwen-
Austen at 13th Corps, who both wanted to protect the Infantry if attacked by armour, consequently 
the 4th Armoured Brigade was re-assigned to cover the Infantry flank. General Freyberg was 
seriously worried because his battalions only had four anti-tank guns each, and he feared they 
would be easily overrun by Panzers, as had happened in Greece.24 The New Zealand Division would 
be divided to screen the frontier defences and advance west towards Tobruk, while the 4th Indian 
Division was to assault the Libyan Omars to clear the forward supply routes.  
In Tobruk, the breakout by 70th Division was well planned in every detail by Brigadier Willison of 
the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, who trained his troops in combined arms assaults. They had the 
difficult task of advancing ten miles to the Ed-Duda ridge through some extensive Axis defences. 
This part of Crusader was more successful because Willison ensured all ranks understood their 
tasks and became used to working together.25 Other diversionary attacks included Commando and 
SAS raids as well as ‘Oasis Force’, a unit designed to create havoc in the Axis rear supply routes and 
cut the road near Benghazi. Although some of these diversionary attacks failed, Oasis Force did 
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cause some anxiety to the Panzergruppe HQ who brought in additional air units from Sicily in 
reply.26 Overall, the task of planning for Crusader involved bringing all these elements together to 
defeat the Axis forces. They were a complex set of objectives which was asking a lot from a newly 
formed army. 
Axis forces had been building up to assault Tobruk in November since Rommel’s victory in mid-
June. However, both German and Italian Divisions were struggling to increase men and resources 
due to the stranglehold on Axis supplies by the Royal Navy and RAF on Malta. Their Air Forces 
were now weaker than the RAF, as there were only 300 Axis aircraft operational in Libya although 
they could call on reserves of planes from elsewhere. The Axis supply shortage led to petrol 
shortages by November and this had principally delayed Rommel’s planned assault on Tobruk 
which was just nearing completion. 
Sidi-Rezegh: battle summary 
One of the major successes for the Eighth Army was the discipline and precision by which it 
advanced into Cyrenaica with numerous large Brigade Groups. The left flank was protected by the 
Reconnaissance Regiments from 1st South African Division because of their strength and 
expertise.27 The advance placed the bulk of 30th Corps south-east of Tobruk awaiting a reaction 
from the Panzer Divisions. The reaction was slow because Rommel disbelieved early reports about 
the British advance and there was no air reconnaissance due to the stormy weather which flooded 
all Axis airfields. The battle for Sidi Rezegh Airfield developed through a series of armoured 
engagements and Infantry defence against attacking Axis battlegroups, with 13th Corps Brigades 
advancing either side of the second escarpment to reach Sidi Rezegh. 
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The impact of terrain and doctrine on the battle 
In early armoured engagements, units dispersed in order to capture objectives and engage the 
enemy armour. The later Infantry assaults also dispersed as they attempted to overcome key 
landscape features on the escarpments in order to gain the higher ground. British doctrine still 
operated with separate actions by Armour and Infantry rather than by combined assault. In one 
action the 4th Armoured Brigade engaged a battlegroup from 21st Panzer Division at Gabr-Saleh, at 
only two-thirds strength. The terrain also influenced the fighting at Sidi-Rezegh when the 6th RTR 
captured the airfield but was drawn into attacking Axis positions on the ridge above.28  
British commanders continued to direct separate Armoured Brigades to engage enemy 
formations, the 4th Armoured spent most of the first five days chasing Axis formations but with 
little success. Armour was directed across the Sidi-Rezegh ridge and north-west towards the Ed-
Duda ridge, Lieutenant-General Norrie directed the 7th Armoured Brigade to make this link-up with 
the 70th Division, because Axis forces were thought to be weaker there. The attack also failed 
because there were command errors and poor doctrine. The attack initially combined two 
Armoured Regiments with the 2nd Rifle Brigade to assault the Ed-Duda ridge but the 7th Hussars 
were diverted back to defend the airfield. The attack was initially successful with Pt 167 secured, 
after which two squadrons from 6th RTR advanced towards Ed-Duda but were halted by strong 
enemy gun positions leaving the unit decimated.29 A combined assault had been reduced to a 
weak armoured thrust which had been easily halted by well sited guns. 
Another issue for British tactics was that newly arrived units showed their inexperience in combat 
and doctrine, despite training in the UK. The 22nd Armoured Brigade engaged the Ariete Division at 
Bir el Gubi because it was considered an easier objective. They began with a frontal assault by one 
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regiment supported by a single artillery battery, ’the position was overrun in a dashing cavalry 
charge…(we lost 35 of our 53 [Crusaders])…[and] we were not able to hold the ground and were 
ordered to retreat.’30 The two remaining Regiments attacked later and halted by minefields and 
anti-tank fire, so that the Brigade was outflanked and forced to withdraw by a later Axis counter-
attack. British Armoured Brigades were not combining with Infantry and were delivering poorly 
coordinated frontal assaults on strong Axis positions for no gain. 
Another feature of the separated armoured battle was the high attrition rates suffered by 
Regiments against these defended positions. Having been weakened in the early actions, the 7th 
Armoured Brigade and its Support Group defended the Sidi-Rezegh ridge and airfield over two 
days which left both formations very weak by the 23 November.31 Units were reformed and re-
equipped around surviving personnel, but were largely incapable of further offensive action. The 
weak defence forced the 4th Armoured Brigade to return the airfield but its two remaining 
Regiments, the 3rd and 5th RTR, also suffered further heavy losses and were reduced to just 12 
tanks. British armour suffering attrition faster than tanks and crews could be replaced. The 
weakened units also had to attack Axis defensive positions on the Sidi Rezegh ridge which held low 
profile anti-tank guns in rough ground and caused further losses.  
Other factors which influenced the outcome were failures of doctrine and Command. British 
doctrine proved weak when Armoured Regiments disengaged because of their practice for 
replenishing of fuel and ammunition, the 3rd RTR initially assisted 1st South African Division’s 
defence on low ground but was ordered away to replenish leaving the isolated Infantry Brigade 
which was later overrun.32  
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Another failure was for British HQs to direct Regiments towards different objectives. Informed by 
Ultra intelligence, General Cunningham changed his plans on the 21 November to meet an 
expected Panzer thrust. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades were combined to receive it, but 
Cunningham also then separated the 1st South African Division to screen both Bir el Gubi and Sidi-
Rezegh airfield. HQs were put out of action by the mobile nature of operations when they were 
overrun by enemy columns, the 4th Armoured HQ was overrun and was temporarily out of action, 
whilst the 8th Hussars lost 35 tanks captured in night-close leaguer which meant it was unable to 
support the vulnerable 5th South African Brigade which was overrun on open ground the following 
day.33 British Commander directed forces to hold the both Sidi Rezegh airfield and the Third 
Escarpment to the south. A weakened 22nd Armoured Brigade reached the escarpment and 
assisted the weak 2nd RTR against strong Panzer attacks. They were held up by anti-tank fire and 
dust which created total confusion because of the lack of visibility. They moved to outflank these 
guns but the Brigade remained caught on the ridge for the rest of the day.34  
The Infantry Brigades also fought separate battles as they approached Sidi-Rezegh, the 2nd NZ 
Division and the 5th SA Brigades both fought separate actions as they made their approach 
marches to the airfield. The South Africans were too slow approaching from the south and were 
caught in the open and overrun by a powerful attack by DAK.35 In comparison on the frontier 
sector the 4th Indian Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade, made set-piece Infantry attacks supported 
by ‘I’ Tanks, similar in type to the Compass assaults in 1940. 
The 2nd NZ Division was assigned multiple objectives and the approach march towards Sidi-Rezegh 
which was 100 miles away and took four nights to reach. Each Brigade had a different objective, 
the 4th Brigade moved north-west to cut the Tobruk road, while the 6th Brigade directly west to 
                                                          
33
 Birkby, Uncle George, p.218. 
34
 Bovington Archives 2
nd
 RTR War Diary. Account of Operations of Composite Squadron, 22 November 1941. 
Two Regiments only; the 4
th 
CLY and 2
nd 
RTR. 
35
 Birkby, Uncle George, pp.183-240, is based on Brink’s unpublished report of Jan 1942. 
109 
 
support Sidi-Rezegh each supported by a Regiment of ‘I’ tanks. The Brigades took four days to 
reach Pt 175, because they had to clear Axis battlegroups from their rear to maintain their supply 
routes.  The 6th NZ Brigade moved along the escarpment and 4th Brigade was north of it, directed 
towards Belhamed ridge and both were in continuous contact with the enemy which caused heavy 
casualties and forced two battalions to be amalgamated. The key Pt 175 was taken after hard 
fighting along the ridge by 6th NZ Brigade.36 
The Infantry assaults were weakened because they were made without any powerful armoured 
support, the attack by the 4th Brigade on Belhamed was made by two battalions with no artillery 
support after an approach march of 6,000 yards. Belhamed was captured but was then subjected 
to heavy shelling, which caused further high casualties amongst the units which were surrounded 
by Axis positions on lower ground between them and Sidi-Rezegh ridge. 37 
The heavy attrition forced the New Zealanders to make a weak daylight assault on the low ground 
with just two companies of 20th Infantry Battalion and three tanks to clear the machine gun 
positions which was a complete failure. The supporting artillery quickly ran out of ammunition and 
smoke whilst.38 Casualties continued until the battalion was overrun by a large Axis Battlegroup. In 
comparison the 19th Battalion had by-passed Belhamed to the north and made contact with the 
Tobruk garrison on the Ed-Duda ridge, though this link was briefly closed again by Axis attacks.39 
The need to capture Belhamed and Pt 175 had exhausted the 4th NZ Brigade in a succession of 
assaults which highlighted the influence of terrain and the weakness of the assault doctrine. 
The combination of factors of terrain, numerous objectives and weak formations highlighted the 
weaknesses in doctrine. British forces further east targeted the Axis positions dug-in near Bir el 
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Gubi and along the Trigh Capuzzo. Those on the Trigh were considered too well dug in, so 7th 
Armoured Division moved against the Italian units near El-Gubi. Unfortunately the 11th Indian 
Brigade with just one squadron of Tanks and the 4th Armoured Brigade with 98 tanks and its 
Support Group, all fought separate actions rather than making a combined assault. The key heights 
were again the main objectives of for each assault, the 11th Indian’s attack was only partially 
successful in securing Pt 182 which overlooked the position and they failed to secure Pt 174 
nearby.40  
The improvised doctrine defined that the Support Group and Reconnaissance Regiment would 
hold off an enemy force using Jock Columns and harassment when the Armoured Division had 
suffered major losses, until it had recovered sufficiently enough to return to the offensive again.41 
This is what happened during Crusader and successes for the Jock columns ensured their 
continued use well into 1942. The 7th Armoured Division had followed this defensive doctrine and 
appeared to be fighting with all units, but in reality the Brigades still fought separate actions. 
Operation Crusader was an important British offensive which lasted for 20 days and resulted in a 
costly victory. They had succeeded in relieving Tobruk and pushed back Axis forces out of most of 
Cyrenaica. They retreated to a defensible position near Mersa Brega so that Eighth Army was able 
to re-occupy Benghazi and the western airfields. Historians have failed to properly emphasize the 
importance of the terrain which influenced the fighting throughout. The key terrain features at 
Sidi-Rezegh had dominated the key battles in the central sector of the battlefield and they had 
become the main objectives of British operations, such as the Ed Duda feature which divided the 
forces breaking out of Tobruk with Eighth Army outside. The tactical terrain included a 
‘quadrilateral’ of heights near the Sidi-Rezegh airfield which all became objectives and this 
dispersed British forces trying to capture them. The operational distances in this part of Cyrenaica 
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had influenced British planning and on-going decisions by Eighth Army HQ, who divided its 
Brigades to either blockade the frontier with Infantry or sent its Armoured Brigades to Tobruk to 
engage the Axis. 
The victory drew British forces too far forward again into Cyrenaica, which left them over-
extended, and short of supplies but with another long front line held by the improvised Jock 
Columns. British forces would again be vulnerable to future Axis counter-attacks. They had not 
developed their doctrine to be fully concentrated or using combined arms again. Units were still 
directed towards too many objectives which were too widespread. British doctrine continued 
using dispersal tactics as there was an increased use of Jock columns within major operations. This 
improvised tactical doctrine undermined the subsequent defence of western Cyrenaica in January.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 7 Gazala and Tobruk, May-June 1942 
 
The battles for the Gazala line during May and June 1942 were the Eighth Army’s second attempt 
at a defensive battle that year and ended in a major defeat. Strategically it was the last defensive 
position in eastern Cyrenaica, but operationally it was a battle for the defence of Tobruk and its 
adjacent supply bases. However, it failed to develop into the armoured counter-stroke envisaged 
by Ritchie and Auchinleck. At the tactical level, the Eighth Army was outmanoeuvred from a series 
of ridgeline positions.  This chapter argues that the key terrain features had a repeated impact 
throughout the battle and also on British doctrine. Gazala was a defensive battle over an artificial 
line in the desert. Once each of these positions had been lost British units had little choice but to 
retreat beyond the frontier. The Army had also failed to improve its doctrine of combined arms in 
either attack or defence, due to weaknesses in command and the on-going problems of poor 
quality armour and training, which until now, have always been cited as the main reasons for 
British failure.  
Until recently the battle has remained much less obvious in the historiography, often being part of 
the story of the general retreat from El Agheila to Alamein and of course overshadowed by the 
later victory at Second Alamein. Alan Moorehead believed that it was the loss of Bir Hacheim 
which undermined the British frontline, combined with the loss of armour around the 12 June, 
whilst Niall Barr concentrates on the problems of command and lack of an effective tactical 
doctrine in the Eighth Army, which led to the British defeat.1 The official history blames the defeat 
of British armour on the 12-13 June which enabled Axis forces to capture Tobruk. Michael Carver 
offers the most detailed study of the battle but essentially defends Lieutenant-General Ritchie as 
Army CinC and blames poor command by Auchinleck down to Divisional level commanders and 
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poor doctrine.2 Adrian Stewart also blames poor command practice as does Barrie Pitt’s detailed 
narrative which highlights the loss of armour and the command confusion in a fast moving mobile 
battle.3 John Strawson thought the major loss of armour from the 12-13 June was the turning 
point along with an over-rigid plan and the lack of combined arms doctrine.4 Lieutenant-General 
Francis Tuker blamed the lack of direction from both Eighth Army HQ and Auchinleck at GHQ, 
following the defeat in the Cauldron on the 5-6 June. 5 Ken Ford’s recent account offers a fresh 
narrative but argues there were no discernible terrain features and that Rommel largely dictated 
the battle.6 However the tactical terrain of the battlefield also influenced these factors and 
materially contributed to the results of the fighting. 
Gazala: terrain 
The British sited their defences at Gazala on the best available terrain features in that sector of 
eastern Cyrenaica, where Tobruk could be protected, forward of its 1941 defensive line. The line 
was created to be a strong defensive position to protect Tobruk and the new Belhamed railhead. It 
was based on a forty-five mile long minefield running south/south-east from Gazala on the coast 
road and covered the main Trigh routes going east.7 Ritchie planned to hold it using defensive 
‘Boxes’ which overlooked the extensive mine-belt. Interlocking boxes covered the coast road in 
the north whilst the desert flank was protected by the Bir Hacheim box.  
In the centre of the line the main feature was the Sidi-Muftah depression, with the Trigh Capuzzo 
passing east-west through it. Its northern edge was the Sidra ridge which also dominated the open 
plain to the north behind the minefield. The eastern edge of Sidi-Muftah was the Aslagh ridge 
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which also overlooked the Bir-Hacheim track running north to Tobruk. The plain north of the Sidra 
ridge had some key heights which were used as defended localities later on but their weakness 
was that they were easily outflanked and isolated. The plain continued north to the next key 
heights which included a steep escarpment overlooking the coast road into Tobruk. This ridge 
included a series of boxes or ‘keeps’ along the ridgeline at Mrassas, Acroma and El-Adem, 
designed to protect Tobruk. The concept of dispersion of forces continued in British command 
thinking as further keeps and lines of minefields were under construction during the battle.8  
The centre position of the British line was an open plateau east of the Sidra ridge, quickly named 
the ‘Knightsbridge box’. It was constructed by the 201st Guards Brigade and was sited to dominate 
the junction and ridgeline at Pt 167 near the crossroads of the Trigh Capuzzo and Bir Hacheim 
tracks. The tracks ran east to the El-Adem airfields and this box became crucial to holding the 
centre of the line. Knightsbridge was at the centre of a series of ridges which included the Maabus 
and Rigel ridges to the north, the Hagieg-Batruna ridge north-east and Bir Bir-Belleiffa ridge 
running east, which all formed terrain which held an Axis approach from the south. At the 
southern end of the line, the Bir Hacheim box was based on a low ridge which overlooked ground 
to the south and west; the defensive area itself was dominated by a pivotal observation point at Pt 
186, which if captured made the site untenable.9 The southern end of the line had a second belt of 
minefields running back north-east to the Aslagh ridge near the centre.  
The weakness of the Gazala line due the open flank has been well documented and is not 
disputed.  However, the line could be outflanked if Axis forces broke through past the 
Knightsbridge Box into the plain north of the Rigel ridge or east along the Trigh Capuzzo.10 The line 
had been designed to hold an enemy from the west but it was also equally important for the 
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Eighth Army to hold against an advance from the south and the Knightsbridge sector was the only 
place to do this. The terrain was at the forefront of Richie’s defensive planning. He was, 
‘concerned to keep control of the pivotal positions...to keep his armour within close distance 
ready.’11 This example shows how Richie’s thinking was influenced by the prominent ridges in the 
centre of the line and the doctrine of defensive boxes. 
 
Figure 7:1 The Gazala line, May-June 1942.
12
 
Gazala: Plans and preparations 
The Infantry Brigades were deployed in boxes behind the minefield line. These were defensive 
positions for Infantry and artillery batteries, each designed to hold independently for three weeks 
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and were surrounded by wire and minefields. Richie wanted the nearby armoured brigades to 
manoeuvre and counter-attack the enemy after they had been weakened by attacking the box 
defences. As late as the 26 May, GHQ confirmed the importance of a defensive line backed by 
armour Brigades. It called for ‘defended localities’ (smaller box defences) to be reduced in number 
and for units to counter-attack from within the battle area.13 The Eighth Army was allowing 
Panzerarmee to make the first strike which was a sensible option, given the lack of training for an 
effective combined arms doctrine but was a dangerous one if the Axis succeeded in breaking 
through the line to the supply base at Tobruk. 
Ritchie’s plan was for an armoured counter-attack which would decisively defeat Panzerarmee.14 
Despite increases in the Eighth Army’s strength there were too few Brigade Groups to hold the 
whole line because there was still not enough manpower. Therefore an Axis approach around the 
open desert flank could not be prevented. In mid-February, Joint Planners at GHQ reported that 
the Eighth Army would have the forces necessary for an offensive to begin by early May, despite 
an equivalent Axis build up and dealing with the problems of operations in summer heat. It 
wanted a limited advance to capture the Derna-Martuba area and ideally to capture Benghazi.15 
Yet by mid-March, ‘Q’ Branch planners noted there was still a lack of direction and offered only 
cautious plans to supply a limited number of brigades at either 130 miles or 200 miles distant from 
Tobruk. To achieve even this modest advance across Cyrenaica, the two supply bases would 
operate at the maximum rate.16 These administrative problems contributed to a more cautious 
approach by Ritchie, despite heavy pressure from the Prime Minister and COS for a renewed 
offensive to relieve the air assault on Malta.  
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The coastal sector was more strongly held by three South African Brigade boxes and two Brigades 
from 50th Division. It’s third Brigade, was belatedly moved south to cover a gap in the centre at the 
Sidi-Muftah depression. This new defensive box was isolated being six miles from its neighbouring 
Brigade in the north and ten miles from the Free French Brigade at Bir Hacheim. It had a twenty 
mile perimeter and no protective minefield across the rear.17 At Bir Hacheim, the southern edge of 
the Eighth Army’s defence was held by the 1st Free French Brigade who had deployed large 
numbers of additional anti-tank and artillery guns which were well dug in.  
The Armoured brigades were positioned behind the line to counter-attack enemy thrusts. Ritchie 
was concerned to, ‘retain his armour, for a concentrated effort’ and he held lengthy discussions on 
where these would be best deployed to counter the Axis armour. 18 Auchinleck believed the Axis 
would attack in the centre and north whilst Ritchie thought they would swing around the southern 
flank at Bir Hacheim. At 30th Corps, Lieutenant-General Norrie predicted that the main offensive 
would be in the north, and directed the armoured brigades to fight a separate battle.19  The 4th 
Armoured Brigade was deployed in the south to fight using ridges three miles east of Bir Hacheim. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, of 3rd RTR noted how they spent weeks selecting a near perfect hull 
down ‘battle position’ from which to defend against the Axis advance, but were unable to reach it 
in time for the actual battle.20 
By now the Eighth Army had become a sizable force with numerous Brigade Groups in Cyrenaica. 
The armour was mostly in 30th Corps and consisted of 1st and 7th Armoured Divisions and three 
Motor Infantry Brigade Groups. The 13th Corps had three Infantry Divisions, supported by one 
Army Tank Brigade and an additional Infantry Brigade. The lack of training remained an issue 
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within many of these formations; some troops had only recently arrived at the front and were 
inexperienced in desert conditions. The Brigade groups were equipped new weapons to fight the 
German armour, including American Grant tanks and a limited number of better 6pdr anti-tank 
guns, both of which gave improved firepower. Artillery and anti-tank regiments were reorganized 
but there were only enough Grants to partially equip each regiment and only a few batteries had 
received the new guns.21 Brigadier Briggs, commanding 2nd Armoured Brigade, noted that one 
regiment had received their Grant tanks just a few days before the offensive began.22 This limited 
the vital training time that tank crews had with the new equipment. 
The Axis forces had spent months being re-equipped and were well prepared for this offensive. 
The Panzerarmee also reorganized its structure with the emphasis more firepower and fewer men. 
Rommel also created his own mixed Kampstaffel battalion and had the best mobile Italian 
divisions, Ariete and Trieste, which gave him five well-balanced Divisions for the offensive. Other 
Italian Infantry Divisions held the line opposite the mine-belt and provided diversionary attacks to 
pin down the British frontline boxes. The Axis plan included a night-time approach march south 
around the British line, then swinging north-east, to overrun Bir Hacheim and  defeat the British 
armour, followed by a rapid advance north to capture Tobruk.  
Despite the reverses in February, the Eighth Army believed it was ready to fight the Panzerarmee 
again. Morale remained high and the men still had, ‘absolute confidence’ in the Allied cause but 
there was impatience at getting on with winning the war.  By mid-May one report noted, ‘current 
morale is exceedingly high. Men are convinced an offensive will soon begin and a considerable 
number express the opinion that this time they will finish the enemy once and for all.’23  However, 
other censorship summaries noted praise for Rommel and a lack of confidence in their own 
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commanders who were blamed for recent failures. Overall British forces were becoming more 
experienced and were well supplied if somewhat disparate in quality of experience, training and 
equipment and faced a well-organized and experienced enemy with a dynamic commander and 
better tactical doctrine. These factors certainly influenced the coming battle but British tactical 
thinking and planning also hinged on holding key terrain features and so terrain was became an 
additional vital factor in determining the outcome of battle. 
Gazala: battle summary 
Gazala developed into a lengthy and complex battle for the Eighth Army. The first tactical 
engagements took place across a series of ridges in the southern sector when two Motorised 
Brigades were contacted and overrun within hours. Following this the British armoured Brigades 
were also engaged and quickly reduced to weak regiments in strength. These were followed by 
two major Axis assaults on the Bir Hacheim and Sidi-Muftah boxes, the former held out until the 
12 June but the latter succumbed more quickly when the key heights around it were captured by 
the Axis.  
British armour continued to engage at the flanks of these assaults and took part in the ill-fated 
Operation Aberdeen with 5th Indian Division, when the Panzerarmee went over to the defensive 
for a brief period on the 5-6 June. A second phase of armoured engagements took place in 
defence of the Knightsbridge box and the Maabus-Rigel ridge, followed by a larger battle over the 
12-13 June. The armoured losses on these two days have been considered by many to be the 
turning point of the battle, yet the 6th RTR regimental diary noted it was the losses prior to this 
which weakened the Brigade irreparably and left it unable to cope with the heavy fighting which 
followed. The final stage of Gazala occurred as both Bir Hacheim and Knightsbridge boxes and the 
central ridgeline were abandoned, with Eighth Army units retreating rapidly north to the 
Acroma/El-Adem ridge-line around Tobruk. This also forced the static 1st South African Division and 
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50th Divisions to retreat from their boxes and escape to the frontier. The final phase included the 
capture of the Acroma/El Adem ridge and the rapid assault which led to the fall of Tobruk.  
Gazala: the impact of terrain and doctrine on the battle 
The impact of terrain and the effectiveness of British doctrine will be discussed through the main 
phases of the battle.  The Armoured Brigades engaged the approaching Axis columns separately 
from the Infantry and during these early engagements their battle quickly became attritional with 
two regiments of the 4th Armoured Brigade losing most of their tanks on the first day.24 The 8th 
Hussars concluded that, ‘Owing to the rapidity of [the Axis] advance…no adequate warning was 
received by the regiment… [so] the enemy was able to affect a surprise attack.’25 The losses 
compounded the problem of there being too few heavy tanks; the 3rd RTR had just 24 Grants and 
lost 19 of these on the first day.26 The 4th Brigade had 100 Grants, however the other Brigades had 
only 50 Grants.27 The adjacent 2nd Armoured Brigade was ‘sadly depleted’ and by the 31st May only 
one regiment, the Queen’s Bays, remained as a viable unit.28 The 1st Army Tank Brigade also fought 
separately from the Infantry, the 44th RTR engaged Axis armour from the Aslagh ridge, using it as 
cover for hull down positions, but lost heavily in a close quarter tank melee. The terrain impacted 
on the battle because the Regiment’s advance was halted by the steepness of the Hagiaget-Rigel 
ridge, so that only one squadron actually closed with the larger enemy formation and the regiment 
lost another third of the unit.29 The constant daily battles were rapidly wearing out British 
Armoured Regiments through losses to crews and vehicles which left them too weak in 
subsequent actions. 
                                                          
24
 TNA WO 169/4486. 8 King's Royal Irish Hussars, Diary.1941 Nov.- 1942 Dec. 27 May 42. 
25
 TNA WO 169/4486. 8 King's Royal Irish Hussars, Diary.1941 Nov.- 1942 Dec. Temporary Diary 27 May. 
26
 Bovington Archives 3
rd
 RTR Files. Some notes on the Knightsbridge battles after conversations with 
General Roberts (who commanded 3
rd
 RTR there). 
27
 LHCMA Roberts GPB, Papers. Comparison of British and German Tanks, May 1942, report by Major Carver. 
28
 IWM.8109. 99/1/2.Papers of Maj. Gen. R. Briggs. 2
nd
Armd Bde. 2/5. Western Desert Dec 41-Oct 42. 
29
 TNA WO 201/539.Eighth Army: intelligence matters. Nov 41-Aug 42.Report By Brigade Major, 1
st
 Army 
Tank Brigade, on the action Fought By 50 Div. Mobile Reserve, p.1, (18 out of 51 tanks). 
121 
 
The deployment of Infantry inside defensive boxes continued the doctrine of fighting separate 
battles for armour and Infantry with occasional support by artillery. The first major defence of a 
box was made by the recently arrived 150th Brigade, a territorial unit with little experience of the 
desert. Some units were inexperienced, yet the Brigade Major believed it was the loss of higher 
ground which decided Brigadier Haydon to retreat to new positions nearby.30 The 5th Green 
Howards noted, ‘the enemy continues massing in the east, overlooking the box and shelling 
heavily all the time.’31 The capture of the height B.175 late on the 30 May gave the Axis a good 
view of the defences which were then heavily and accurately shelled the following day.32  
The 150th Brigade had been rushed to occupy this area just prior to the battle, and had little time 
to construct decent defensive positions in low ground. This hurried deployment was a serious 
error and Axis forces took full advantage of gaining the high ground and preventing British support 
from reaching the Brigade. After spending three days assaulting the position, the Panzerarmee 
reached a turning point when 232 Field Engineer Company was overrun and this gave the Axis, ‘a 
vantage point from which a greater part of the Brigade position could be overlooked.’33 The 
defences were steadily eliminated and overrun on the 1 June. Attempts were made to relieve the 
Infantry by the weakened 4th Armoured Brigade who attacked the eastern side of the cauldron, but 
were repulsed with heavy losses. The Eighth Army had lost a key central position which threatened 
the adjacent boxes and another Infantry Brigade. Its defensive doctrine had been undermined and 
the armoured counter-attacks were constantly suffering attrition which was unsustainable. 
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Operation Aberdeen and the Cauldron 
Following the armoured battles, the Panzerarmee had overstretched itself and regrouped in the 
Sidi-Muftah depression (or cauldron as it became known). This was to re-group and open up new 
supply routes through the mine-belt. Operation Aberdeen developed from a plan to relieve the 
150th Brigade, into an assault on the supposedly weakened Panzerarmee. On the northern side of 
the depression was the Sidra ridge, with multiple peaks along its eastern sector. It was a vital area 
of operational ground which needed to be re-gained from Axis control, due to the proximity to 
both the Bir Hacheim and Knightsbridge boxes. The operation highlighted the failings of poor 
planning and continuing disjointed doctrine.  
 
Figure 7:2 Operation Aberdeen, 5-6- June 1942.34 
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The Eighth Army had reacted too slowly to save the 150th Brigade and now planned to assault 
three Axis Divisions with just two Infantry Brigades, an Armoured Brigade and four artillery 
regiments. All the units which advanced into the depression faced tremendously heavy fire from 
Axis artillery and anti-tank guns which forced them to dig-in. The 10th Indian Brigade was pinned 
down and they were, ‘eliminated…with ease, as they had no mines or anti-tank guns.’35 However 
the Infantry had been given multiple objectives and battalions were quickly separated from each 
other and became trapped in the low ground or dispersed along the Sidra Ridge. This was a rare 
attempt at a British combined arms assault which failed under the weight of enemy fire and poor 
doctrine. 
The Axis counter-attacked to outflank the British artillery on the Aslagh ridge before moving 
through a gap in the rear minefield to overrun the Headquarters of both 5th Indian Division and 
7thArmoured Division, which had been controlling the operation. This left the stranded Infantry 
without any command.36 Major Daniel described the attack which overran his unit on the ridge. He 
also notes that his Regiment, the 107th RHA, could not dig-in effectively,  
Topping a rise we were met with a hail of shells. We dropped into action...on a horrible 
stony ridge, which proved our undoing…in front [there] was a nice large bowl [the 
cauldron]. More and more German tanks appeared until they had totally surrounded us, 
standing off at a safe distance, whilst their guns proceeded to pound every vehicle to 
pieces. Our casualties became very heavy...my orders were precise, “to stand and fight 
where we were to the last man and the last round.37  
The stony ridge prevented the Gunners’ ability to dig-in to the ground and defend themselves, 
whilst their separation from the Infantry enabled German armour to pick off each gun from a 
distance before closing in to eliminate the remaining crews.  
The second assault during Aberdeen was the attack on the Sidra ridge against the 21st Panzer 
Division. Here, the slow moving ‘I’ tanks of the 32ndArmy Tank Brigade were committed, supported 
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by a single Infantry battalion in trucks and a single battery.38 Smoke briefly obscured their advance 
and this attack received a storm of artillery and anti-tank fire which forced 7th RTR tanks to swerve 
right in front of the neighbouring 42nd RTR.39 More than fifty tanks were lost and the surviving 
vehicles fought off a local counter-attack and retreated. Terrain played an important part here too 
because, ‘the slope to the ridge was hardly discernible and tanks reached the high ground without 
actually being aware of it’, which left the armour easily silhouetted to anti-tank guns deployed on 
the rear slopes of the ridge.40 The failure of the two armoured assaults left the artillery and 
Infantry isolated and overrun. The British lost 96 guns and most of six battalions, along with more 
than eighty tanks. Operation Aberdeen was a failed attempt to make a fully coordinated and 
combined arms assault against the enemy. The Divisional Commanders were given little 
opportunity for thorough planning and the coordination and doctrine of the assault units was 
poor. This was compounded by the fact that Axis doctrine had proved much more effective in 
defence and also in counterattack against British positions. 
The final phases of Gazala 
Following Operation Aberdeen, British efforts concentrated on maintaining a hold on the ridges 
near the Knightsbridge box and Bir Hacheim. The armoured brigades made further piecemeal 
attacks on Axis columns and adjacent ridge-top positions, but with limited success. On the 8 June, 
the 6th RTR had been ordered to, ‘smarten up the Germans but on no account to lose any tanks.’41 
They advanced to attack a ridge south of Knightsbridge with just two squadrons of Grants and with 
no artillery support and suffered the inevitable casualties. At Army HQ, Ritchie maintained an 
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optimistic view of events which blinded him to the reality of a declining situation. Even after 
Aberdeen had failed, he considered the defensive line to be quite strong.  
Operationally the Panzerarmee was now well positioned in the cauldron to cut off Bir Hacheim, 
envelop Knightsbridge and threaten eastwards towards El-Adem along the ridge. Equally, the 
Eighth Army became overstretched along the Knightsbridge ridges as they sought to prevent Axis 
columns from breaking through them. In the south the Hacheim box had been stoutly defended by 
the Free French Brigade for fifteen days and had been sustained by nightly supply columns. Their 
defence was aided by low profile anti-tank guns dug into near invisible positions around the slope 
at Pt 186, and was supported by extensive RAF operations. The Luftwaffe made over 1,300 sorties 
on the tough Foreign Legion Brigade, leaving them isolated from supply and fatigued by ten days 
of battle. General Ritchie finally withdrew this exhausted garrison when he felt that it could no-
longer be re-supplied. British tactics were becoming improvised again with the operation of Jock 
Columns against the flanks and rear of the Axis forces but these had little effect. The Panzerarmee 
now controlled the cauldron sector and Bir Hacheim was isolated from effective British support.  
After the Axis forces had gained control of specific sectors of the battlefield, they were able to 
‘unlock’ other, nearby British positions. The withdrawal of the Free French Brigade from Bir 
Hacheim allowed the Axis to concentrate their efforts against the Knightsbridge box and the 
adjacent ridgelines. The subsequent armoured battles either side of Knightsbridge proved costly 
because British commanders remained offensively minded despite their armour being weak. The 
6th RTR was ordered forward to capture Pt 171 on the 12 June, despite being low on petrol and 
ammunition. Axis forces then countered with a powerful and sustained bombardment on the 
height before making an attack with Panzers and 88mm guns. The battle climaxed on the 13 June 
as 6th RTR planned to make a final stand back on the main ridge, but was ordered north to Tobruk 
along with the remaining armour. The adjacent 22nd Armoured Brigade noted, ‘If the enemy had 
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got onto the escarpment over-looking the Bir-Bellafun valley that night, the withdrawal of the 
[Knightsbridge] box…would have been impossible.’42 British units were being worn down trying to 
hold the ridgeline positions and the continuous combat resulted in the armoured regiments being 
mauled, leaving their crews exhausted.  
The continuous battles for the ridges were linked to the British use of armour in separated assaults 
in the southern battlefield sector. The armoured brigades suffered further heavy losses from the 
7-13 June as they fought to hold the ridges around Knightsbridge. Ritchie reported, ‘Yesterday we 
were unable to prevent enemy from establishing himself on [the]escarpment running westwards 
to HAGIAG[and]…occupying RIGEL RIDGE, driving our armour North towards ACROMA, thus so 
much endangering the KNIGHTSBRIDGE BOX, that its evacuation was ordered.’43 Brigadier Briggs, 
commanding 2nd Armoured Brigade, was surprised when the Knightsbridge box, ‘a feature, well 
dug in, well wired in and mined and occupied by 201st Guards Brigade and 2nd RHA,’ was given up 
without a fight similar to that made by the Free French at Bir Hacheim.44 It was a telling moment 
for British defensive doctrine.  
There was further command confusion as the battle became more fluid. By the 14 June Auchinleck 
signalled Ritchie, that even if the Gazala line needed to be evacuated, Acroma and El Adem should 
be held, while he built up reinforcements. Two days later Auchinleck signalled that El Adem was 
now the ‘decisive point’ of the battle, despite the problem that the 29th Indian Brigade defending 
it, had already been split up.45 He believed Axis forces could still be held as they advanced from 
Knightsbridge, even though there were 15 miles between the two locations. Ritchie was dispersing 
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Infantry battalions to adjacent ‘defended localities’ whilst Auchinleck wanted the Infantry to 
concentrate on a specific position. Confusion continued when El-Adem was later evacuated as part 
of the overall retreat from the Gazala line. The remaining elements of the 29th Brigade formed five 
Jock columns and were given a harassing role against the 90th Light Division. After the loss of so 
much armour during this battle, British defensive tactics had resorted to forming Jock columns 
again.  These proved much less effective against the Axis Battle groups, as seen during Crusader. 
Terrain had again played a crucial part influencing the final stage of the battle. Eighth Army had 
been defeated trying to hold a series of defensive positions along the ridges near Acroma-El Adem 
and was and then forced to retreat to the frontier which left Tobruk exposed and unready for a 
renewed siege. The port was lost because of further command confusion about the situation and a 
rapid, well directed Axis assault at the weakest point of the defences. The losses in supply tonnage 
were enormous, as was the capture of approximately 33,000 men which had to be added to the 
losses in armour, crews, infantry and artillery suffered since the 27 May.   
Gazala: Conclusion 
The Eighth Army had been decisively defeated at Gazala, and the influence of the terrain played a 
key role in each of the engagements. Operationally the Brigades Boxes in the southern part of the 
line at Sidi-Muftah, Knightsbridge and Bir Hacheim had been sited too far apart and were unable 
to support each other. Tactically, the British obsession with trying to hold the Sidi-Muftah 
depression cost the Eighth Army dearly in terms of men and equipment. Later, the higher ground 
around the Knightsbridge Box became the defining point on the battlefield. Other factors such as 
poor battle tactics, poor command and equipment failures all contributed to the British defeat. 
The Panzerarmee and its dynamic commander General Rommel had also dominated operations at 
crucial moments.  He used an effective doctrine to carry out a series of assaults, which, along with 
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a determined defence of the cauldron position, unlocked the southern and central sectors of the 
battlefield. 
There had been other problems including poor command decisions which had contributed to the 
in-effective use of Armoured Brigades throughout the battle. British troops had been let down by 
bad decision making by Corps and Divisional commanders who were sluggish and un-cooperative. 
Messervy was a highly experienced Infantry leader but was thought to have little experience of 
commanding armour, while the Corps commanders Norrie and Gott queried the plans for 
Operation Aberdeen and left the operational control to the two harassed Divisional commanders. 
When Brigadiers managed to combine their weakened units, their tactics appeared to be direct 
frontal assaults with limited artillery support. The artillery fire support had been affected by a lack 
of suitable vehicles for the Forward Observation Officers and communications had been easily lost 
when the rear link tanks were quickly knocked out. Therefore the armoured assaults had lacked 
the proper fire support needed. Overall British doctrine had failed to develop and this had left the 
Eighth Army defeated and with poor morale. Yet it had been the impact of the operational and 
tactical terrain in the southern sector of the line which had contributed to the defeat so far and 
had left British forces with no option but to retreat to the next available defensive position at 
Mersa Matruh in Egypt. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 8 Mersa Matruh and First Alamein, June-July 1942 
 
This chapter considers the British retreat into Egypt and looks specifically at the defeat at Mersa 
Matruh on the 25-26 June 1942 and the longer battle of First Alamein from the 30 June to late July 
1942. At Mersa Matruh, The Eighth Army was still trying to hold a wide area of ground which 
stretched for at least 20 miles inland. In contrast, at El Alamein there were more numerous terrain 
features which gave British forces a ‘hook’ on which to anchor their defences. At Mersa Matruh 
British doctrine was still chaotic with changes in command, organisation and defensive tactics. By 
El Alamein, however, there was an improvement in defensive doctrine but the problems of poor 
cooperation between armour and Infantry during attacks continued. The two battles have been 
linked because they represent the last two actions in which General Auchinleck commanded both 
the Eighth Army directly and Middle East Command. They also represent the nadir of British 
defensive doctrine, which was followed by improvements, but was still experiencing problems in 
assault tactics.  
Mersa Matruh background 
The battle for Mersa Matruh was a minor action when compared to Gazala or First Alamein and 
shows another example of how the terrain was exploited by Axis forces to outflank the Eighth 
Army and force it to retreat. Increased RAF support became a new weapon which British 
commanders were able to use for the remainder of the campaign.  After the loss of Tobruk, Ritchie 
believed an Axis advance into Egypt was inevitable and so despite the Eighth Army withdrawing in 
some confusion from Cyrenaica, a holding action at Mersa Matruh was planned.1 The Eighth Army 
attempted to hold an area of ground consisting of two plateaus running parallel with the coast 
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road, which failed to provide any defensive features. This strategy contributed to the subsequent 
defeat and retreat. 
As with the Second Retreat, most narratives such as Clayton and Craig, have glossed over the 
action at Mersa Matruh to concentrate on First Alamein or later battles.2 Whilst the terrain may 
have been noted in terms of the narrative, the impact of it has been largely ignored. Other 
commentators, including Adrian Stewart and Barrie Pitt, both provide detailed narratives which 
focus on the poor British command and confusion, particularly that from an over-tired Lieutenant-
General Gott, as being the main issue leading to British defeat.3 
Mersa Matruh: terrain 
The fighting near Matruh took place along the ridges and high ground south of the base. The port 
was classified as a fortress, but without the strength of those which surrounded Bardia or Tobruk 
and consisted of old or incomplete minefields along the southern and western sides. Near the 
coast there was a low, cliff-like escarpment which was the continuation from the higher ridge near 
the frontier, except at Mersa it was lower and traversed by a few tracks and the railway. The 
plateau above it was protected by a much thinner minefield stretching ten miles across to next 
escarpment inland. South and west of the plateau was a second ridge leading up to further higher 
ground consisting of hard limestone rock which prevented any defensive positions being made. 
There were very few routes which traversed this higher ridge onto the central plateau and units 
were deployed to block these descents with defended localities. The going for vehicles along the 
higher escarpment was good east-west and this route outflanked the defended localities along it 
and the central plateau. East of Matruh the terrain was described as, ‘undulating coastal desert of 
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mixed going,’ for the next one hundred miles to Alamein but there were also rough areas of 
ground which damaged vehicles and used up valuable supplies of petrol.4 
 
Figure 8:1 Map of Matruh defences and minefields, 26 June 1942.5 
Mersa Matruh: Preparations 
The Eighth Army had retreated eastwards past the frontier positions while the Panzerarmee 
diverted around them via Maddalena to the south and then headed east towards Mersa Matruh. 
Auchinleck and his advisor Major-General Eric Dorman-Smith took over direct command of the 
Eighth Army from Ritchie on the 25 June and developed plans to halt the Axis advance, leaving 
staff officers to reorganize formations as they crossed the frontier.6 The Eighth Army was much 
stronger than the advancing three German Divisions at this point. The coast road route was 
defended by a newly formed 10th Corps with three brigades from the 10th  Indian Division in 
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Matruh itself and two brigades from the 50th Division at Gerawala further east along the coast.  
Both Divisions essentially defended the coastal sector for ten miles inland to the first escarpment.  
Inland the 5th Indian Division had only one brigade remaining and two artillery regiments from 
which two Jock columns were deployed to hold the central plateau and the remaining units were 
scattered over three sites along the higher escarpment. Further east the 2nd New Zealand Division 
protected the Minqar Qaim track again on the higher escarpment but they lacked transport, whilst 
the remnants of 1st Armoured Division deployed two Armoured Brigades.7 Axis forces were even 
weaker because the Panzerarmee’s strength had been greatly exhausted by the continuous 
fighting. The DAK now had just sixty tanks, while the Ariete Division had just seventy M13s.8  The 
21st Panzer Division had been reduced to just 600 men and 23 tanks by the 27 June, whilst 90th 
Light Division was using British trucks for half of its transport.9 Rommel drove his tired units 
eastwards, and was correct to gamble that speed would undermine any defence British forces 
might put together. At Matruh he was fortunate to advance across the weakly held central plateau 
although this decision was based on chance rather than good intelligence.  
Mersa Matruh:  battle summary and the impact of terrain and doctrine on the battle 
On the evening of the 26 June, Engineers from two Axis battlegroups broke through the narrow 
minefield and quickly advanced through the two Jock columns which were holding the central 
plateau.10 Eighth Army HQ was confused by reports about the loss of the 29th Indian Brigade and a 
possible breakthrough by 150 tanks, although this was clearly an over estimation of Axis 
strength.11 The two battlegroups then made further advances on the 27 June. The 15th Panzer 
Division advanced along the higher ground above both escarpments which outflanked both 1st 
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Armoured Division and 2nd NZ Division and forced their retreat.12 The Axis advance was briefly 
halted on the 27 June, as the battlegroups were weak, separated from each other and short of 
supplies.13 They advanced again next day and blocked the coast road. They then by-passed the 
more powerfully held flanks with a central thrust by 21st Panzer which turned south and 
outflanked the New Zealand Brigades on the escarpment at Minqar Qiam.14 On the coast, 10th 
Corps was also forced to retreat overnight on the 28-29 June, losing 6,000 men and left much 
ammunition and equipment behind.  
The defensive deployment near Matruh had been determined by the landscape features of the 
area. There were few defensive features on which the British could develop a stronger defence 
line, and made questionable deployment decisions. The Eighth Army was left with a few intact 
formations following the retreat from Gazala, so it had logically strengthened the coastal route 
east with five Brigades.  Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith had left the central plateau and higher 
ground too weakly defended, which was possibly due to inexperience in dealing with fast-moving 
Axis operations. Equally the battle had been won by a more mobile Panzerarmee which took 
advantage of the good going along these two upper routes and advanced 21st Panzer Division 
through the centre and 15th Panzer Division along the higher plateau to outflank the coastal route.  
The outcome of this engagement was also affected by better RAF support for the Eighth Army. The 
Air Force was now fully committed to attacking Axis ground units and supply routes which gave 
some protection to the retreating units, with some commentators believing that this saved the 
retreat from becoming a worse rout.15 The Army continued to be protected largely by RAF sorties 
which targeted Axis vehicle concentrations as they advanced towards Matruh. These harassing 
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attacks slowed down the speed of the Axis advance considerably by bombing and ground 
strafing.16 Both sides were affected by the daily heat-haze and sandstorms which confused troops 
as they moved towards Alamein.17  
Mersa Matruh: Conclusion 
The Eighth army had been defeated once again by trying to hold a line of passable terrain with too 
few units and a reliance on poor defensive doctrine. The central and higher plateaux proved to be 
good going for motorised units and enabled the Axis to overrun the British forces. The Jock 
columns were too weak to halt an Axis advance and there was too much reliance placed on them 
by commanders who failed to realise their ineffectiveness. The remaining Brigade units were too 
widely dispersed across the coastal sector and unable to provide mutual support. The defended 
localities on the higher plateau were also by-passed by Axis units who made good use of the 
improved ground conditions in this area. There had been no improvement in British tactical 
doctrine, with the exception of improved RAF support. During the battle there was a high level of 
confusion during fighting with little coherence between armour and infantry. The Eighth Army had 
no option but to retreat to the only remaining defensible line near Alamein which provided two 
secure flanks, had nearby supply bases and a more powerful RAF support.  
First Alamein: Introduction 
British operations at the First Battle of Alamein focussed on the capture of key heights including 
the Ruweisat ridge and the depressions which flanked it as well as the Tel el Eissa ridge near the 
coast. These numerous key landscape features had a greater impact on the British operations here 
than previously at Mersa Matruh. British Infantry assaults proved initially successful in gaining 
objectives, which showed a slight improvement in doctrine. However, they were unable to hold 
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the key positions from being recaptured by Axis counterattacks. Operationally the series of battles 
contributed to wearing down Axis forces who struggled to make a decisive breakthrough when 
British forces were in retreat.  
The historiography is more prolific on this engagement as it forms part of the trilogy of Alamein 
battles fought between July and November 1942. Niall Barr’s study argues that the Eighth Army 
failed to gain a decisive victory because of poor command, doctrine and equipment, though the 
tactical importance of the terrain features in this battle are noted.18 Kippenberger provides 
excellent detail on the 2nd NZ Divisional operations whilst Peter Bates gives another useful 
narrative about the July battles in which he fought.19 Barrie Pitt does not show the real importance 
of why the ridges were being assaulted whilst Alexander McKee only briefly notes the problems of 
fighting amongst the depressions.20 Whilst the terrain may have been noted in terms of the overall 
narrative the impact of the landscape has been largely ignored by other commentators, as they 
focus on the issues of failures in command, planning and execution of the July battles.    
First Alamein: terrain  
The capture of key positions remained the priority for operations for both sides. They needed 
tactical control of the various ridges and depressions which made up the sector, with the most 
crucial being the Ruweisat ridge in the centre of the Eighth Army’s defensive position. The Eighth 
Army stabilized a temporary line from the Tel-el-Eissa ridge near the coast, through a series of 
ridges and depressions southwards for 35 miles to the Himeimat feature on the edge of the 
Qattara Depression. The Ruweisat ridge in the centre of this line runs east-west for fifteen miles 
and dominates the central area. It is surrounded by some shallow depressions on either side which 
had to be captured before the ridge itself could be assaulted. There was more open ground south 
                                                          
18
 Barr, Pendulum of War, pp.13-68 and p.83. 
19
 Kippenburger, Infantry Brigadier and Bates, Dance of War,  
20
 Pitt, Crucible of War, Vol II, pp.306-323, and Alexander McKee, El Alamein. Ultra and the Three Battles 
(London: Souvenir, 1991), p.78. 
136 
 
of Ruweisat which contained the El Mrier depression and beyond this the smaller Alam Nyal ridge 
and the much larger Munassib depression.  East of Alam Nyal was Alam Halfa which at 132m was 
one of the highest points in the area and dominated the ground east of Alamein. The terrain south 
of Alam Nyal became more fragmented as it developed into various wadis, depressions and the 
Himeimat feature which overlooked the impassable Qattara salt marshes. This protected the 
desert flank meaning that any Axis offensive would take place in the coastal area. 
 
Figure 8:2 First Alamein, 30 June-27 July 1942.21 
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First Alamein: preparations 
The Alamein position had been selected as a possible defensive line as early as 1941 when Wavell 
ordered that some defensive preparations should be made.22 A Year late the Eighth Army halted 
on the position and gradually increased in strength as the troops were consolidated. The 1st South 
African Division which was weak in infantry was deployed in the Alamein box powerfully 
supported by four regiments of artillery. Further south were more boxes spaced at intervals up to 
15 miles.  In the centre, the weak 18th Indian Brigade held the Dier el Shein depression in front of 
the Ruweisat ridge. In the south, elements of the 50th Division were deployed in Jock Columns and 
the 2nd NZ Division was divided between the Bab-el-Qattara and Dier el Munassib features. The 
Eighth Army began this phase of operations with remnants of Armoured Brigades but it was fairly 
rapidly reinforced with fresh tanks throughout July.   
First Alamein: battle summary 
He was quickly forced onto the defensive for the remainder of the month, and Axis doctrine 
utilized rapid local counter-attacks to undermine British gains and to ensure the key heights were 
held or disputed. Auchinleck directed further attacks on the static Axis position throughout the 
month. By the 10 July, operations included joint attacks by the 9th Australian and 1st SA Divisions to 
capture the high ground at Tel el Eissa near the coast. These continued for three days but gained 
little ground and added to the attrition of men and tanks lost.  
In the centre the Ruweisat ridge became the focus for much of the Eighth Army’s operations for 
the rest of July. On the 14 and 15 July two New Zealand Brigades and elements of 1st Armoured 
Division made an assault on the ridge, however it ended on 17 July, having failed to secure Pt 63 
on the ridge. The 5th Brigade’s two leading battalions had rapidly overrun enemy strong points and 
one unit had secured its objective with the other halted just below the ridge. However, a typically 
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swift Axis counter-attack captured left the forward units too weak and exposed to hold the ridge. 
The 2nd NZ Division made two major assaults to capture the Ruweisat ridge in July, but both failed 
due to a lack of Infantry manpower and poor cooperation from supporting armour, during 
Operation Bacon, 2nd NZ Division delivered a two battalion assault with just 500 men.23 These 
operations further weakened crucial Infantry strengths as the repeated assaults and battles to 
defend newly captured positions on the ridge highlighted the manpower shortages.  
Auchinleck’s plan for the subsequent ‘Operation Splendour’ included another attack west along 
the Ruweisat ridge by the 5th Indian Division. This was supported by a second attack from the 
south by 2nd NZ Division, supported by two Armoured Brigades onto the Ruweisat ridge. To reach 
the ridge it had to cross the El Meir depression held by the DAK. The newly arrived 23rd Armoured 
Brigade would make a supporting advance just south of the ridge which ended in bloody ruin for 
the regiments involved. 
First Alamein: the impact of terrain and doctrine on the battle 
Rommel initially planned a rapid advance between the British defensive boxes in order to cut them 
off from the rest of the Eighth Army. However, the terrain had slowed the DAK’s approach due to 
the nature of the ground surface as they moved towards the Ruweisat ridge. Consequently 
General Nehring ordered an attack on the British units which he realized were deployed in the 
Deir-el-Shein depression instead of manoeuvring around them.24 Further south the 2nd NZ Division 
had been pulled back from the two depressions which were forward of the line. The withdrawal 
from El Mreir straightened out the British line but the move had abandoned an important feature 
which protected the southern flank of the Ruweisat ridge. This made the later British attempts to 
recapture the ridge more problematic. British operations continued to be directed to capture 
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specifics key ridges, an attack on the Miteiriya ridge attack, was a combined assault based on a 
hasty plan between armour and Australian Infantry which fell short of the objective and left units 
weakened and unable to progress. 
The first action showed an improving defensive doctrine by the Eighth Army, when the 1st SA 
Division used concentrated regimental artillery fire to halt an advance by the 90th Light Division. 
The defensive boxes and localities were still vulnerable though; at the Deir-el-Shein depression, 
the 18th Indian Brigade managed to slow down a powerful attack by the DAK before being overrun. 
This stubborn defence prevented a breakthrough in the centre of the line and contributed to the 
Panzerarmee being forced onto the defensive.25 The Brigade only had two days to dig-in and 
prepare this site, and had little support despite a brief counter-attack by 1st Armoured Division 
which remained weakened from earlier battles. The Eighth Army benefitted from the many 
landscape features in this area, as they provided good defensible positions. They also divided the 
attacks from a weakened Panzerarmee which was to the British advantage. The later attacks on 
Tel-El-Eissa highlighted how the coastal high ground was important to both sides but the ground 
limited vehicle movement and defensive operations.  
There were continuing problems with poor doctrine and command including a lack of 
communication with the commander of 1st Armoured Division which resulted in the failure of 
supporting tanks to get through a minefield. The New Zealand Infantry was forced to withdraw 
from the Ruweisat ridge despite holding their positions for much of the day.26 The attacks showed 
that the ridge objectives were attainable, but the limestone nature of the ridge made digging-in 
difficult. Operation Splendour highlighted the on-going problems of British doctrine and how the 
tactical focus was on the need to capture key terrain positions.  
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In other attacks, inexperienced units were committed to battle before they had an opportunity to 
become used to desert conditions and doctrine. The newly arrived 23rd Armoured Brigade was 
committed to battle to support a renewed assault. In the hastily organized attack, two slow 
moving Regiments of the Brigade were committed towards El Mrier. They ran across minefields 
and were stopped by accurate and heavy anti-tank fire from which only 6 tanks returned to the 
start-line.27 The newly arrived Infantry were also inexperienced in combined assaults. At the 
Miteiriya ridge the Australian Infantry were criticized for not working correctly with the supporting 
armour which caused unnecessary casualties.28 Commanders had not learnt from previous errors 
in planning, coordination and doctrine and new formations were showing their lack of specific 
training. 
British doctrine began to show a limited amount of improvement which included the use of 
concentrated Regimental Artillery fire which halted the 90th Light Division outside the Alamein box 
on 1 July. Another increase in British firepower was made by the direct RAF support which 
averaged 570 per day throughout most of July. This helped to delay the Panzerarmee by inflicting 
vehicle losses, unit disruption and shortages in fuel and equipment. The Axis defences and tactics 
were also strengthening so that even when units made progress, it was nearly impossible to hold 
onto the gains. The attacks by the 69th Brigade took ground within Axis defences and penetrated 
their minefields only to falter with heavy casualties after the initial break-in.  
The effect of these continuous operations to capture key high ground was that they caused the 
Eighth Army to become exhausted in men and equipment.  The 8th Hussars had lost all their tanks 
many times over since the 27 May and were left with just one third of their original personnel by 
August.29 The heavy attrition also occurred amongst British Infantry with the 69th Brigade and 24th 
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Australian Brigades suffering over 1,000 casualties between them. British Intelligence analysis also 
improved dramatically as Corps HQs intelligence provided the majority of details of Axis 
formations to assist tactical operations more readily. In addition to Ultra, the ‘Y’ service provided 
information on targets and expected Luftwaffe attacks.30 As the line became more static, some of 
the best intelligence came from the Forward Observers of the Royal Artillery who provided the 
most accurate information of enemy movements.31 These regular reports contributed to an 
improving overall doctrine for Eighth Army operations which culminated in success at Second 
Alamein. 
The operations during First Alamein had focussed on the capture and retention of the significant 
terrain of the battlefield which included the Ruweisat ridge and its adjacent depressions, as well 
the Miteiriya ridge. Despite some successes in a series of operations, all of these attacks had been 
driven off by swift counter-attacks or became bogged down in attritional battles. The Ruweisat 
ridge was too large for the battalions assigned to capture them. Brigades became too dispersed 
trying to cover these features, which weakened their fighting power and left individual battalions 
to be captured or overrun. There were also continuing failures in command, planning and 
problems with doctrine especially cooperation between armour and infantry. 
 Although the Infantry proved they could capture an enemy position, the difficulty was retaining it 
after the inevitable Axis counterattack. There were some improvements in the better use of 
concentrated artillery fire and intelligence analysis, but these were not yet fully developed. The 
inconclusive nature of the fighting at Alamein led to Churchill to order changes in Middle East 
command in early August and both sides regrouped for the further operations in later in the 
month.  
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Chapter 9 Alam Halfa and Second Alamein, 30 August- 4 November 
1942. 
 
The battles of Alam Halfa and Second Alamein represent the first period of new command at the 
Eighth Army and Middle East Command.1 The battles have been linked here to highlight the 
progression of tactics firstly in defence and secondly in assault doctrine. The continuing impact of 
terrain on planning and objective setting by commanders can also been seen alongside the steady 
development of Eighth Army doctrines in defence at Alam Halfa and in an improved level of 
assault at Second Alamein. 
Alam Halfa Introduction 
This battle was a successful defence by the Eighth Army which made full use of a key ridge in the 
British defensive line and fresh tactics to halt another powerful offensive by the Panzerarmee. It 
also showed the development of air and ground units working in closer cooperation to create a 
victory.  
The historiography has concentrated on the controversy over the plans for the defence of the 
Alam Halfa sector.2 John Connell and Corelli Barnett argued that Montgomery used former plans 
drawn up by Eric Dorman-Smith for the defence. They continue to emphasize the importance of 
command, fresh troops and the discussion of terrain remains part of the narrative rather than part 
of any real assessment. Michael Carver notes the armoured deployment along Bare ridge and the 
battle for Pt 102, and discusses the reasons why the Panzerarmee halted on the 31 August.3 Barrie 
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Pitt emphasizes the problems caused by soft sand in the southern depressions which seriously 
delayed the Panzerarmee whereas John Strawson fails to mention the impact of the terrain at all.4  
Alam Halfa: terrain 30 August- 5 Sept 1942 
Earlier British assessments of the terrain selected the Alam Halfa ridge to defend against an Axis 
thrust from the southern sector of the Alamein line. It was the highest feature in the rear of the 
line and south of the ridge there was soft-going through a series of depressions which would delay 
any eastward movement for armour. In the centre, one possible avenue for vehicles was across 
the open ground south of Ruweisat ridge and the El-Mrier depression before it reached the 
smaller Alam Nayal. East of Alam Nyal ridge was Alam Halfa, which reached 132 metres and 
dominated the southern sector of the Eighth Army defences. It provided a strong defendable 
position along its length, which enabled the British to prepare for attacks from the southern side.  
Alam Halfa: preparations 
This battle was Montgomery’s first operation as Commander of the Eighth Army. The force was 
still weakened from the month long battles of First Alamein, with August being a quiet period 
which allowed both sides to re-group and replenish for the next round of operations. Intelligence 
reports noted a, ‘quiet week with enemy attention devoted to reorganisation of forces and 
consolidation of defences. Whole Axis front now believed covered by minefields.’ It was a period, 
‘of positional warfare with heavy shelling by both sides.’5 The Panzerarmee was expected to begin 
a new offensive towards the end of the month aimed at breaking through the southern minefields 
and outflanking south of the Alam Halfa ridge.  
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Figure 9:1 Alam Halfa, 30 August-3 September 1942.6 
British preparations for defence were rapid and thorough thanks to the Ultra intelligence on Axis 
plans which enabled Montgomery to move up formations and allow them to prepare defensive 
positions. The 13th Corps was given the task of preparing a defensive position on the ridge but not 
to incur excessive casualties.7 He requested and was given the newly arrived 44th Division which 
consisted of two Infantry Brigades to hold the ridge and was supported by the 22nd Armoured 
Brigade which was dug-in around the western end, near Pt 102. The 23rd Armoured Brigade moved 
south to support them and to cover the gap along Bare ridge where a breakthroughs might be 
possible. The two Armoured Brigades totalled nearly 150 tanks with 90 of these being Grants.  
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Despite the problems of an over-extended supply line the Axis forces made an impressive effort to 
build up for this offensive logistically throughout August and they provided the frontline units with 
234 German and 281 Italian tanks and plenty of ammunition. However they were still desperately 
short of petrol, thanks to RAF and naval targeting of fuel tankers using Ultra decrypts. The Panzer 
Divisions totalled some 200 tanks with a higher number of the  Panzer ‘specials’, whose more 
powerful guns outranged the Grant tanks facing them. 
Alam Halfa: Summary and impact of terrain 
This attack began on the 30 August, with a night time approach march through the British 
minefields. The Panzerarmee was monitored continuously and its transport columns pounded by 
RAF bombers. The Axis force worked its way across the depressions south of the ridge, they were 
under constant bombardment and were observed by the British defenders on Alam Halfa. 
Panzerarmee commanders turned towards the ridge sooner when they realized the Eighth Army 
was prepared for them and made a series of assaults on the ridge. Axis forces had problems 
moving over the soft ground south of the Bare ridge and were unable to made the rapid moves of 
previous battles. They were also slowed down by natural dust storms and the effects of continual 
bombing by the RAF. The Panzerarmee remained in front of the ridge making various assaults until 
the 3 September, when it was forced to retreat. 
British defence tactics were better coordinated during this action and contributed to the victory. 
The 7th Motor Brigade slowed down the initial Axis advance through the minefields, and the heavy 
and continuous attacks by the RAF destroyed many Axis vehicles, disrupted their movement and 
exhausted enemy personnel. The attacks on the ridge by the 21st Panzer Division were halted by 
anti-tank guns from 1st Rifle Brigade. They were supported by the two armoured Brigades who 
fought a defensive battle near Pt 102. The British armour had maintained its hull down positions 
and was supported by large concentrations of artillery deployed behind the ridge.  
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British forces still had some issues with poor planning and problems in their assault doctrine. One 
Brigade from the newly arrived 44th Division made an obvious approach march which gave Axis 
forces time to prepare and repel the subsequent assault that night.8 It became clear that errors 
were still being made even in set-piece attacks, when in the north a diversionary raid crippled the 
2/15th Australian Infantry battalion near Tel-el-Eissa.  The 132nd Brigade attacked in the south to 
block the Axis retreat by the 90th Light Division, only to suffer heavy casualties. Despite the 
improving picture and better intelligence analysis which allowed Montgomery to prepare for the 
assault, not all units received the correct warning of Axis intentions. The CO of the 8th Hussars was 
not informed an attack had begun and found his Light squadron in observation and under severe 
air attack on the first day of the offensive.9 
Alam Halfa: Conclusion 
Alam Halfa was the first successful tactical defensive battle for the Eighth Army. The Army had 
become more effective in understanding the terrain and using it to the best advantage to maintain 
a defensive position, and had combined this with an improved tactical defensive doctrine. It 
received good intelligence which enabled it to make a strong deployment across the suitable 
defensive terrain. The Alam Halfa ridge provided the Eighth Army with an ideal defensive site from 
which to try new defensive tactics. Lieutenant-General Montgomery had insisted on fresh tactics 
at the ridge, with the armour remaining mostly hull-down, supported by strong anti-tank and 
artillery numbers to increase firepower against the expected Panzer attacks. Alam Halfa clearly 
demonstrated the Eighth Army’s progress in defensive doctrine, which combined hull-down tank 
positions and well deployed anti-tank guns, supported by heavy concentrations of artillery. 
This combination of anti-tank and artillery fire was a highly effective tactic which would be 
repeated in future battles. The RAF made a significant contribution to the British defence by the 
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constant round the clock bombing and strafing missions. These destroyed huge numbers of the 
Panzerarmee’s vehicles, men and equipment and prevented it re-supplying frontline troops.10 A 
heavy Khamsin storm caused problems for both sides and slowed movement by the Panzerarmee, 
which was already struggling through the soft sand in the depressions south of the ridge. 
Therefore, despite the success of improving doctrine, tactical success for the Eighth Army resulted 
from using the terrain to the best advantage. 
Second Alamein Introduction 
This battle was important to the British war effort at a political, strategic and operational level. 
Montgomery was determined to push for an October offensive which would coincide with the 
Allied Torch landings due in November in Algeria and Morocco. The Eighth Army was committed to 
an intense period of training, new doctrines, rebuilding and receiving new equipment designed to 
break the Axis line and defeat the Panzerarmee. British planning was focussed on capturing two 
key ridges in the northern sector of the battlefield, with the result that terrain was to contribute to 
the outcome of this battle.  
In the historiography this encounter remains the foremost battle of the campaign, De Guingand’s 
post-war memoir noted Montgomery’s close control of the battle and planning, which he believed 
was the key to the victory.11 Michael Carver agrees with Corelli Barnett’s revisionist polemic which 
argued that could have been avoided if Montgomery had been more aggressive at Alam Halfa.12 
Niall Barr’s more recent study shows the Army was still developing into a confident and battle 
hardened force, despite losing some of its experienced Divisions to other theatres. Artillery and 
Engineer doctrines were resolved for future battles, whilst the armour and Infantry still had 
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problems which depended on training.13 Jon Latimer meanwhile, notes the tactical importance of 
the artillery and the doggedness of the Infantry in maintaining the battle over the thirteen days.14 
Jonathan Fennell contends that the recovery of morale in the autumn, following a crisis within the 
Eighth Army in the late summer, made a decisive contribution to the victory.15 The latest study by 
Bryn Hammond argues that it was a ‘special case’ in terms of assault doctrine which required 
weeks of planning, training and new specialised equipment, all of which was designed to 
breakthrough exceptionally deep Axis defences and minefields.16  The domination of Second 
Alamein in the historiography undermines the importance of other battles in the campaign.  
Second Alamein: terrain 
The British objectives for Second Alamein included capturing the Miteiriya ridge and Aqqaqir hill 
beyond it. The key feature of the battle was the Miteiriya ridge which runs on a north-west 
alignment. The area around the ridge was noted as, ‘featureless, but with slight undulations and 
ridges which when captured gave fair observation.’17 Beyond it was the low hillock, Aqqaqir hill, in 
the centre-rear of the Axis line and this became the main objective for the revised plan, 
codenamed ‘Supercharge’. It dominated the ground in the rear area and its capture would lead to 
the break out by British armour. In the north, the ridge at Tel el Eissa was also an objective for the 
second stage of the battle for the 9th Australian Division and was designed to draw Axis forces 
away from Tel el Aqqaqir.  
The key terrain features directly influenced the British assault plan which was designed around 
them. These primarily included the ‘good-going’ ground which ran parallel with the coast road but 
six miles to the south of it. Army HQ wanted to thrust the Armoured Corps through the Axis 
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defences and along this faster ground to strike for the air bases at Daba and Fuka. This would push 
back the Luftwaffe and also cut of the static Axis Infantry lying to the south of the Mitieriya ridge. 
The ridge was also regarded as an objective despite British forces already controlling good 
observation near Alamein and the restricted deployment area for the six Divisions to be used in 
the attack, (see Fig.9.2).18 
 
Figure 9:2 Second Alamein, 23 October-4 November 1942.
19
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Second Alamein: preparations  
The initial planning for Operation Lightfoot began in August with the main objective to destroy the 
enemy’s forces in their current defences. To achieve this, the assault plan targeted the capture of 
the Miteiriya ridge, which would then provide the Eighth Army with suitable ground from which to 
defend against the expected Axis counter-attack. It was hoped that the armour would make a 
break-out to cut off the Axis from their landing grounds near Daba and Fuka and their supply lines. 
There was a major administrative issue when two Corps were deployed in the same area of 
ground, creating a cramped area for deployment of so many Divisions.20 The Eighth Army had 30th 
Corps providing the Infantry for the main assault supported by a new 10th Armoured Corps and 
other Independent Armoured Brigades. Further south the 13th Corps would make diversionary 
assaults using elements of two Divisions. The administrative and logistical preparations for such a 
major assault were huge, and the air support was equally impressive, ensuring that the RAF 
dominated the battlefield in the first few days.  
The new assault doctrine focussed on firepower from concentrated batteries of artillery to enable 
the Infantry and engineers to break-through the deep minefields and capture enemy positions 
across the ridge. This was a defining feature of the initial assault and was a significant new tactic 
for the Eighth Army. The break-in to Axis defences was to be made in the north by four Divisions 
supported by over 800 guns over a frontage of 7,000 yards. They were to advance to a depth of 
4,000 yards in the first phase. The use of photo reconnaissance enabled the mapping of defence 
positions and the Artillery fire-plan concentrated on these. The barrage included a 20 minute 
concentration on each location and a steady lifting of the barrage of 100 yards every three 
minutes. The 51st Highland Division had a more locational barrage and used ‘flash-spotting’ and air 
reconnaissance targeted the estimated 454 Axis guns in the frontline sector. These were noted in 
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readiness for a counter-battery programme, which aimed to neutralize them within the 
bombardment phase.21  
The British Signals organisation and planning was made more complicated due to the close 
proximity of a large number of Headquarters for different formations, but close control of signals 
kept communications running smoothly. The Engineers developed new tactics to make gaps in the 
minefields and widen them to allow the armour to advance onto the ridge.22 Operation Bertram, 
which was the deception plan, enabled the Eighth Army to deploy in the forward areas without 
giving away any information to the Axis intelligence.23 The six weeks of preparations had allowed 
the Eighth Army to train for the assault but it had also allowed the Panzerarmee to establish 
minefields. These were five to nine thousand yards deep across the area, covered by numerous 
linked areas of anti-tank and artillery positions.24 Axis forces held the line with six Divisions and 
kept the Armoured DAK in reserve. German forces were spread amongst the weaker Italian 
formations and had reached 75% of their full strength.  
Second Alamein: battle summary and the impact of terrain and doctrine 
The attack commenced on 23 October, with a large artillery bombardment followed by an Infantry 
assault. Over the next two days, the Infantry continued the ‘crumbling phase’ which gradually 
reduced the Axis defences. There followed a series of Axis counter-attacks in the centre area 
which were halted in hard-fought actions. The Australian 9th Division attacked northwards towards 
Tel-el-Eissa prior to the renewed Operation Supercharge attack and breakout. These phases have 
all been well-documented and extensively discussed. 
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The Axis defences took advantage of the landscape by using the undulating ridges to conceal the 
density and depth of the minefields.  Their numerous defensive positions made best use of each 
fold across the ridge and created major problems for the Eighth Army’s assault. The Infantry 
Divisions experienced mixed success in reaching their objectives due to the combination of the 
ground conditions and complexity of the Axis defences. The supporting Armoured Regiments came 
forward to drive through the gaps in the minefields but came under heavy fire when attempting to 
cross the ridgeline. The tanks were silhouetted against the crest-line and became easy targets for 
Axis Self-Propelled and anti-tank guns on the reverse slopes. The 3rdHussars had this experience on 
the Miteiriya ridge where they lost a high number of tanks and officers which crippled the 
leadership of the regiment.25 The terrain conditions served to slow down the British advance, and 
forced Montgomery to rethink his plans. 
Despite the recent intense planning and training, this battle demonstrated the old issues for 
British doctrine had not been resolved.  Regiments became dispersed again during operations 
while trying to capture too many objectives.  The Regiments of 23rd Armoured Brigade was 
assigned to different attacks, which dispersed their firepower and reduced its effectiveness. The 
complexity of the defences also caused confusion and heavy losses to both armour and Infantry. 
The 40th and 46th RTR lost many tanks to mines and anti-tank fire when they supported the 9th 
Australian Division during its assault near Tel-el-Eissa. The Infantry was forced to dig-in short of the 
objectives whilst the Brigade artillery was hampered by continuous re-deployments within the 
mined areas and failed to give adequate fire support.26 Even the improved and more mobile 
artillery support had problems coping with the complexity of the Axis positions. The Infantry 
assaults in the north continued the British offensive whilst the armour re-grouped for Operation 
Supercharge. However they were important in drawing Axis reserves away from Tel el Aqqaqir 
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sector. The multiple objectives made it more difficult to provide rapid and effective artillery 
support to the front line and this made each attack more attritional and inconclusive.  
One successful British defensive tactic made good use of low hummocky ground and contributed 
to one of the turning points of the battle. This occurred during the Snipe Action on the 26 October 
and took place in the central sector of the battlefield. A Motor Brigade was pushed forward to 
extend the bridgehead and draw out the Axis armour onto the Brigade position. This included two 
features consisting of low, hummocky dunes, which were code-named Snipe and Kidney ridge. The 
position was occupied by 2nd Rifle Brigade and a Battery equipped with twenty-seven 6pdr anti-
tank guns. Unfortunately only nineteen guns reached Snipe as the remainder became stuck in the 
soft sand in the advance. The Artillery support was confused again when there were problems in 
locating the correct position from maps. Despite this the British guns fought off numerous attacks 
by the Axis armour and received some support from the nearby 24thArmoured Brigade.27 Axis 
forces were thought to have lost between thirty and fifty tanks over two days, which dramatically 
weakened their Panzer Divisions for the final phases.  
Second Alamein: conclusion 
The battle was an important stage in the development of new doctrines for the Eighth Army. 
Fighting during stage of the operation had been affected by the key features of the landscape. 
These had increased the complexity of the Axis defences, which had taken full advantage of the 
ground. The Eighth Army used the build-up phase to practice specific tactics using combined arms 
of Infantry, Engineers and armour to break-into and capture a succession of defensive lines. They 
were now fully supported by a programme of massive Artillery and RAF ground attacks, thorough 
Intelligence analysis and deception operations which was a noted improvement from earlier 
offensives. Montgomery had maintained a powerful grip over the planning, and command which 
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had enabled him to alter the original assault when it became stalled within the deep Axis 
defences. This led to a revised armoured assault which broke through the rear of the Axis line and 
forced the Panzerarmee to begin the long Axis retreat into Tunisia. Second Alamein was a turning 
point for the Eighth Army for improving its tactical doctrine and for showing that terrain was a key 
consideration of its operations now. Following the long Axis retreat, the British would fight their 
next major battles in Tunisia in early 1943 and prove themselves adept at both attack and defence. 
The British victory led to the Axis fighting more defensively for much of the remainder of the 
campaign in North Africa. 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 10 Medenine, Mareth, Wadi Akirit and Tunis, March – 13 
May 1943. 
 
This series of four final battles for the Eighth Army shows the greater impact of terrain on British 
operations in the Tunisian landscape and the development of its offensive and defensive 
doctrines. The outcome of each battle also showed how well the Eighth Army had developed its 
offensive tactics to overcome increasingly complex Axis defences, but they still highlighted some 
ongoing problems of intelligence or with inexperienced units. The doctrine developed by the 
Eighth Army and Montgomery across all arms meant that preparation phase was now a major part 
of all operations and that the study of the terrain was an essential part of the process. At Mareth, 
attacks were targeted across low ground, away from heights, but despite the massed firepower 
directed units were halted by dominating features within the coastal wadis. It also highlighted the 
increasing tenacity of Axis units and their methods of making the best use of the terrain to 
improve the defences. By the end of the campaign the Eighth Army could adapt its operations and 
be flexible in manoeuvre to outflank and undermine defences which would have halted attacks in 
previous periods of the campaign.  
Tunisia: the impact of terrain on British operational movement 
The Tunisian landscape had more major relief than either Libya or Egypt, so that its influence on 
operations became even greater. It became a central part of the Axis defence of central Tunisia, 
Kesselring wanted a large Axis ‘bridgehead’ and reinforcements were continually rushed from Italy 
to build up a strong defensive line across the high ground. The Tunisian hills and relief features 
gave the Axis opportunities to develop strong defensive positions which used deployed multiple 
heavy machine-guns, to cover the steep slopes, against which only Infantry could assault.1 The 
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weakness of all static positions was that as each one was captured it generally unlocked or 
outflanked other heights and adjacent positions which gradually made them untenable. This was 
the basis of the British advance towards to Tunis defence line. The continuing plan for the Eighth 
Army was a step-by-step capture of the heights which dominated the terrain and the ports en 
route to Tunis. It would then break out into the Kairouan plain to exploit the rear of the northern 
Axis defences and overrun the all-weather airfields located there. Each stage of ground, which 
overlooked a valley or plain, had to be captured in order to continue.2 
Introduction: Medenine 6 March 1943. 
Following Alamein, the Eighth Army advanced 1,400 miles in three months as Panzerarmee 
conducted a model withdrawal despite being badly weakened. The retreat continued into 
southern Tunisia and halted on the French built Mareth line. Montgomery considered the Eighth 
Army to be ‘unbalanced’ as there were only a few formations near the front, including 7th 
Armoured Division, and for the Infantry, 2nd NZ and 51st Highland Divisions, so that he made only 
cautious advances because of the potential for swift Axis counter-attacks. There are few histories 
of this battle which has been largely overlooked until recently, Bruce Watson notes Rommel’s plan 
to cross soft ground to confuse Allied watchers, but fails to emphasize the impact of the Eighth 
Army’s deployment in the low Metameur hills.3 Equally David Rolf’s detailed work only mentions 
the impact of Ultra which enabled the Eighth Army to deploy effectively.4 
Medenine: Terrain 
The principles of control of key high ground for artillery observation purposes remained the same. 
The Eighth Army’s line of approach was now north-west towards the southern Tunisian frontier 
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which was semi-desert and contained fewer populated centres. Any possible outflanking routes 
were to the west of difficult or impassable ground and so the coast plain remained the main area 
of operations. Terrain was a significant factor at Medenine where the expected Axis spoiling attack 
was halted as the Eighth army made good use of low hills in front of a larger hill feature. The 
position was selected operationally as the optimum site to halt the axis advance using an effective 
anti-tank defence. 
Medenine was a small town with a vital road junction for routes into southern Tunisia and a useful 
landing ground. The best defensive position was east of the town. Here, Lieutenant-Colonel M.E. 
Parker, noted that forward units, ‘arrived in the plain looking towards the Matmata hills with a 
very splendid observation post behind us, the Tajera Shrir, renamed for convenience as, 
‘Edinburgh Castle.’ At the top of this height all the gunner [Observation Posts] were installed and 
all had telephone lines laid to their guns [batteries] behind our positions.’5  
Medenine Preparations 
After earlier offensives against the First Army, Axis forces had re-grouped and Rommel was given 
the Panzer Divisions to make a spoiling attack to further delay the Eighth Army’s approach to the 
Mareth line. Rommel used his veteran 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, and elements of the 90th Light 
and 164th Infantry Divisions, to make the assault, and he also had the newly arrived 10th Panzer 
Division. 
Eighth Army plans for Medenine used daily Intelligence from Ultra which gave Montgomery clear 
details of the Axis approach. He later admitted to some misgivings about receiving an assault by 
these three veteran Panzer Divisions,6 but his message to the troops reminded them to, ‘hold firm 
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in their defended localities,’ and that there would be no retreat.7 The Eighth Army had limited 
forces available near the front, although they were well supported by 5th AGRA and the RAF. 
Montgomery deployed elements of the 5th NZ Brigade with numerous anti-tank guns which were 
well sited and the whole position was well camouflaged by experienced troops. Here the ground 
fell away in front of his Brigade position and was confident that the Artillery had, ‘mastered the 
technique of quickly putting down massive concentrations [of fire].’8  
 
Figure 10:1 Medenine, 6 March 1943.9 
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Other formations included the 201st Guards Brigade, and the 8th Armoured Brigade supporting the 
131st Infantry Brigade. The frontline units also deployed some 600 anti-tank guns and 400 tanks 
which sited in a series of hull down positions overlooking the approaching plain. The commander 
of one Anti-tank Gun Regiment, Colonel Parker advised the Guards Brigade, ‘to pull back a good 
mile into broken ground that lay at the foot of the Edinburgh Castle.’10 Behind the hill feature, the 
Eighth Army deployed a full Artillery Group was deployed and their Forward OPs used the 
Edinburgh Castle heights to observe from. 
Medenine: Battle summary and impact of terrain and doctrine 
The Axis used the terrain to disguise its approach made across difficult low ground to confuse the 
Eighth Army about their direction of approach. They began probing attacks from the 3 to the 5 
March which confirmed the reports from Ultra that a large scale armoured assault was imminent. 
As the action began, Colonel Parker watched, ‘the Germans drove blindly onto the anti-tank 
screen and lost 52 tanks without ours being engaged…he cryptanalysts had told us what was 
coming and when.’11 Two Panzer Divisions drove up to the Guards Brigade anti-tank guns and 
appeared to wander vaguely in front of their position. Brigadier Kippenberger thought the Axis 
made a very badly coordinated attack as 10th Panzer Division approached his units and they 
appeared undecided about where to attack.  
The poor quality of the German assault was compounded by the British use of the tactical terrain 
with 5th NZ Brigade using the low hills to create a concealed defensive position which was praised 
as a model deployment.12 The Guards and Highland Brigades had a more severe battle than the 
New Zealanders however all the Axis attacks were repulsed and 5thAGRA was personally thanked 
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by the 7th Armoured Division for their fire support.13 British tactics were improved as the Artillery 
support was well directed and planned, the 64th Medium Artillery Regiment had a large number of 
defensive fire plans arranged and as the attacks intensified many concentrations of fire were put 
down including one regimental bombardment. It was noted that, ‘the enemy did not like the 
attention he was receiving from our guns,’ and the attacks were directed at Pt 270 which, ‘affords 
us some excellent observation.’14  
Medenine: Conclusion 
The terrain was significant in deciding how the Brigades deployed. They had utilized the low hills 
for anti-tank and Infantry; while the Tajera Shrir hill behind provided the ideal observation post 
where the artillery had set up OPs and registered defensive fire plans which were used extensively 
on the day and this study is the first to note the importance of this feature within the Eighth 
Army’s defence line. The 5th AGRA was praised for its vital support in bringing down large 
concentrations of fire where needed. This success boosted Eighth Army morale and their 
confidence in Montgomery, that he would always deliver a victory.15 He had planned and dictated 
control of two defensive battles and an offensive one at Second Alamein, which increased his own 
confidence enormously.  
The Eighth Army received timely intelligence to deploy in suitable defensive terrain. The battle 
clearly demonstrated the progress in defensive doctrine, combining hull-down tank positions with 
well deployed anti-tank guns, all supported by heavy concentrations of artillery. At Medenine the 
Panzer assault had been decisively defeated in just one day, and was a clear defeat for the veteran 
Axis Divisions. Rommel ordered an immediate retreat after Axis forces lost 52 tanks most of them 
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‘specials’ out of 135 and 600 casualties for no gain, in comparison Eighth Army losses were said to 
be trifling.16  
Mareth: Introduction 
The battle for the Mareth line in late March 1943 was the first major offensive battle for the 
Eighth Army since Second Alamein. Codename Operation ‘Pugilist’, the planning for it was heavily 
influenced by the terrain features which dominated the defences. The strength of the inland hill 
defences made the Eighth Army HQ opt for an assault across low ground near the coast. There are 
fewer studies about this latter part of the campaign, Rick Atkinson’s recent study covers the First 
Army’s campaign from the Torch landings and is the most detailed of these studies. He argues that 
the final victory at Tunis was a strategic one which opened up the Mediterranean to the Allies but 
also useful for the tactical experience gained by the First Army.17 Geoffrey Blaxland offers a dual 
assessment of the final campaign by both the First and the Eighth armies as does David Rolf’s 
more recent work.18 As with earlier battles, Kippenberger’s memoir provides useful detail on the 
New Zealand Corps operations, showing how they became more adept at combined arms 
assaults.19 Two wartime accounts give more detail on the battles; John D’Arcy Dawson’s account 
defends the First Army operations,20 while A.D. Devine provides similar aspects of American 
experiences towards Tunis.21 Both are wartime published memoirs which note the terrain more 
readily than many post-war studies. 
Montgomery highlighted that the army was ‘balanced’ and able to switch attacks quickly; it was 
growing in confidence in its doctrines. Following Second Alamein, the Eighth Army had advanced 
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1,400 miles in three months. Axis forces although still badly weakened, conducted a near model 
withdrawal across Egypt and Libya. Rommel decided not to make a serious defence at any of the 
most feasible positions along the coastal route, such as El Agheila, Homs or Tripoli. Against the 
wishes of Comando Supremo he had continued the retreat into southern Tunisia and halted along 
the French built line. The Eighth Army arrived in front of the line on the 20 February.  From the 
west, the First Army under General Anderson was pushing into Tunisia along the few viable routes 
from the coast down into the central mountains. Both armies now operated under General 
Alexander’s command as 18thArmy Group.22 Axis forces were reinforced so Rommel made a 
spoiling attack to delay the Eighth Army’s preparations on the 6 March at Medenine. General 
Alexander took control of the US II Corps to work more closely with the British and to break 
through the Gabes gap onto the plains south of Tunis, in order to capture the airfields. These 
would provide bases to give air support for the capture of the Tunis-Bizerta bridgehead and 
threaten the Axis supply lines to the rear. First Army units had their own problems of in-
experienced units and long supply lines. On the northern flank, V Corps was being blocked by 
strong defences along the few approach routes. 
The Tunisian landscape was a very different type of terrain for operations. The principle of 
capturing and controlling the high ground for artillery observation purposes remained the same. 
The country in the southern sector was semi-desert and contained fewer populated centres. The 
Eighth Army approached along the coast, with any potential desert outflanking routes blocked by 
difficult or impassable terrain. The front was already nearly 200 miles from Tripoli, so the coast 
plain remained the main area for operations. The coastline sector had to be occupied to capture 
future supply ports such as Sousse, the third largest of all the ports in Tunisia.  
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The plain in southern Tunisia provided good going across mostly undulating or featureless ground 
which was frequently cut by deep wadis. The inland route was blocked by the Djebel Dahar hills 
through which there were few tracks. West of this line of hills was the Great Erg desert region, 20 
miles of shifting sand dunes.23 Southern Tunisia was divided from the central plains by a series of 
salt marshes or Chotts which left only one passable gap of twenty miles from the sea at the wadi 
Akirit, Gabes gap. These salt marshes dried up quickly after May, but Alexander wanted operations 
to pass north of Gabes more quickly than this. 
The Mareth line was sited between the coast and the dominating Matmata hills which were noted 
as, ‘impassable for any large force [and which] ran back at right angles to the Mareth line, and 
more or less parallel to the coast for more than a hundred miles to the narrow Tebega gap.’24 Axis 
Engineers had developed the old French defence line behind two wide coastal wadis, they had 
scarped the sides into steep-sided anti-tank ditches. The defences consisted of a series of strongly 
fortified posts running for twelve miles inland, from the northern end of the Matmata hills, then 
across the plain to Mareth and Zarat near the coast.25 Axis engineers had developed newly 
entrenched defences consisting of concrete blockhouses, and gun positions. The two wadis 
provided natural anti-tank obstacles; the wadi Zeuss in front and the main wadi Zigzaou, with 
rocky sides which had been scarped up to 20 feet deep. They were up to sixty feet across, but 
heavy rains had waterlogged them and created streams eight feet deep, all of which created a 
formidable anti-tank obstacle. The defences were covered for 19 miles by minefields and wire 
entanglements around nests of strongpoints which each held up to half a battalion and were sited 
in defiladed areas to break up any advance across the wadis.26  These fortifications were 
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considered to be so strong by Alexander that only a full scale assault would break-through them.27 
Axis commanders were also fully aware of the inland route via the Tebega gap which flanked the 
line and led to El-Hamma in the rear. The change in terrain from desert to hill country, created a 
tactical change in reconnaissance. One of the LRDG’s final tasks was to lead the New Zealand 
Corps around the flank of the line.28 
 
Figure 10:2 The Mareth Line, 20-26 March 1943.29 
Mareth: preparations 
The Eighth Army was described as being in ‘peak condition, with a sick rate of only one in a 
thousand.’ It was ordered to break through the Mareth defences, and destroy as much of 
Panzerarmee before it retreated to the Gabes gap which was considered another strong defensive 
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position further back.30 Preparations for the assault took a month because three Corps were 
involved and each required a large amount of supplies and ammunition to be brought forward the 
180 miles from Tripoli which was just being re-established as a supply port. Half the troops 
planned for the assault were still 600 miles to the rear in Cyrenaica.31 However, the Infantry 
divisions were low on manpower, the 50th Division had received no reinforcements since Alamein 
whilst General Freyberg was cautious because the New Zealand reinforcements were limited and 
the 4th Indian Division only had two brigades. To limit casualties, the initial attacks targeted the 
defences in the low lying sections near the coast to avoid being overlooked.  
The plan, codenamed operation ‘Pugilist’, included an attack by the 50th Division supported by 
armour. They were preceded by a series of night attacks. Operations ‘Walk’ and ‘Canter’ began on 
the 16 March, followed by the main assault in better weather on the 20 March. For this 151st 
Brigade would cross the wadi Zigzaou, supported by 50th RTR tanks. Further east the 69th Brigade 
would capture the ‘bastion’ a position and 4th Indian Division would follow through and exploit 
beyond the bridgehead.32 The whole attack was supported by sixteen regiments of Artillery and 
Engineers were brought up to clear the extensive minefields and deploy fascines for a causeway 
across the flooded wadi.33  
The build-up phase for the assault was now a vital part of Montgomery’s methods of assault and 
he used elements of three Divisions for the frontal assault and increased the forces available to 
27,000 troops to form a New Zealand Corps. This formation had strong Armoured and Artillery 
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support and was to move around the inland hill range, through a gap plotted by the LRDG, and 
breakthrough the Tebega Gap to the coast, ideally to block the retreat to the Gabes gap.34  
Mareth: Battle summary 
The main assault included two Brigades assaulting different parts of the Axis defences. The 201st 
Guards Brigade assaulted the ‘Horseshoe’ feature with two battalions and suffered 40% casualties 
for no gain because of poor intelligence. The 69th Brigade made more headway and reached the 
wadi Zigzoau, but heavy rain prevented armour from crossing the waterlogged wadi. The fighting 
continued for two days and the Eighth Army was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy 
casualties for little gain.  
Manpower shortage problems forced the old issue of an inexperienced unit being committed 
without any detailed intelligence on the strength of the Axis position. For the main assault the 50th 
Division crossed the broad Zigzaou, despite it being waterlogged and deep in mud, but supported 
by a heavy barrage. The fresh Infantry of the 8th Durham Lights thought the assault would be ‘a 
picnic’, and took their objectives but with heavy casualties which left their morale shattered.35 
There were further delays with the assault because the Engineers had to clear gaps under heavy 
enfilade fire, the tanks of  50th RTR and other support units were unable to get through through 
because the only causeway was blocked leaving the weakened Durhams isolated.36 The terrain 
features delayed British attempts to reinforce the main battle, the wide wadi feature assisted the 
Axis forces who made a determined defence by 15th Panzer Division, who made an effective 
counter-attack which heavily defeated 50th RTR and pushed the Durhams back to the edge of the 
wadi.37 The wadi feature also delayed a fresh attack by British units trying to relieve the pressure 
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on the beleaguered 151st Brigade. The Division spent the next two days in mopping up operations 
which were equally costly.  
Montgomery was forced to revise his plans from the 23 March, and halted the main assault. The 
Army then turned the Axis line by an flanking move made by the 2nd NZ Corps Group, who fought a 
separate battle to break-through the Tebega gap and El-Hamma to get behind the position. 38 The 
flank march was an operational move dictated by the terrain and by the failures of the frontal 
assault at Mareth. The main flank attack was timed for a daylight assault because of the expected 
heavy air support from the RAF.39 Further key heights at Tebaga were captured by the 25 March, 
again using constant heavy fighter-bomber support.  
The British assault doctrine had developed into a successful combination of Infantry and 
supporting Armour clearing the hills of enemy anti-tank guns, which allowed fresh Armoured 
Regiments to advance across the plain. Each hill position, once captured, enabled the Corps to 
‘unlock’ the next position. A combined assault by the 3rd RTR and 6th NZ Brigade captured Pt 201 
which enabled the New Zealanders to outflank and capture Hill 184, undermining the defences on 
Pt 209.40 This final height held out in a tough battle and its subsequent capture broke through the 
Axis defences, ‘We had seen the awe-inspiring sight of the hundreds of tanks of the 1st Armoured 
Division rolling in masses past the left of Pt 201 and on through the gap made by the attack.’41 As 
the 1st Armoured Division advanced through the Tebega gap, Axis units retreated under cover of a 
dust storm and the RAF bombardment. Mareth had been successfully outflanked and this forced 
Panzerarmee to retreat to the next defensive position at the Gabes gap or wadi Akirit position.42 
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Mareth: conclusion 
The Mareth assaults proved the Eighth Army’s doctrine were becoming well established in 
preparations, confidence and coordination. However, carefully sited Axis defences could still cause 
problems. At Mareth the attacks on the ‘Horseshoe’ position crippled two battalions of Guards.43 
Higher terrain features overlooked or enfiladed the wadis with well sited anti-tank and MG 
positions, which caused severe delays and heavy casualties to the assault units. The waterlogged 
wadi Zigzaou proved too much for either trucks or tanks to cross, leaving the forward infantry cut-
off when counter-attacks occurred. Here then, localized Axis counter-attacks worked well in 
ending the assaults. Terrain problems affected the flank march, where deep sand made the going 
slow and difficult. The 27,000 strong column was also delayed by its own size and number of 
vehicles. Later on positions on the Djebel Melab and Pt209 positions delayed armour, but these 
were overcome when the experienced Maori Battalion captured them.44 The New Zealand Division 
suffered fewer casualties at Tebega, but these were from already understrength rifle companies 
who could ill-afford to lose men. The 164thDivision lost many killed in the heavy bombardments 
and a battalion which surrendered when cut off.45 
Intelligence was improving rapidly with Ultra being more quickly fed through to the 18th Army 
Group. There were still errors in interpretation by First Army commanders and their HQs.46 Yet the 
Eighth Army still made errors in planning and poor intelligence, the frontal assault on the 
‘Horseshoe’ was made in bright moonlight against a position protected by masses anti-personnel 
mines which crippled the attacking Guards Battalions, despite this they achieved their objectives 
but were too weak to hold them. The later, main assault also suffered from a lack of 
reconnaissance. The preparatory attacks were made during a period of heavy rain in which little 
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air or ground reconnaissance was made or analysis conducted of the key defences.47 Other issues 
which severely hampered the British operation included the heavy rainstorms throughout the 
operation, which created major problems maintaining the causeway across the wadi and left units 
cut off in the bridgehead.  
The Eighth Army was seen as being audacious in the offensive now and Montgomery was seen a 
making a bold move by switching to a left flank thrust. The Eighth Army commander was 
considered a flexible and daring commander, but there were also errors in command which 
influenced the battle. The Corps commander, Oliver Leese, left the detailed planning to the in-
experienced Major-General Nichols who commanded 50th Division. Following the breakthrough 
there was a confusion of orders between Horrocks and Montgomery which delayed the advance 
by the 10th Corps. When the delays were sorted out, Axis rearguard unit prevented the leading 
units from exploiting the advance.  
British assault doctrines were gradually improving, with the heavy weight of the artillery 
bombardment providing close and timely barrages which covered infantry assaults. The continuing 
heavy fire support contributed to the decline in morale of the defending Italian units who began to 
surrender in numbers after the 21 March. Similar mass surrenders later took place at the Wadi 
Akirit. The British Armour began fighting alongside new and more powerful 17pdr anti-tank guns 
which defeated a German counter-attack near El Hamma. This method of quick defence had been 
learnt from earlier German doctrine used since 1941.  The 2nd NZ Corps now attacked on a narrow 
front towards El Hamma and was also heavily supported by an RAF bombardment of relays of 
medium bomber squadrons, who targeting the enemy defences and armour.48 One onlooker 
noted, ‘at 1600 hours…waves of Kittyhawks, Hurricanes and Spitfires came in from the west, so 
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that the Axis had the sun in their eyes’.49 The RAF had become a more flexible fire-support option, 
to be called in as needed by a Liaison Officer located within 8th Armoured Brigade, who directed 
the waiting fighter-bombers onto the Axis positions.  
The assaults at Mareth and Tebega represented a new phase in Eighth Army operations. Frontline 
units were depleted but had become highly experienced units who maintained good morale. They 
had improved equipment and doctrines for both attack and defence. The army had developed 
quite far since the retreats in 1941, using much improved techniques in assaults, and had learnt 
many lessons from Second Alamein. They focussed on the need to capture and hold key heights 
and this remained a significant issue on all operations. The breakthrough at Tebega ensured the 
Mareth line was untenable and Axis forces retreated to the Gabes gap. 
The Wadi Akirit, 6 April 1943: Terrain 
The terrain defined the parameters of the battle for the Wadi Akirit. This feature ran the length of 
the Gabes Gap which was eighteen miles wide and was dominated by high ground behind the 
wadi. Five miles along the wadi was the 500 feet high Djebel Roumana, which was considered a 
superb artillery position and the Germans considered the wadi to be the strongest in North Africa 
but it was still overrun within 24 hours.50 Montgomery’s noted, ‘the enemy position was extremely 
strong, and he held all the observation areas.’51 The Djebel Roumana dominated the central sector 
became a British objective against which both Armour and Infantry was committed. One of the 
attacking units was the 7th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, its CO described the ridge and Pt 112 
as ‘… a huge brier of a hill, which…rose into an enormous, steep sided rocky lump, which was 
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Roumana itself.’52 Next there was more low ground before the desert left flank was dominated by 
a high,‘massif’ feature which needed to be taken. This reached 900 feet and was a complicated 
mass of gullies, escarpments from Pt 275 on the forward edges to the Djebel Fatnassa behind it.53  
 
Figure 10:3 The Wadi Akirit, 6 April 1943.54 
General Tuker noted that his plans for the 4th Indian Division pre-empted the main assault by, 
’seize[ing] this area by first light, El Meida, Pt 275, El Aligh, and the scarps south-west of Pt 275…to 
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enable us to reach out to the enemy’s rear positions…and open up the whole position for 
exploitation by 10th Corps.’55 He feared the attacks across the central plain by 51st Division and 50th 
Division would be overlooked and halted by Axis artillery observing from these heights if they 
were not captured.  
Akirit: Preparation 
General Alexander wanted the Eighth Army to make the frontal assault at the wadi Akirit to clear 
the Gabes Gap whilst the First Army applied pressure in the rear of the Axis bridgehead. Some 
commanders thought a rapid assault might capture the position but Montgomery ordered 30th 
Corps to make a set-piece assault, and noted, ‘I must attack quickly, before he[the enemy] has 
time to make the position too strong.’56 Montgomery wanted two Divisions for the assault, the  
51st and 4th Indian Divisions, with 2nd NZ Division and 8th Armoured Brigade exploiting afterwards, 
but Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese later inserted the 69th Brigade from 50th Division, to attack the 
centre low ground also.  
The battle plan was heavily influenced by the terrain when a reconnaissance by the two Divisional 
commanders forced the original plan to be altered so that 4th Indian Division would make a silent 
assault on the left flank high ground, before the main assault by the 50th Division went in. 
Christopher Mann argued that this was an example of improved command decisions as the more 
experienced Divisional commanders were allowed to adapt the set-piece plan provided by 
Lieutenant-General Leese at 30th Corps HQ.57 As standard doctrine now, the Divisions were 
supported by much greater heavy artillery and air cover. 
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Montgomery thought that a different type of assault, using the no-moon period, would catch the 
Axis out, and had not done before by the Eighth Army.58 A three Divisional assault appeared to be 
large scale, but the reality was that 4th Indian would assault the difficult hill positions on the left 
flank with elements of two Brigades while 50th Division used three Infantry battalions to attack the 
low ground. The 51st Division would attack both the Djebel Roumana and further east across the 
plain with just five battalions supported by two Armoured Regiments and the 22nd Armoured 
Brigade and the 5th AGRA. The combined Allied Air Forces continued to provide support against 
Axis ground targets. 
The Axis defences were prepared quite quickly from the end of March and von Arnim who was 
dispirited by the growing lack of supplies getting through and thought the Italian units were, ‘tired 
of war’ with little remaining combat value.59 The position was strengthened by 4,000 mines and 
wire entanglements and was held by three German battalions and elements of two Italian 
Divisions. Most of 15th Panzer Division was in reserve behind the position despite being weak in 
tanks and 88mm guns.60  
Wadi Akirit: Battle summary 
The attack opened with the 4th Indian Division’s 1/2nd Gurkhas making a night assault without ant 
preliminary bombardment, which secured the high ground and enabled the 5th Indian Brigade to 
pass through and capture the vital El Meida height. In the centre, the Medium Artillery Regiments 
fired an exceptionally heavy programme against enemy batteries and infantry strongpoints. In 
return the Axis defensive fire was thought to be very weak considering the excellent observation 
they had from the high ground.61 The scale of the bombardment awed onlookers and supported 
the infantry attacks all day. The 51st Division Infantry made continued assaults on Roumana, 
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despite extremely tough Axis fire captured Pt 112 by early morning which created two gaps for 
armour. The 69th Brigade assault suffered heavy casualties and was pinned down, but achieved 
some objectives with armoured support from 4th CLY.62  
The Axis counter-attacked and committed their Panzer reserves onto the Roumana heights with 
infantry and pushed the 152nd Brigade off Pt 112 and the battle dissolved here into one of attrition 
for the heights. As the day wore on a units from the 69th Brigade and 5th Indian Brigade made 
breakthroughs on the lower hills, capturing El Hachana hill and 1,000 prisoners, which broke the 
Italian defences on the centre left, but the German commanders were frustrated because their 
reserves had been committed against the Roumana hills in the centre. 
British doctrine now showed its ability to counter Axis moves as large numbers of RAF bombers 
and fighters who disrupted any concentrations of enemy armour or troops.63 The failure of this 
Axis counter-attack combined with 4th Indian Division capturing the high ground, forced the Axis 
commanders to consider whether to withdraw and by 7pm, 90th Light Division summarized that, 
’The enemy has captured all the commanding features of the Akirit Line and thus brought about its 
collapse.’64 General Messe ordered his forces to retreat back to Enfidaville, the next dominant set 
of heights beyond the Goubellat plain, the Axis had at least 5,300 POWs taken whilst the Eighth 
Army lost some 1,289 casualties. 
Wadi Akirit: conclusion 
The Army had shown flexibility in tactics and was able now to alter its accepted doctrine at a late 
stage. The moon-less night aided the 4th Indian Division’s silent assault on the massif, rather than 
wait for the next full moon when Axis forces expected a night assault. The high ground facing 4th 
Indian Division was the key to the position. The ridge Djebel Roumana dominated the central 
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sector and was captured quickly, although local counter-attacks forced 51st Highland Division off 
the key features and the Infantry suffered heavily fighting for these hill-top positions. The German 
commanders committed all their reserves to this point and so were unable to block further British 
moves by fresh battalions in the left-centre across low ground.65 The greater controversy remains 
a failure of command and why Horrocks did not take advantage of the breakthrough created by 4th 
Indian Division and order his 10th Corps armour forward to trap more Axis units.66 These were 
allowed to retreat across the Goubellat plain to the Enfidaville heights. 
Tunis: The final phase of the campaign 
During the final phases of the campaign the Eighth Army had rapidly crossed the central Goubellat 
plain, to be halted by further Axis defences amongst mountainous features above Enfidaville. In 
the west it was dominated by the twin-peaked Kournine height, which was noted as being, ‘too 
good an observation post to remain in enemy hands…Kournine was absolutely bare and after 
several attempts had been made to hold it we had to [retreat]. From adjacent hills artillery and 
mortar fire could be brought to bear on the crest…and under fire from guns further back.’67 Many 
accounts have failed to note the significance of the ground and how it impacted on operations to 
such a degree. It was now an integral part of planning, objectives and doctrinal methods of 
overcoming difficult Axis defences. 
Tunis: Preparation 
The final Allied plans to break the Axis line were altered by terrain and also impacted on the 
doctrine of the final assault. The strength of the defences in the Kournine hills, made attacks by 
the New Zealand Division only partially successful, so Montgomery halted these having failed to 
secure the high eastern point of the Enfidaville ridge. This meant the Eighth Army could not thrust 
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through the defile to Bou-Ficha, so Alexander switched fronts to make the final assault in the First 
Army sector, across more accessible ground.68 However this showed how flexible British forces 
were now quite formidable, under General Alexander’s firm leadership, The 18th Army Group 
transferred 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions over 100 miles across difficult terrain. This was 
achieved by these veteran units through good navigation across difficult lateral routes using 
‘wireless silence’ they only needed just four days to prepare for the assault.69 
 
Figure 10:4 The final assault on Tunis, 6-13 May 1943.
70
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The final assault represented an Army which now had confidence in its doctrines. It had the full 
support from the Allied Air Forces who added a powerful force multiplier in firepower and were 
able to neutralize enemy positions allowing Armour and Infantry to reach and capture them 
quickly. The two Divisions combined with two experienced First Army Divisions for the final 
breakthrough assault into the Tunis-Bizerta bridgehead. ‘Operation Strike’ targeted Tunis itself 
rather than just capturing Axis hill positions on the outskirts.71 
The plans were influenced by the terrain to be traversed, ‘on May 2 all cmds [commands]…spent 
the day getting to know the country and gleaning as much information from it.’ There was also a 
lack of time so the objectives were selected from maps, which highlighted that the, ‘two 
dominating areas of high ground,’ were the Djebel Achour and St Cyprien, which covered the main 
road into Tunis.72 Typical of how efficient and experienced the HQs and commanders had only one 
day to prepare as the orders were issued on the 4 May and the assault began on the 6 May. The 
commanders were also confident as the first objectives were to be captured by 5am and two 
further ones by 7am, Horrocks said if they had been gained by the end of the day and the armour 
was at least forward on either flank, ‘we shall have done well.’ Yet both he and General Alfrey 
from the First Army remained confident they had the support and numbers to breakthrough.73  
The doctrine was a repeat of the Tebega gap assault adapted to develop an attack with a two 
Divisional front with new heavy armour supporting each Infantry Divisions on a 3,000 yard 
frontage. This needed heavy fire support from over 400 guns because both Infantry Divisions had 
only two Brigades and the whole of the RAF resources were made available for the assault.74 The 
superiority of the supply situation also showed how the First Army’s supply situation had coped 
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with additional units added to its operations. Other tactics used since Second Alamein also 
included a deception plan which used dummy tanks to confuse the Axis as to where the Armoured 
thrust would come from. 
Tunis: Battle summary 
The British forces now had a formidable and impressive assault doctrine and this was aided by the 
clearer weather from 5 May, which brought in waves of fighter-bombers who targeted any Axis 
defence positions. Allied bombers added weight to the Artillery bombardment and the Infantry 
had captured the high ground by mid-morning the following day. In a subsidiary assault, American 
forces finally opened up the northern coastal route to Bizerte when they captured the twin 
positions – Green and Bald hills – by outflanking them.75  
The British also had the flexibility to hold off weak Axis forces and not be defelected from the main 
assault. The Axis made insignificant counter-attacks which needlessly used up the latest powerful 
Tiger tanks (MkVIs) and other armour. The 81st Anti-Tank Regiment’s new 17pdr anti-tank guns 
held them off and another assault by just twenty Panzers whilst 6th Armoured Division continued 
its main thrust towards Tunis. The main Axis counter-attack towards the 1st Armoured Division was 
also ‘smashed’ by waiting artillery near Kournine.76 The 15th Panzer Division was crushed by the 
weight of firepower and overwhelmed by the assault on the Masicault ridge. Their command 
structure crumpled and units withdrew towards Tunis.  
There were still some issues though as the 4th Indian Division complained the armour was too slow 
in exploiting their success, but the advance remained a measured one for a time.77 In comparison 
the 6th Armoured Division moved quickly forward some 20 miles ahead of the supporting Infantry, 
towards St-Cyprien which was another naturally strong defensive height. The tactical assaults were 
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directed at the ridgelines as 1st RTR assaulted a final hill defence and overcame a few Panzers and 
numerous 88mm guns, the German forces now became demoralized and heavily outnumbered by 
British armour.  
The final phases of the assault highlighted the combination of tactics by British forces; Scout cars 
moved from ridge to ridge, followed by armour on each flank, checking all likely defensive sites. 
Infantry in armoured carriers moved up steadily and more infantry in trucks occupied the hill 
positions.78 When armour was stopped, medium artillery batteries were brought up which soon 
eliminated them, which allowed the armour to begin its final dash into the city. The advance took 
two days with any sectors of stiff opposition being by-passed and left for units coming up behind.79 
The final operations continued with feint attacks which contained Axis units behind the frontline, 
directly contributed to the final surrender.80 On the 7 May British Armour swept into Tunis just as 
US Forces entered a flattened Bizerte and Axis forces formally surrendered on the 13 May, with 
over 250,000 men going into captivity. It was a greater defeat than Stalingrad had been five 
months earlier. 
Tunis: conclusion 
British doctrines had evolved into a formidable combination of attack and defensive tactics. They 
were complemented as both the Eighth and the First Army Divisions became more experienced in 
battle and were able to work together. The 18th Army Group had evolved to become a powerful 
fighting force in attack or defence with RAF fighter-bombers and Heavy Corps Artillery fire being 
called down onto the slightest opposition, which enabled the heavily armoured Churchill tanks to 
support the Infantry right into the Axis defensive positions.  
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The four battles discussed clearly show the increasing impact of the tactical terrain had on each 
battle and how doctrines were altered to take account of it. They enabled Eighth Army Divisions to 
develop their battle doctrines in attack and defence. Medenine was a clear improvement on 
tactics which had been first used at Alam Halfa, where good use had been made of defensive 
ridges and low hills, to deploy powerful combinations of anti-tank guns and armour, backed by 
massed artillery. The Mareth Line proved to be a tough frontal battle for the Eighth Army in poor 
weather conditions which contributed to the difficulties created by the tactical terrain and more 
powerful defences. The flexibility of the Army was shown by the successful flanking Corps which 
made a telling daylight assault on tactical hilltop positions using massed waves of bombers and 
heavy Artillery and Armour. The Wadi Akirit highlighted the flexibility of experienced units such as 
4th Indian to alter from Montgomery’s usual form of heavy assault to making a silent assault to 
ensure the capture of key heights. The main Infantry assaults were also directed at the central hill 
ridgeline and drew in the expected Axis counter-attacks which enabled fresh British Armour to 
breakthrough and outflank the defensive positions. The final assaults into Tunis specifically 
targeted high ground with combinations of tanks and infantry, heavy artillery and waves of 
bombers, all of which crushed Axis defences.   
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Chapter 11 Other factors: British doctrine, training, equipment, 
command, and Intelligence 
 
During the campaign in North Africa, British forces were also affected by factors including major 
changes to their doctrine; command and intelligence issues; supply problems and support from 
the RAF and Royal Navy. British units made improvisations in both attack and defence doctrine 
between 1940 and 1943 and these were significant in deciding the outcome of operations. 
Command and intelligence issues were a key factor in the campaign and they remain a dominant 
feature within many studies. Supply influenced RAF and Royal Naval operations as they targeted 
the destruction of Axis supply routes, as being a more effective use of aircraft while the 
Mediterranean Fleet targeted the Libyan bound convoys. This chapter will look briefly at these 
issues and discuss some examples of their influence on the campaign.  
The major changes in doctrine occurred at the tactical level, where tactics were developed on the 
battlefield through a series of improvisations. The most striking example of this is the 
development and subsequent overuse of Jock Columns. The Motorised Battalions within the 
Armoured Brigade were meant to provide close support for the armour as a pivot group, but from 
March 1941 to October 1942, they fought separately in Jock Columns. This was an all-arms 
formation designed by the commander of 3rd RHA, Lieutenant-Colonel, (later Brigadier) J.C. ‘Jock’ 
Campbell. They were designed for reconnaissance and to harass enemy positions, and became the 
standard doctrine for the Infantry Brigades operations up to late 1942 to overcome the need to 
disperse units along a wide front line.  
They commonly consisted of a company of Infantry, one battery or troop of artillery and platoons 
of three Bofors AA and 2pdr AT guns for defence. The dispersal of Artillery batteries deployed 
amongst Jock columns quickly resulted in a dispersal of their firepower, rather than retaining them 
182 
 
for regimental strikes. Even when batteries fired at high rates, they could not replicate the density 
of shelling a regiment of twenty-four guns could produce. This formation was assumed to be 
effective in engaging the enemy. However, the experience of some columns highlighted 
weaknesses in relentlessly using this formation. Lieut-Colonel Roscoe from 1st Rifle Brigade clearly 
warned about their lack of effectiveness when the column lost 40% of its vehicle strength due to 
the near impassable going and a lack of petrol.81 The dunes and soft going near the Wadi Feragh 
ruined truck engines and suspensions, leaving Jock Columns short of vehicles. Signalling problems 
caused them to lose their supply echelons and so they also lost fuel and ammunition.  
In the summer of 1941 the 7th Support Group used Jock columns continuously and during the 
Battleaxe offensive they were assigned a flank role. In November during Crusader, the Group later 
deployed Jock columns against the flanks of the Panzergruppe, where they influenced Rommel’s 
decision to retreat.82 Auchinleck believed they were the way forward for offensive tactics, 
although he was influenced by the mixed performance of the Armoured Brigades, which had 
suffered tremendous losses. The Artillery’s 25pdr gun proved to be a weapon capable of knocking 
out Axis armour at a longer range so that Jock Columns were used throughout the Spring of 1942 
as the Eighth Army sought to dominate ‘no-man’s land’ in front of Gazala.  
The limited success of some Jock Column activity masked their inherent weakness. In March, 50th 
Division targeted two airfields at Martuba and Tmimi which diverted Luftwaffe operations away 
from a vital Malta convoy. At Gazala after the British armoured defeat, the Free French Brigade 
Columns attacked Axis supply units and harassed the Panzerarmee as it approached Tobruk. 
Despite the defeat at Gazala, Major-General Eric Dorman-Smith, still emphasized his ideal 
‘battlegroup’ which consisted of two companies of Infantry, one battery of artillery and supporting 
AA and anti-tank guns, in other words another Jock Column. He wanted an Infantry division of 
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three brigades, to deploy up to nine of these new ‘battle groups’. He had effectively discounted 
armour as the primary strike force.83  
At Matruh the British centre was held by two Jock Columns, which were quickly overrun and 
enabled the Axis to drive onto Alamein. During First Alamein, one enterprising New Zealand 
commander deployed a more powerful column based around a full Regiment of Artillery with four 
troops of anti-tank guns for defence which trebled its offensive firepower.84 Montgomery finally 
ended their use a month later, as he imposed his new Divisional doctrine and training programme 
upon the Eighth Army, in readiness for Operation Lightfoot. 
At the tactical level, armoured units were influenced by key terrain features during their doctrinal 
planning, and in their training. The threat of air attack and a lack of cover also caused vehicles to 
be more dispersed whilst moving and operating in units and led to demands for improved 
equipment, such as more powerful main tanks. Consequently the Army received successive 
deliveries of equipment which brought its own problems of doctrinal coordination and altered the 
way armour, infantry and the artillery fought the enemy. A lack of armour forced commanders to 
use their artillery and infantry more offensively from the beginning of hostilities. These new Jock 
columns, combined with the practice of dispersion created a different mind-set amongst 
commanders.  
From late 1942 onwards Montgomery made the first successful reorganisation of the Eighth Army, 
which contributed to its improved operational performance from Second Alamein to the end of 
the campaign. By February 1943, the Eighth Army assaults were fully backed by a huge Air Force 
and direct Artillery support which commanders recognized as a vital part of the assault and break-
in phases. These combined arms forces were concentrated as a standard doctrine, and this finally 
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overcame issues of dispersal which had been prevalent for so long. These new tactics would be 
used by the British Army in future campaigns in Europe.  
Attack and defence doctrine 
During early engagements, individual Armoured Regiments developed their own improvised 
methods of operating to overcome the dispersed nature of desert warfare. Cyril Joly noted how, in 
five weeks on patrol, his troop, ‘evolved certain simple drills which covered most of the troop’s 
tactics…We all acquired a great deal of confidence in…and made ourselves into a really effective 
fighting unit.’85 During Crusader, The armoured experience was a mixture of separate Brigade 
actions which highlighted their new doctrine. Typical of this was 3rd RTR, who in one action 
‘formed line for an attack which went in…the sqn was then encircled and it became a race to 
escape the circle.”86 In the immediate aftermath of Crusader, armoured combat was accepted as, 
‘largely a matter of columns of all arms…over large distances…widely separated.’87 Yet in reality 
the use of combined arms was rare, but battles had become more widely dispersed. 
The ideal assault doctrine was practiced during Operation Compass. Here the Infantry made 
prepared assaults supported by ‘I’ tanks and artillery bombardments, which worked well. Yet by 
the summer of 1941, British assaults were directed at too many terrain features as military 
objectives, which were spread over too wide an area. The armour should have co-operated with 
attached artillery but was viewed as an ‘area weapon’ and assumed to be useless against well dug-
in AT guns.88  In the same period of build-up the Armoured Brigades received METP No.2, which 
confirmed that the key Armoured Regimental doctrine was to attack. Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts 
of 3rd RTR noted that great stress had been placed upon fighting as a Brigade, ‘but when it came to 
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operations each Regiment was sent off to conduct its own battle.89 Even the Armoured Brigades 
were being dispersed into individual Regimental battles. The 3rd RTR commander noted that, ‘Days 
[were] spent selecting Brigade hull down positions from which they would fight.’90 However, when 
the Axis advanced, 3rd RTR just failed to reach its allotted position in time and was forced to fight 
isolated from its fellow Regiments. The 5th RTR and 8th Hussars were caught moving out of their 
night-time leaguers and were heavily mauled. The result of the actions were that the Armoured 
Brigades were quickly reduced in strength and suffered serious losses of tanks and experienced 
crews.   
During the middle phases of the campaign, combined arms assaults were attempted once again by 
British formations. At Gazala, Operation Aberdeen was a large scale attempt to assault a key ridge 
feature. The attempt by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade on the Sidra Ridge was a complete failure. 
Major Tatum of 42nd RTR, noted, ‘we came first under enemy artillery fire which had no effect on 
the tanks but a considerable effect on the lorry-borne infantry.’91 The main assault took place 
south-east of the Sidra Ridge when the 22nd Armoured advanced with two Indian Brigades from 5th 
Division into the ‘Cauldron’. The armour was quickly separated from the Infantry, and retired 
leaving two dispersed Brigades across the depression and ridge with supporting artillery on the 
Aslagh ridge. These Brigades were all overrun by rapid Axis counter-attacks. 
By the autumn of 1942 Montgomery ordered a large scale training programme for Operation 
Lightfoot in September. Battle drills showed a more standardized and combined arms approach, 
ensuring close artillery support.92 During First Alamein the 2nd NZ Division had suffered from poor 
cooperation with supporting armour so that Freyberg ensured that an Armoured Brigade was now 
directly attached to the Division for Lightfoot. By 1943, the Eighth Army was much more confident 
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of its battle doctrines against difficult Axis positions. One of the main developments was its 
flexibility and the capacity to try a different approach. This happened against the Mareth Line 
when the New Zealand Corps outflanked the position.93 Equally at the Wadi Akirit, some variations 
to tactics were used, including attacking under a ‘no-moon’ period, but it took six days to stockpile 
artillery ammunition. Here training was considered unnecessary as, ‘the plan of attack was simple 
and after the customary fashion.’94 The Army had developed a well versed doctrine of assault. The 
full development of what became British and Allied assault doctrine was seen during the final 
assault on the Tunis bridgehead in May 1943. The plan of attack was designed by General 
Alexander and made full use of an Artillery Corps and nearly 1,200 aircraft in direct support to a 
four Division combined arms assault. British doctrine had developed a long way from the modest 
Regimental and Brigade.  
Early commentary on defensive doctrine showed the importance of keeping dispersed formations 
cohesive as defensive positions became over extended while trying to block off the open desert 
flank. By May 1942 Infantry Brigades were deployed separately in Brigade box defences. The 
Eighth Army commander General Ritchie re-defined defensive doctrine using a combination of 
fortified positions and counter-attacks.95 The 50th Division was new to the desert campaign and 
noted that the Brigade box frontages were very wide and had to be held irrespective of an Axis 
breakthrough.96 In theory these boxes should hold for three weeks, however the experience of the 
Gazala battle proved that very few Brigades could hold out for more than three days.  
The defensive boxes proved to be weak because they were often sited too far apart and became 
vulnerable when Axis units seized high ground which overlooked them. The 150th Brigade was 
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quickly moved to occupy a new position near the Trigh Capuzzo, overlooked by higher ground, 
‘with a perimeter of twenty miles [and] was isolated from its fellow 69th Brigade by a gap of six 
miles. The position was too big for three battalions, uncompleted and very hard to defend in the 
rear. Yet it was obvious that the Germans would cut off this position and attack it in the rear.’97 
Training 
Recent studies on British Army training during the Second World War have highlighted different 
aspects which affected the Army’s performance. These include the conservative nature of the 
military hierarchy and the different backgrounds of the men who made up the ‘citizen army’ from 
1941. 98 Tim Moreman notes the rapid expansion of forces which created a ‘training deficit’ in the 
Middle East. GHQ issued pamphlets from autumn 1941 which emphasized that mobile warfare 
needed specialized training.99 Despite the expanded numbers of Training Schools by GHQ, for 
different arms, regiments noted there was a lack of actual training actually carried out.  
It was quite common for fresh units with higher proportions of inexperienced troops to be 
committed to desert operations without sufficient training. The huge increase in citizen-soldiers 
created high numbers of in-adequately prepared units being sent out to the Middle East.100 
Individual Brigades and Regiments were committed with no time to practice local doctrines for 
combat. During Crusader, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was rushed into action, at Gazala the newly 
arrived 5th Indian Division commander had to plan Operation Aberdeen in one afternoon and the 
Division was committed to the assault the following day. And at First Alamein, the recently arrived 
23rd Armoured Brigade first action ended in a hasty charge which failed with terrible losses.  
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During Operation Compass, the 4th Indian Division trained hard for the impending assaults and 
practiced against full sized replicas of the camps at Tummar and Nibeiwa to maximize success.101 
This achievement was not repeated until the six weeks training implemented by Montgomery 
before Second Alamein in the autumn of 1942. British forces tried to pass on the lessons of 
combat for newly arrived formations but these documents took time to come through. The 
Lessons about the first Cyrenaican campaign were written by O’Connor at some point before his 
capture in April 1941, but the pamphlet, Notes from the Theatre of War, on Libya, did not appear 
until early 1942, with NTW No.6 relating to armoured experiences during Crusader against 
German forces. During Gazala, the Eighth Army commander thought that newly arrived Armoured 
Regiments did not have the training to be effective in combat and so were forced to hand over 
their fresh tanks to exhausted crews from the depleted frontline units. General Ritchie had clearly 
lost confidence in the ability of untried Armoured Regiments to win against the more experienced 
Axis battlegroups.  
Auchinleck made an assessment of the Army following his arrival in July 1941 and laid down some 
principles of training and doctrine before any further offensive was undertaken.102 By September 
GHQ issued Middle East Training Pamphlets or METPs, with titles including, ‘Tactical Handling of 
Armoured Divisions’ which became the basis for future doctrine.103  They provided officers with 
details on how to operate in the desert, but whether they were used is more difficult to ascertain. 
The METP No.2, for Army Tank Brigades stipulated the use of combined arms assaults with 
Infantry, but notes on defence doctrine was a much lower priority.  
By May 1942 Auchinleck again reiterated that training was of the first importance and his report 
defined areas in need of training. However, the Axis offensive began two weeks later and only 
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relatively low numbers of troops had been processed through the new Training Schools.104 
Experienced formations returned to the Eighth Army in the autumn of 1942, including the 9th 
Australian Division which had undergone intense training in Lebanon and was considered ‘battle-
ready’ by October.105  The experienced 2nd NZ Division continued full scale rehearsals, training over 
similar ground and using live minefields and ammunition to make the practice as realistic as 
possible. The Engineers were a vital part of the break-in assault now and trained to clear gaps in 
the deep mine-belts, to enable the Armour and Infantry to pass through. 
In the latter stages of the campaign, the advance to Tripoli left little time for training for the Eighth 
Army. As it drew close to the Axis defences along the Mareth line, Montgomery held a study week 
for new officers to learn from the more experienced frontline units. General Patton attended but 
many other Divisional Commanding Officers sent their Staff Officers instead.106 This may have 
showed that they felt more confident of their new doctrines, even though further combat 
experience would develop these more in the final assaults in Tunisia.  
Command and Intelligence 
Command and intelligence were key factors which directly affected operations for both sides in 
the campaign and some of the main issues will be discussed briefly here. The influence of Churchill 
on operations in North Africa has been widely debated in numerous studies as he interfered in 
many aspects of British operations. He often used raw decrypts from Ultra to make his decisions, 
pushed his commanders for action and sent them barrages of telegrams.107 He sacked Wavell after 
the failure at Battleaxe and Auchinleck for losing Tobruk, which was regarded as a political loss as 
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well as a heavy military defeat for the Eighth Army.108 Churchill’s harassment and sacking of 
successive CinCs and other Generals has diverted a proper analysis of their command abilities in 
the field.109  
The numerous changes in commanders prevented good working relationships in HQs, and a 
cumbersome command structure also contributed to problems in frontline operations, where 
multiple layers of bureaucracy often created slower reaction times. British commanders often 
operated from rear areas which slowed down reactions to fast moving situations, In June 1941 
Beresford-Pierce commanded from sixty miles behind the lines using poor radio equipment. Other 
commentators have argued that British failures were caused by weak British Command methods 
combined with signalling failures, whilst David French argues that the British command structure 
was too cumbersome and this exacerbated operational and tactical errors.110  
The impact of Intelligence  
In North Africa intelligence had a direct impact on operations and good quality intelligence was 
crucial to success for all levels of command and planning. Most notably it successfully directed the 
RAF onto Axis supply routes and this battle against the convoys was a major victory for the 
analysts.111 During the ground operations it contributed to tactical successes including the 
approach marches made during Compass and Crusader, the defensive preparations at Alam Halfa 
and Medenine and the preparations for Second Alamein. As Intelligence improved analysis of 
terrain became a standard part of all weekly reports to Army HQ. 
Ultra Intelligence provided partial information on Axis movements and unit strengths and was 
more useful for analysis as it was often out of date which meant some Army commanders were 
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reluctant to use it.112 The reports confirmed what actions had recently taken place rather than 
what was about to happen along with analysis of aircraft numbers and types.113 It was most 
effective in targeting Luftwaffe enigma, and by late March 1941 it had a breakdown of strengths 
and deployment of the Fliegerkorps in Libya.114 Delays were common because of the time taken to 
make an appreciation or analysis of the data from London. The volume of messages decoded daily 
averaged around 50 and increased to 250 per day by April 1941, meant there was a delay in 
getting information out to the Middle East.115  
Some operations were influenced by tactical intelligence failures and Commanders made errors 
because they lacked time to analyse the reports. Wavell admitted an error in his appreciation 
about Axis forces arriving in Cyrenaica, whilst in 1941 the 2nd Armoured Division HQ wrongly 
interpreted RAF reports which contributed to confusion during the First retreat. British 
commanders failed to note the arrival of 15th Panzer Division at the front during Battleaxe, and the 
Second Retreat from Cyrenaica in 1942 was famously blamed on Jock Whitely, the Eighth Army’s 
Intelligence Chief. The arrival of the Germans in Libya created a sudden increase of material to de-
cipher. Army codes relating to the Panzergruppe were broken occasionally from this time and not 
fully until later into May 1942. Analysts often needed time to develop the art of writing a coherent 
signal useful to commanders.116 Decrypts of Axis armour strengths on the Libyan border also 
contributed to Wavell ordering Operation ‘Brevity’ in mid-May. Army enigma was not broken until 
September 1941 and then only intermittently until April 1942 which gave an incomplete analysis 
of Axis plans.117  
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Initially air reconnaissance concentrated on the Italian Air Force but later provided intelligence for 
Operation Compass.118 Signals listening or ‘Y’ services had problems of using different methods of 
interception, analysis and interpretation. In early 1941 the Army Y service was struggling to 
understand German signals which used enigma and Italian units who had improved their signals 
security.119 During Crusader daily flights by the Strategic Reconnaissance Unit (SRU) spotted 
aircraft at each of the main Libyan airfields, ships at Benghazi and columns of motor transport 
(MET) on the main Cyrenaican roads. All of this information was sent back to the HQ as targets for 
fighter-bombers and Wellington night bombers.120 It had limitations though when in August 1942, 
despite good air superiority, the RAF could only offer reconnaissance flights for one Army Corps 
front because of limited fighter protection.121 By the following year the Wadi Akirit was monitored 
from mid-March by photo reconnaissance on a daily basis which provided the Eighth Army with 
effective intelligence on defensive positions.122 
Specialized units, principally the Long Range Desert Group or LRDG mapped large areas of the 
desert and possible routes for future operations. They carried out raids on Axis airfields and bases 
but their primary role was reconnaissance and from September 1941 they began the road-watch 
along the coast road west of El Agheila, which became one of the most useful long term 
intelligence sources for GHQ.123 Intelligence gathering was developed to include improving 
knowledge of the terrain as well as enemy units, so that it became a part of the weekly summaries 
at HQs. The local, tactical knowledge was better provided by the Y service, Reconnaissance and 
Forward OPs who constantly observed the Axis positions and noted their intentions more readily. 
Intelligence was vital but could not always guarantee success in battle, too often there were gaps 
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in the knowledge, or delays in communication, so that units had little information about enemy 
positions or strengths.  
Axis Command and Intelligence was directly influenced by the dynamic leadership of General 
Erwin Rommel, and successive Italian commanders found that he soon dominated operational 
control of the fighting. Italy showed its commitment to the campaign by bringing in General E. 
Bastico, in July 1941, however Rommel largely continued to ignore Italian orders if they disagreed 
with his own plans and he remained in a constant battle with them.124 Rommel was a maverick 
commander who constantly challenged the chain of command above him. In 1941 he convinced 
the Italian CinC General Gariboldi to give him full command of the frontline units and used his 
ambiguous orders to take advantage of the British halt at Agheila in 1941.125 Ultra decrypts noted 
orders from two different higher HQs by the end of May 1941 but could not read Rommel’s 
continual by-passing of them to Hitler.126  
At the operational level the doctrine of ‘Command by directive’ or Vollmacht, allowed 
commanders on the spot to use whatever forces were available to achieve their objectives. It was 
standard throughout the Army and explained Rommel’s style of command.127  In April 1941 Halder 
thought Rommel had ‘gone mad’ after his advance across Cyrenaica and the hasty attacks on 
Tobruk and British intelligence was often misled when they assumed that Rommel would obey 
orders. Rommel was physically and mentally tough and believed a commander should set an 
example to his men, often taking command of battle groups in action and making key decisions on 
the spot.128 His appearance at key points of the fighting often converted difficult situations into 
localized successes or stabilized disordered units. Rommel was an expert operational commander 
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who understood tactical situations and recognized defeat as well as success. He quickly called off 
the attacks at Alam Halfa and Medenine when he realized the strength of Allied forces opposing 
him. Barnett considers Rommel’s major strategic success was to turn the campaign from minor 
defensive role into a major land campaign that absorbed much of the British war effort in the early 
years.129 
Supply 
British strategy initially focussed on keeping Egypt as a base of operations to hold the Middle 
East.130 Some argue that the huge resources committed by Britain and later the USA were a key 
factor in the final Allied victory compared to the limited resources committed by the Axis.131 
However, even during Crusader and Gazala when the army was very well equipped, British forces 
failed to decisively defeat the Axis.  
The ports of Tobruk and Benghazi, along with their adjacent airfields, became the focus of British 
objectives in 1941 and 1942.  After the first British advance across the province, however, planners 
realised that units should not over-reach themselves logistically by advancing too far.132 Prior to 
Gazala, the Eighth Army assessed the coast road as the most viable route supply route forward 
saving over a day’s journey on the desert route. However, air attacks meant that the Mechili/Msus 
route or a journey by sea became preferable. Although Benghazi had a capacity of 45,000 tons per 
month, Luftwaffe raids made it particularly untenable for British units in spring 1941 and January 
1942. Tobruk had a capacity of about 40,000 tons per month, but realistically only unloaded 18-
20,000 tons. It was noted by the British as being the best deep water anchorage between 
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Alexandria and Tunisia although the port was found to be less than ideal because of the time lost 
by units collecting supplies from the scattered depots around the base.133  
The railway line to Mersa Matruh was another vital British supply route. It was extended to 
Belhamed for the Crusader offensive where it significantly aided British operations and an 
improved water supply was extended adjacent to the railway to enable operations for up to two 
Corps,134 which supplied water for both the locomotives and the troops.135 From the base depots 
distribution was transported to Field Supply Depots which developed into larger supply centres by 
1942.136 Frontline units needed large numbers of vehicles to move supplies. Infantry Divisions 
needed 3,700 vehicles at full strength, which meant a large administrative ‘tail’ of men and 
equipment to keep them moving. 
In the early phases of the campaign there was a lack of equipment, which reflected a delayed 
supply route from Britain and shortages at home. It took time to rebuild the depth of supplies 
required for British Forces to operate effectively.137 In the autumn of 1940 the 7th Armoured 
Division received fresh deliveries of tanks when London made a bold move by supplying half the 
remaining British home tank strength for Operation Compass. In 1940, Operation Compass was 
planned as a five day raid due to a supply shortage, and Wavell’s reluctance to start an offensive 
was partly because of a lack of equipment throughout the services.138  
By August 1942 the Eighth Army received 400 tanks, 500 guns, 7,000 vehicles and thousands of 
tons of supplies. Again a huge increase in tanks and equipment re-armed divisions, with armoured 
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strength increasing to 1,351 by the beginning of Operation Lightfoot. The Tunisian campaign was 
affected by the long supply routes which remained a problem until forward depots were built 
which enabled the Allies to complete the campaign. The numbers of troops and weight of material 
directly influenced operations in Tunisia, together with the stranglehold over the single supply 
route into Tunis. The Allied landings provided a new flow of equipment and reinforcements into 
North Africa. American planners chose ports further west to ensure safe supply ports but this 
arrangement added delays which impacted on the campaign for some months.  
RAF support  
Airpower ultimately provided an important role within the campaign but it took nearly three years 
to become fully effective. More information can be found in the detailed study of the 
effectiveness of the RAF by B.W. Gladman. However, his final conclusion, that RAF was the ‘single 
greatest factor in land power’ of victory is quite polemic and whilst acknowledging the importance 
of Air Power the assertion must be challenged.139 In the early phases of the campaign the RAF 202 
Group, under Air Commodore Collishaw worked well with General O’Connor but Collishaw had a 
simplistic approach to operations by insisting on squadrons making costly and repetitive daytime 
attacks, which reduced RAF strengths. The RAF inflicted damaging losses on the Italian Air Force, 
who lost over 1,200 aircraft in the first campaign into Libya.140 Once In Cyrenaica, the Group 
focussed upon attacking airbases, ports and on supply convoys on the coast road.  
In May 1941, Air Marshal Tedder became Air CinC and he began a period of reorganising and re-
building before the RAF could regain air superiority. Crusader was preceded by a massive air effort 
and during the offensive Coningham targeted communications first, then enemy airfields and 
lastly aimed to provide ground support for the Army, who still noted that the RAF was more visible 
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over the battlefield.141 In early 1942, the RAF was overstretched again covering the vulnerable 
forward position near Agedabia. Later during Gazala, Coningham wanted to concentrate on 
gaining air superiority and on attacks against Axis supply columns.  
By June 1942 the RAF was committed to round the clock support of the Army. However 
cooperation remained poor as Coningham’s HQ remained separate from Auchinleck on Ruweisat 
Ridge. From late August sorties were better targeted and more effective because of improved 
intelligence, and the RAF gained air superiority again. The intensity of air operations was increased 
dramatically during Alam Halfa, the number of sorties doubled by the end of the battle. General 
Bayerlein noted how the, ‘continuous and very heavy attacks of the RAF...pinned my troops to the 
ground and made impossible...any advance according to schedule’.142 These continuous air attacks 
forced Panzerarmee to retreat.  
From August 1942, the RAF became a central part of Eighth Army operations. The massed 
squadrons of medium bombers were a powerful force multiplier for the Eighth Army’s firepower 
while the fighter squadrons secured air superiority.143 Targeting and cooperation improved when 
Montgomery relocated his HQ adjacent to Coningham’s HQ at Burg-el-Arab and they found that 
larger strikes committed by an Army level HQ were more effective.144 Montgomery and Air 
Marshal Tedder differed on how the RAF would support the assault, Montgomery wanted it added 
to the preceding bombardment whilst Tedder wanted to ‘hammer’ the Axis positions for days 
beforehand.145 Air superiority enabled the RAF to repeat its successful tactics of round the clock 
sorties on vehicle concentrations and the retreating Panzerarmee after Second Alamein, carrying 
out over 1,600 sorties, mostly on retreating columns and shipping. 146  By 1943 the Allied 
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Mediterranean Air Forces were built up to achieve massive air superiority in Tunisia so that from 
then on Allied airpower became more effective in supporting ground forces and overwhelming the 
Luftwaffe. As more Allied Air Squadrons were deployed into Tunisia they impacted strongly on the 
final month of operations which was an important contribution to Allied victory.  
The impact of Malta 
Malta became one of the major, long term battles fought in the Mediterranean and was also a 
major part of naval operations. The island was a crucial forward base from which bombers, ships 
and submarines could damage the supply route to Libya, protected with powerful anti-aircraft 
defences around the port and airbases.147 The Royal Navy’s major role was to convoy supplies, 
personnel and aircraft to maintain it as a forward base for operations but its airspace was 
dominated by Axis bases in Sicily. The build-up of RAF strike forces in the autumn of 1941 caused 
Hitler to intervene again and he directed the Luftwaffe to reduce the island by air attack from 
January 1942. As the RAF Torpedo-bombers became more effective, Italian merchantmen called it 
the, ‘route of death’.148 The battle for Malta influenced the North African campaign in terms of 
planning by the Prime Minister, the COS and GHQ Cairo, who became pre-occupied with 
preventing the island being totally neutralized.  
The attacks from Malta on Axis supply lines certainly influenced the land campaign through Axis 
responses on a number of occasions during Crusader, Alam Halfa and Second Alamein. Churchill 
pushed Auchinleck for an immediate offensive to ease the pressure on Malta. Auchinleck and the 
Middle East Committee responded by questioning the how much Malta actually influenced Libyan 
supply routes and argued that even a limited offensive would not overcome the large numbers of 
Axis armour near the front.149 The Navy and RAF re-built the offensive strength in aircraft and 
                                                          
147
 Air Ministry, The Air Battle Of Malta. The Official Account (London: HMSO, 1944) p.60. 
148
 Lee Heide, Whispering Death. My Wartime Adventures (Oxford: Trafford Publishing, 2000) p.122. 
149
 CAB 66/24/26. Telegram from ME Defence Committee to War Cabinet, 9 May 1942, pp.1-2. 
199 
 
submarines so that Malta was resurgent from August, and took an increased toll of Axis shipping, 
which contributed to the defeat at Alamein. By 1943, the main target was the routes into Tunis-
Bizerte, working with powerful Allied Air Forces they closed the supply routes which contributed 
to their final surrender in May.  
Supply, RAF and Royal Naval factors: Conclusion 
The Fleet was mainly concerned with maintaining a strategic threat to the Italians, and dominating 
the Eastern Mediterranean, which protected British bases.150 The CinC Admiral, A.B. Cunningham, 
believed Malta was a vital part of the war against Italian convoys and had to defend itself. He 
wanted Malta to be fully operational with submarines, destroyers and aircraft by April 1941.151 The 
island became a key part of operations against the supply route to Tripoli. The island was still 
poorly equipped for air defence and vulnerable to blockade, despite its potential as a strike 
base.152 The Royal Navy also developed a vital role supplying the Army along the coast, especially 
to Tobruk during the siege and when the Army advanced across Cyrenaica. 
Conclusion 
The campaign in North Africa influenced British operations directly by other military factors. These 
include the development of doctrinal improvisation, the effect of command and intelligence 
issues, the impact of supply issues and the growth of support from the RAF and Royal Navy. This 
chapter has discussed some examples of their influence on the campaign. British units developed 
improvisations in their attack and defence doctrine and these were significant in affecting the 
outcome of operations. All of these factors have been the focus of numerous studies and make up 
the major part of the reasons for British success and failure within the historiography. The factors 
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of supply, airpower and naval support influenced the campaign, and in some instances were 
indirectly influenced by the terrain. The geography of the coastline dominated supply issues 
because the Army needed bases to advance or defend in Cyrenaica. RAF support for ground forces 
was overshadowed by the slower development of an effective airpower doctrine by the RAF. Air 
power also influenced strategy because of the need to control airfields to give air-cover to naval 
operations, which again meant that ground forces were required to capture the area and this 
became much more apparent in the final Tunisian battles. Royal Naval support was essential to 
maintain the Army along the Libyan coastline and at Tobruk throughout 1941. However it too had 
additional separate roles to interdict the Axis supply routes and the maintenance of Malta to 
contribute to the British campaign.  
  
Chapter 12 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to determine the impact of terrain and the related improvisation of tactical 
doctrine, on British Army operations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia from 1940-1943. The methodology 
included consulting a range of primary source documents from numerous UK Archives and an 
examination of the historiography. The primary material from battle reports, unit war diaries and 
soldiers’ personal papers provided evidence about the impact of terrain features and details of 
changes in improvised doctrine, and proved how much they affected British operations.  
The analysis of the geography and tactical terrain of the coastal sector included an assessment of 
how they affected the Army at the operational level. This included analysis of the way major ports 
and airfields influenced supply and planning for any advance into Libya. The main body of the 
thesis is then an analysis of the key terrain features at the tactical level. It also highlights the 
development of British doctrine, much of which was improvised throughout the campaign. The 
final chapter shows the impact of other military factors which affected operations directly and 
which previous studies usually regard as the major influences on the British Army. This study has 
clearly shown that the impact of the key features should now be assessed alongside these other 
military factors and discussed at the same level.  
Much of the historiography has ignored terrain or assumed that it was of little importance and 
focussed on other issues including changes to British doctrine, the impact of command and 
intelligence issues, supply problems and support from the RAF and Royal Navy. Whilst these were 
important factors, some commentators may have been diverted by published memoirs from 
soldiers including armoured crews, who problematized their combats against the Axis 
Battlegroups. Some studies have only applied to limited periods of the campaign, such as Jonathan 
Fennell’s work which covers the crisis of mid-1942. The analysis of certain battles has been 
202 
 
undertaken by Niall Barr, Jon Latimer and Bryn Hammond who all consider the Alamein battles in 
detail while the impact of RAF operations and Command and Intelligence issues have been 
assessed by Gladman and Ferris. 
The thesis should contribute to the growing discussion about the development of the ‘British way 
of fighting’ during the Second World War. This theme is currently a running in an ongoing debate 
amongst of British military researchers. It could be taken further with similar assessments of other 
British campaigns in other theatres of war, or more simply as a comparison of how effective 
different Divisions were in terms of tactical doctrine from mid-1943. 
At the operational level the geography of the coastal sector had an impact on British forces as they 
made repeated attempts to capture and hold Cyrenaica in Libya during 1941-42. This approach 
aimed to safeguard the security of Egypt, the Suez Canal and Alexandria from air attacks and to 
keep Axis ground forces from threatening Middle East oil resources. British forces were unable to 
retain control of the province partially because the Cyrenaican peninsula was too large to hold 
against a determined ground assault and partially because it was too close to Axis air bases in 
Tripolitania and Sicily. Operationally the scale of Cyrenaica made it a difficult region to defend. At 
the tactical level there were so few suitable defensive sites that commanders chose to over-
extend the frontlines.  This exacerbated the problem of having too few units to position along 
them. Behind the front, Brigade-Groups were deployed across widely separated sites in 1941 and 
1942 as part of the overall defence plan, but this left them isolated and vulnerable to better 
coordinated Axis offensives.  
The defence along the Gazala line was flawed on two levels. Operationally it was in the wrong 
place and some commanders such as Tuker argued for it to be further forward. Tactically it was 
undermined by a series of low ridges, against which the bulk of British armour was committed in 
piecemeal assaults, which aided the Axis operations. Cyrenaica was lost for a second time by the 
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British after trying to defend it from the Gazala position, because of the peninsula’s strategic 
airfields which protected convoys to Malta. Yet the position was lost tactically because too few 
ground units were trying to defend too many defensive positions and four key areas were lost at 
the southern end of the line.  
The attempt to hold the Axis at Matruh was a mistaken British operation as the entire position was 
undermined by the better going along the higher plateau above the escarpment. Consequently, 
the Eighth Army was forced back to the Alamein sector. The confused series of battles which 
constituted First Alamein were fought over the Ruweisat and Miteiriya ridges and the surrounding 
terrain features. The Alamein position has been the most well documented of the campaign, yet 
few of these accounts emphasize the nature of the terrain apart from the secure flank provided by 
the Qattara Depression. At Second Alamein the terrain was still a focal point for objectives and the 
British forces used new assault doctrines to target the key heights. The British pursuit was affected 
by the impact of terrain features along with the winter weather in 1943 and a difficult supply 
situation. Montgomery was hesitant and wanted to avoid repeating previous failures across the 
open Cyrenaica plain. He was also cautious when Axis forces halted at the stronger defensive sites, 
near Mersa Brega, Agheila and various sectors of high ground along the coast to Tripoli.  
During the final stages of the campaign the terrain had an even greater impact on British 
operations. The strength of the Mareth line forced fresh units to outflank the whole position. At 
the Wadi Akirit, considered by many to be the strongest defensive site in North Africa, British 
plans were altered to capture the key high ground.  Finally the high Enfidaville sector was a series 
of mountainous hills which proved too difficult to retain and the British were forced to change 
their approach towards Tunis and switch Divisions to the First Army front for the final assault. 
Planning here made the terrain an integral part of the operation which targeted all the high 
ground positions along the route to Tunis. 
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The landscape impacted on tactical doctrinal changes within unit dispersion which resulted in 
them moving in more open formations. These were actually the logical formation for much of the 
campaign but inflicted a different mind-set on commanders. The need to defend an extended 
frontline forced commanders to find new formations such as Jock Columns which best used the 
Artillery and Infantry. The improvised Jock Column tactics were undoubtedly successful at times, 
and caused attritional losses on Axis positions. They were used extensively from the early stages of 
the campaign and by Crusader, went onto the offensive after the British Armour had been 
depleted. Their widespread use on patrols continued well into 1942 but they remained weak and 
operated hit and run tactics which contributed to a ‘scarper’ mentality which affected most British 
formations following Axis breakthroughs. With Infantry Brigades dispersed into numerous Jock 
columns, the firepower of the Artillery Regiments were also dispersed, whilst the Infantry 
companies were too weak to make a formed assault.  
There were other problems with tactical doctrine, besides the problems of Jock Columns. The 
battles at Gazala and during the retreats from Cyrenaica of 1941 and 1942, all showed the 
continued separation of Armour, Artillery and Infantry at the tactical level. Support Groups fought 
separately from the Armoured Brigades they were meant to assist. Later at Gazala, the Infantry 
Tank Brigades were often diverted away from the Infantry units they were protecting in order to 
make isolated attacks. It took a lot more training time for armour to work well with Infantry 
battalions and there were still failures of coordination even by Second Alamein. British doctrine 
developed under Montgomery from late 1942. He developed a better-trained force for a specific 
operational assault to defeat the enemy.  
The battle of Second Alamein highlighted the Army’s new doctrine, which included night-time set-
piece assaults supported by massive artillery bombardments and air power to break the Axis 
defences. This was combined with increased RAF and Naval targeting of Axis petrol supplies from 
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June 1942 and contributed to the collapse of Axis forces and their long retreat back to Tunisia. The 
Eighth Army began to use these new assault doctrines which included concentrated artillery fire to 
support combined arms assaults. These became more effective at breaking into even stronger 
defences at Mareth, the Wadi Akirit and the final attacks on Tunis. The defensive doctrine which 
had been used at Alam Halfa was successfully employed again at Medenine in March 1943. Here 
the Army took full advantage of a series of low hills to support their defensive Artillery defensive 
fire and had learnt to fight without massed RAF support. The breakthrough at the Tebaga gap was 
the first major use of a planned assault supported by masses of ground attack aircraft and massed 
artillery to enable the armour to punch through the defensive positions. The Army doctrine now 
included a rapid assessment of the key terrain features which targeted the high ground and 
ensured they were captured first before the armour made a strong thrust along the main highway 
towards Tunis. 
Churchill influenced events with his continuous interference of planning decisions and new 
command appointments, while Intelligence gathering became a fundamental part of the Army’s 
planning process. HQs demanded increased knowledge of key terrain as the Army advanced into 
Tunisia and assault plans became flexible to adapt to the difficulties created by the more extreme 
landscape. The Naval attacks on Libyan supply routes and a new RAF doctrine affected the final 
stages of the campaign as the Allied Forces became highly effective in blocking supplies to Tunisia, 
and still provided massive air power to support 18th Army Group.  
The main argument of this thesis is that the key terrain features across the North African coastal 
sector, had an important effect on British Army operations. The secondary theme has been to 
consider the changes in tactical doctrine, many of which were improvised, and these changes were 
also linked to the impact of the tactical features of the landscape. The Army developed its doctrine 
until it had become a more effective fighting force by 1943.One participant made the simple 
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comment that, ‘because the desert was so…open the least rise or promontory or ridge became of 
great importance.’1 It was this overwhelming point that was a defining factor of British operations 
throughout the campaign.  
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Appendix 1British Army unit organisations. 
 
Infantry Battalions 
Four Infantry companies of 80-120 men, and one HQ company with supporting Mortar and 
machinegun platoons. 
Motor Infantry Battalions – Three Infantry Companies and one anti-tank company (16 guns). 
Armour Regiments 
Three line squadrons of 14-16 tanks each, and one HQ unit with Close Support vehicles 
Infantry or ‘I’ Tank Regiments – three squadrons of 17 tanks each and one HQ unit. 
Artillery Regiments 
Three batteries of 4-8 guns dependent on the calibre of the weapon 
Infantry / Motorised Infantry Brigades:  
Three battalions, plus support units  
Support units included anti-tank, Engineer, Artillery, Signals and supply units. 
Armoured Brigades 
Three Armoured Regiments and one Motor battalion 
Armoured Divisions 
Three Armoured Brigades, One Motor Infantry Brigade, plus support units of Artillery, 
Reconnaissance and Engineers. 
